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Abstract 
The thesis proposes a series of 'forgotten' aesthetic geometries that are 
retrieved from metaphysical philosophy. Organised into five chapters, the discussion 
identifies geometric methods and figures in a series of selected texts from 
Neoplatonic, post-Cartesian and Kantian thinking. 
Chapter I situates the argument in an examination of Kant's Critical 
philosophy and identifies two kinds of aesthetic and geometric procedure that are 
constructed in the first and third Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781/1787) Kant constructs geometry as both pure 'cognition' (i. e. as intuition) and 
sense-perception (i. e. space). In the Critique ofJudgment (1790), however, geometry 
is a procedure that is generated by the imagination and the reflective subject as a form 
of aesthetic judgment. Geometric procedure becomes, therefore, an aesthetic act of 
construction that reflects the irreducible unity of the thinldng subject and is 
reconfigured in relation to intuition, limit and unlimit, the soul, imagination and space 
and time. 
This discussion provides the context through which the aesthetic geometric 
methods and figures in the writings of Proclus, Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson are 
explored. 
Chapter 2 reveals the synthetic figure of the fold from Proclus' (410- 
485AD) procedure of 'unfolding' a divine geometry from Euclid's Elements. Chapter 
3 proposes an aesthetic 'comportment' that generates a 'passage' through Spinoza's 
geometric text, the Ethics (1677). Chapter 4 examines the analytic and aesthetic 
geometric figure of the 'plenum', which is constructed from an intensive corporeal 
and incorporeal magnitude in Leibniz's 'Monadology' (1714). Chapter 5 proposes 
that Bergson's text, Matter and Memory (1896), reinstates intuition as a 'natural 
geometry' or 'life' in the figure of the 'envelope'. 
The thesis explores, therefore, a geometric tradition in which Kantian 
aesthetics looks both backwards and forwards, and each method and figure represents 
a different 'recollection' of its potential. 
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Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations are used with reference to the main primary texts 
discussed in this thesis: 
APP 1. Kant, (1798), Anthrqpoloýyftom a Pragmatic Point of View. 
CDS 1. Kant, (1768), 'Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation 
of directions in space'. 
CE H. Bergson, (1907), Creative Evolution. 
CEE Proclus, (410-485AD), A Commentary on the First Book ofEuclid's 
Elements. 
c0i 1. Kant (1790), Critique ofJudgment 
CPR 1. Kant (1781/1787), Critique ofPure Reason. 
E B. Spinoza, (1677), Ethics. 
Im H. Bergson, (1903), 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. 
m G. W. Leibniz, (1714), Monadologv. 
A4m H. Bergson, (1896), Matter andMemory. 
7 
Introductio 
This thesis explores the construction of geometric methods and geometric 
figures in a series of philosophical writings in which geometry is expressed, not as 
scientific method, but as aesthetic procedures. It reveals these aesthetic procedures in 
the writings of Kant, Proclus, Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson. By examining the extent 
to which these philosophical texts are imbued with an aesthetic geometfic sensibility 
each text is shown to 'enact' a method and figure, which challenges the assumption 
that geometry constitutes only scientific forms (that is, finite, static and objective 
measurements of space), and demonstrates that each method and its figure constitutes 
an aesthetic procedure. ' 
The thesis is organised into five chapters, each of which examines a particular 
philosophical text. Two research questions direct the argument; first, what is the 
geometric method that is present in each text and, second, what is the figure that is 
produced by this method? In addition, Kant's concept of the aesthetic subject 
provides the pivot through which the aesthetic geometric methods are analysed. By 
situating the notion of the subject and geometiic method in this context the 
construction of geometric method and figure is revealed in a manner that challenges 
the association between geometry and linear thinking; first, by disrupting the 
chronological order of the texts that are examined and; second, by proposing a 
different notion of 'origin' through which to construct geometric thinking. 2 
The first chapter examines Kant's demonstration of geometry and aesthetics 
that are developed in his the Critique ofPure Reawn (1781/1787) and the Critique of 
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Judgment (1790). It proposes that in the Critique of Judgment Kant constructs a 
relationship between the technical enactments - that is, the act of drawing geometric 
figures - and the aesthetic subject. Developing ftom this definition of geometry as an 
aesthetic 'action' or procedure, the discussion suggests that an ontology of aesthetic 
geometric methods and figures can be traced from Kant's Critical writings both back 
to Proclus' commentary on Euclid's scientific geometric method and Spinoza and 
Leibniz's post-Cartesian philosophies, and forwards to Bergson's metaphysics of 
'duration'. The relationship between aesthetics and geometry is retrieved as an 
ontological concern in Neoplatonic philosophy, post-Cartesian philosophy and post- 
Kantian philosophy. 
In chapters 2,3,4 and 5 an individual text is analysed in order to define in 
what ways the aesthetic geometric method is constructed and how it operates. In 
addition, each chapter analyses the geometric figure that is prcduced by each 
respective method and, by examining geometry in the context of a Kantian concept of 
aesthetic construction, geometric figures such as the fold, passage, plenum or 
envelope, are also shown to be enactments of an aesthetic geometry, rather than 
diagrammatic objects of scientific or mathematical geometry. A more detailed outline 
of the chapters demonstrates the structure of each particular method and its 
respective figure that is constructed. 
The research methodology is initially structured in the context of Kant's 
writings on geometiy and aesthetics in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique 
ofJudgment. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
provides a definition of geometry in the form of two kinds of intuition. On the one 
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hand geometry is defined as a pure, transcendental intuition and, on the other hand, it 
is the formal appearance of the 'sense-intuitions' in the form of space (and time). 
Thus, although geometry is separated from the aesthetic nature of the sense 
intuitions, as well as space and time, it is nevertheless identified as being an intuition 
that constitutes a potential link between the sensible and transcendental realms that 
will be developed in the later Critique. Intuition, therefore, is explored here as an 
important aspect of the geometric method and, as will be shown in chapter 5, it 
provides a particularly vital connection between Kant and Bergson's engagement in 
geometry. 
In the Critique of Judgment Kant develops his notion of geometric intuition 
and the aesthetic powers of the reflective subject, in particular, in relation to the 
powers of the imagination. In the 'First Introduction', for example, we find that the 
relationship between geometry and aesthetics is generated through the geometric act 
of drawing out figures. In this respect, Kant suggests that the imagination 
encompasses the active and aesthetic aspect of georneuic method in its ability to 
represent an equivalent to the technical tools of constructing geometric figures (e. g. 
the compass and ruler). Kant's aesthetic subject provides a site through which 
geometry and aesthetics are re-engaged because the geometric method is embodied 
into the reflective subject's aesthetic powers of construction; geometry is 
constitutive of the internal powers of the reflective subject. An alternative model of 
geometric method is found, therefore, in the shift from the first to the third Critique 
in which the external and objective geometric element becomes developed into an 
intemal, subjective and aesthetic figure. 
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In addition, this chapter begins the re-engagernent of Kant's aesthetic 
geometry into a broader context of philosophy by exploring the geometric method 
that Plato provides in his dialogue, the Meno (380BC). In this text, Socrates and the 
slave-boy embody two aspects of the aesthetic geometry, that is, recollection and 
intuition. On the one hand, the boy represents the pure intuition of memory and, on 
the other hand, Socrates' enactment of drawing out the geometric figures, which the 
chapter suggests, previews Kant's 'technical' form of memory in the aesthetic power 
of the subject's imagination in the Critique ofJudgment. 
Chapter 1, therefore, begins the discussion by drawing out a thread of 
aesthetic geometry that can be traced between Plato's dialogue and Kant's Critiques, 
retrieving an alternative definition of geometry that exists prior to Euclid's 
paradigmatic mathematical geometric method of the Elements. It establishes the 
conditions of the aesthetic geometry as a constructive and technical enactment of 
memory (intuition) in which the geometric figure is both the embodied subject and the 
drawn fine of the geometric figure, representing an important shift from the external 
and objective method into the embodied subject. 
Chapter 2 considers the context of Classical geometry in more detail in its 
analysis of Proclus' Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements 
(410-485AD), suggesting that Proclus' examination of Euclid's scientific method is 
itself a version of this forgotten geometric method. Proclus' text reveals the 
Neoplatonic and Pythagorean definitions of geometry in the form of the 'unfolding' 
geometric method. In particular, it will be shown that the procedure of unfolding and 
its figures - the fold/unfold - provide a 'genetic' description of the discursive nature 
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of geometry. In addition, the method expresses the Stoics' divine notions of limit and 
unlimit that promote a continuous series of geometric figures. This discussion also 
explores the nature of the synthetic geometric method, which permits the production 
of discrete, differentiated figures. Limit is, therefore, derived from a synthetic 
ontology that, as will be shown below, will counter the analytic geometric method 
that chapter 4 suggests Leibniz develops in the Monadology (1714). For Proclus, 
however, the geometric method represents a divine and discursive demonstration 
through which the imagination and the soul are brought into harmony with the 
understanding. Discursivity, therefore, reconfigures the geometrical enactment of 
Plato's Meno and upholds the irreducible nature of the divine notions of limit and 
unlimit. 
in chapter 2 the geometric method is shown to be discursive, but is an 
exclusively cognitive act, disembodied from the subject. In chapter 3, however, we 
find that the notions of limit and unlimit are reconnected with the body and its affects 
in Spinoza's axiomatic text, the Ethics (1677). This text is structured following the 
scientific definitions of the geometric method and is informed by Descartes' 
development of an analytic procedure, but examines human emotions. Spinoza does 
not produce a geometric figure as such, since his purpose is to reveal the acts of the 
geometric method as an ethical process, rather than as a 'technical' procedure. It is 
suggested, therefore, that an analysis of the text itself reveals the geometric figure, 
that is, the 'passage' from understanding the subject to a 'perfect' understanding of 
God, This figure of the passage arises from examining the way in which the text 
demonstrates the changes of state in the body and its passions, which act out the 
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relationship between the divine infinity of God and the body's irreducible limits. In 
chapter 3, then, Proclus' idealised and divine notions of geometric figures become 
reconfigured into a series of embodied modes of subjectivity, in particular, through 
the powers of the emotions. In addition, Spinoza's geometric method is shown to be 
a synthetic and divine method that is also embodied within the powers of the subject. 
Chapter 4 provides a distinct version of this hidden geometry in an analytical 
form in Leibniz's Monadology (1714). This text provides perhaps the most intensive 
version of the notion of limit in this discussion because limit is not only an external 
geometric magnitude, but is intemally and qualitatively differentiated. in the Monad. 
Thus, the geometric figure represents notjust an embodied state, but one in which the 
notion of limit has been rationally, or intelligibly explained as an internal operation (in 
contrast to Spinoza's concern with the external expressions or affects). In addition, 
Leibniz's method and figures are generated from an intensification of an analytic 
understanding of the subject that, in contrast to Kant's, Proclus' and Spinoza's 
thinking, is powerful precisely because of its emphasis on limit as an aspect of 
unlimit. Geometric limit and unlimit are redefined, therefore, in terms of infinite 
divisibility, in particular, dirough the notion of 'incorporeal magnitude'. Such an 
approach means that a number of geometric figures are generated, including the 
'plenum'. a geometrical figure that embodies both the intemal differentiation of the 
Monad and its continuity with the infinite divisibility of the world. 
This leads, finally, to chapter 5 in which Bergson's text Matter and Memory 
(1896) is shown to reject the notion of limit and the imagination in the reformulation 
of a distinct set of metaphysical relations that reflect the psychical and physical 
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conditions of the active subject. Geometry becomes re-invigorated with its sense- 
perceptions in the form of memory and intuition. In contrast to the Critique of Pure 
Reavon, however, Bergson insists that intuition is formatively concerned with the 
thinking, living subject. Bergson considers the figure of the 'envelope' to be the site 
through which the body acts out the intuitive spatial actions of geometry. In this final 
chapter, therefore, the initial image of Socrates' drawing and the boy recollecting the 
geometric figure is redrawn by Bergson into a topological relationship between the 
internal psychical activities of the subject and its perception of the external world. 
The conclusion reminds the reader of the research questions of this thesis and 
provides a summary of the different versions of the aesthetic geometric method, 
drawing out key distinctions between each text. Briefly, it also points towards 
further research that might be developed in relation to these methods and figures; in 
particular, a revision of feminist and architectural models of spatio-temporal relations 
and the notion of 'figuration' in modernist art practices (see the note below). 
Contextual not 
Ihis research project beganftom a concern with the definitions of geometry in 
recent Anglo-American Modernist art history, and was an attempt to reflect my 
previous education and research in art history andphilosophy. 
In the context of Modernist art history, geometry has been considered to be a 
problematic system of representation that is understood as being either representative 
of the a priori idea or the a posteriori object or process; for example, in the debates 
about Formalist painting and Minimalism between Michael Fried and Rosalind 
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Krauss. Ihe research began, therefore, by evaluating examples of this problem in the 
context of Kant's notion of 'aesthefic' and found that Fried and Krauss relied upon 
notions of aesthetic in which geometry was either, exclusively, a notion of pure 
intuition (e. g. Michael Fried, 'Shape as Form' in Art and Objecthood: Essays and 
Reviews, 1998), or a sense-intuition (e. g. Rosalind Krauss, Passages in Modern 
Sculpture, 1993). In each case, geometry is consigned to a position of a limited 
aesthetic value. 
Having attempted to define the problems of geometty in art historical 
discourse, the research turned to examine models of geometric method as they are 
found in philosophical discourse in order to re-assess the nature of geometry as an 
aesthetic concern. In addition, the second element of the research was an attempt to 
reconsider the notion of geometty and its figures in the practices of Modernist art 
works. Aese included; a conceptual art-work, Duchamp's readymade, Bicycle 
Wheel (1913); a formalist painting, Frank Stella's Moultonboro 111 (1966); and a 
time-based installation, Tall Ships (1992), by Gary Hill. Early chapters of the 
research attempted to bring a philosophical geometric method into dialogue with one 
of the above art works; for exwnple, it suggested that Duchamp's practice was 
pseudo-axiomatic and represented a kind of 'unfolding' in relation to Proclus ý figure 
of thefold. It became increasingly clear during this period, however, that the attempt 
to bring together the philosophical method and the art practice failed to produce a 
satisfactory analysis of the art work; rather than the art works being 'adequate' 
figures of the geometric method they became hand-maidens to the philosophical ideas. 
It also became apparent, that the scope for geometric figures to be revealed in 
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Modernist art works was a project that should take place after a clear understanding 
of how the notion of the geometricfigure operates in a philosophical context. 
As a result, the research became concerned with the discussions outlined in the 
introduction; first, by considering the extent to which the aesthetic nature of the 
philosophical geometric methods generated a series of unique and under-researched 
figures that, in themselves, provided a stronger demonstration of the scope of 
aesthetic geometric methods than attempting to use art works as demonstrations of 
the methods and; second, by examining the extent to which Kant's 'aesthetic' could 
reconfigure discussions about geometry in Neoplalonic, post-Cartesian and post- 
Kantianphilosophy. 
The reader should note that this thesis also reflects some of the discussions 
about geometry and aesthetics that Gilles Deleuze's writing has revealed in the 
history ofwestern philosophy; for example, his interest in Proclus' and Leibnizs fold 
in The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque (2001 [19881) and his writing about Spinoza's 
affirmation ofsubstance in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988 [19701). In a"tion, 
the texts Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1997 [19681), Difference and 
Repetition (1997 [1968]) and Bergsonism (1991 [1966]) also demonstrate 
'geometric' thinking. Following Deleuze's rigorous engagement in these discussions 
this thesis is, therefore, informed by his interest in retrieving forgotten' ontologies 
from western philosophy. ' 
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Chapter 1: Drawing figures 
In this chapter geometry and aesthetics are defined through Kant's Critical 
philosophy. It will be shown that Kant's first and third Critiques propose two 
different kinds of geometry and aesthetic. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), geometry is considered to be an ideal 
knowledge or cognition that is commensurate with the higher realms of a 
transcendental intuition or aesthetic. Kant tells us that we are able to have access to 
this cognition in the sense world, but only by means of the sense-intuitions, space 
and time, which represent the phenomenal forms of the transcendental intuition. In 
the Critique ofPure Reason, therefore, pure geometry is inaccessible to our embodied 
experiences of space and time; its origins in the metaphysical realms of the immaterial 
and unextended thought cause it to be at odds with the extended, material and 
'inadequate' phenomena of space and time in the world. 
In the Critique of Judgment (1790), however, a different notion of geometry 
and aesthetic is generated in which this divide disappears and a continuity of relations 
is suggested between the external, transcendental and 'pure' geometric space and the 
embodied, reflective subject that brings geometry into a heterogeneous continuum of 
spatio-temporal relations. Here, transcendental geometry is transformed into the 
mental, sensory and bodily actions of the subject in the form of aesthetic judgment 
and the actions of the imagination. Transcendental and empirical forms of geometry, 
therefore, become connected in the aesthetic acts of the reflective subject. 
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The chapter begins by examining the construction of geometry, space and 
time in Kant's first and third Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's 
examination of these relations is an aspect of his analysis of intuition in the form of 
'synthetic a priori judgments'. In the Critique of Juckment geometry, space and time 
are brought together under the powers of 'reflective judgment'. A 'forgotten' 
geometric method and figure is therefore reanimated in this discussion. The acting, 
aesthetic subject of the third Critique represents an important 'recollection' of the 
scope of the geometric method in metaphysical philosophy so that, in the following 
chapters, the discussion considers Kant's geometric constructions in relation to the 
geometries of other 'aesthetic' geometries; Proclus' Neoplatonic philosophy, the 
post-Cartesian philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz, and Bergson's ontology of 
durafion. 
Bridging the shift from the external, spatial geometry of the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the internal, aesthefic geometry of the Critique of Judgment the argument 
also draws from Kant's earlier essay 'Concerning the ultimate ground of the 
differentiation of directions in space' (1768). In addition, the notion of a productive 
imagination is shown to be important in Kant's later studies of the human subject in 
Ihe Anthropology ftom a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), adding weight to the 
suggestion that Kant's reflective subject is an example of the 'forgotten' aesthetic 
geometry. 
The second part of the chapter then draws out Kant's aesthefic geometric 
figure in relation to Plato's discussion about geometry, memory and intuition in the 
Meno (380BC), demonstrating that Kant's reflective subject can be linked back to 
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Plato's discussions about the geometric method, recollection and drawing. The Meno, 
therefore, is seen to present an aesthetic geometry in two accompanying forms; first, 
as 'recollection' or memory, and second, in the aesthetic act of drawing. Plato 
attributes these forms to two human figures, the slave-boy and Socrates; on the one 
hand, the slave-boy embodies an intuitive understanding of geometry that unfolds, 
and on the other hand, Socrates who draws geometric figures in the sand. Geometry is 
constructed both as a mental activity and in the actions of the body; it is both 
extended and unextended, logical and aesthetic, ideal and particular. The subject's 
capacity for constiucting heterogeneous and aesthetic geomeuic figures is therefore 
posited in preparation towards an examination of specific geometric figures in the 
following chapters. As a result, this chapter will also consider some of the principle 
constituents of the geometric method that construct the analysis in the following 
chapters; intuition, spatio-temporal relations, unextended and extended matter, the 
imagination and the soul, and the Stoics' notions of limit and unlimit. 
So, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant posits a relationship between the 
science of geometiy and space in the form of intuition, or a priori judgments. 
Geometry represents an interme&wy knowledge, i. e. it is pure, unextended intuition 
in a mathematical fonn. Intuition, however, is also present in the 'sense-intuitions' of 
space and time. Kant tells us that space is the form of our experience as an 'outer 
sense' and time is 'inner sense'. Intuition is, therefore, both a pure, absolute 
knowledge, such as geometry, and a fonn of our sensibility, that is, space and time. 
As intuitions, geometry, space and time are therefore a priori and necessary and 
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irreducible to simple concepts or ideas. Space and time, however, are limited to the 
status of 'phenomena', because they are merely fornis of appearances, rather than 
4pure intuition' itself They are generated out of the extended world of bodies and 
ideas. Geometry, on the other hand, may be extended bodies or ideas, but it is also 
immaterial and unextended (i. e. pure). Space and time, therefore, always represent 
formal and extended manifestations of Kant's notion of intuition and, as a result, they 
are prevented from having a continuous relationship with the higher realms of 
unextended intuition and pure geometiy. 
As we will see below, it is only when these sense-intuitions become properly 
embodied in the reflective subject in the Critique ofJu, *ment that this link is remade, 
i. e. spatio-temporal relations become a priori and 'real' intuitions. The 'limit' 
between the transcendental ideas and the sensed forms are brought together to form a 
different unity in the Critique of Judgment. Here, the relationship between the 
abstract science - i. e. geometry - and the sense intuitions are unified in the reflective 
subject, in particular, as a result of the productive powers of the imagination. ' 
In the Critique of Judgment, therefore, a more productive development of 
intuition is generated in the form of the reflective subject in which experience is 
examined, not as a form of reason, but as aesthetic judgment. Geometry and 
sensibility become linked through a different concept of limit in particular, in the 
form of the imagination, in which different geometric figures are generated from 
within the subject, not determined by an external law of formal classification. It is, for 
example, a notion of limit that is felt in the movement between the pleasure and 
displeasure of experiencing the limit of the imagination's attempt to understand the 
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sublime. Thus, the transcendental aesthetic, i. e. the critique of non-conceptual forms 
of understanding, is reconfigured into the aesthetic experiences of the reflective 
subject. The two, divided forms of intuition that are posited in the first Critique are 
brought together into an active and speculative aesthetic power in the third Critique, 
in part, through the faculty of the imagination. 
Kant's promotion of the synthetic, a priori difference carries with it, 
however, a number of consequences that are significant aspects of the geometric 
method, especially, the relationship between notions of limit and unlimit. For Kant, 
the emphasis on the 'formal' limits of space and time is a problematic example of 
these relations. In addition, although the imagination is a productive power, it 
nevertheless remains tied to the notions of limit as a form of mathematical division 
and its converse, that is, unlimit as an excessive operation; rather than the promotion 
of the imagination as a form of the sensibility in a 'genetic' understanding, through 
which the imagination provides an immanent connection between the subject and the 
natural world. In the subsequent chapters, however, it Will be demonstrated how 
notions of intuition and geometry construct aesthetic geometries in which there is a 
continuity of intermediary states (or figures) between pure intuition and absolute 
geometry and their embodied manifestations; for example, Leibniz and Bergson's 
notions of perception. First, however, it is necessary to examine the transition in 
Kant's construction of aesthetic intuition, from the first Critique to its manifestation 
in the reflective subject, in more detail. 
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Forms of pure intuifi 
in the CPR, Kant brings together scientific cognition (geometry) and forms of 
the sensibility (sPace and time) under the same doctrine, that is, in the notion of 
4 aesthetic'. 2 In a note to the 'First Part of the Aesthetic' (second edition, 1787), Kant 
defines the term 'aesthetic' based upon Baumgar-ten's definition that aesthetics is the 
'critique of taste'. But, he notes, that Baumgarten's efforts to bring the beautiful 
under the premise of 'reason' remain limited because its concepts can only be 
generated from a posteriori evidence. Instead, Kant argues that 'speculative 
philosophy' requires that sensibility is not merely determined by a posteriori 
- 'or else empirical evidence but is examined as a transcendental condition. He writes, 
share the term with speculative philosophy and take aesthetics partly in a 
transcendental meaning, partly in a psychological meaning' (CPR: A21/B35,173). 
As a result the sensibilities of space and time constitute extended and 
empirical experience but are also considered to be a priori propositions. In the CPR 
sensibility is therefore examined under its conditions of its extended, a priori forms, 
the intuifions of space and time: later, in the Co. J Kant will examine its forms of 
feeling pleasure and displeasure, again, not as a posteriori conditions but as a priori 
condificms. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic of the CPR defines the elements of a 
C speculative philosophy' that are generated in cognition. Geometry, space and time 
are linked by their relationship to intuition. Each 'element' is evidence, therefore, of 
synthetic a priori judgments. Kant demonstrates the relationship between the 
metaphysical conditions of expefience and the scientific forms of these intuitions and 
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suggests, in particular, that mathematics is a paradigm of 'pure' reason that is a 
priori, yet confirmed by empirical experience: 
Mathematics gives us a splendid example how far we can go with a 
priori cognition independently of experience. Now it is occupied, to 
be sure, with objects and cognitions only so far as these can be 
exhibited in intuition. This circumstance, however, is easily 
overlooked, since the intuition in question can itself be given a priori, 
and thus can hardly be distinguished from a mere pure concept (CPR: 
A5/B9,129). 
But in a section titled, 'Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space', 
in the second edition, Kant emphasises that it is intuition through which the 
relationship between geometry and space is primarily constituted, not mathematics; 
'[g]eometiy is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet 
a priori. What, then, must the representation of space be for such a cognition of it to 
be possibleT Kant tells us it must 'oliginally be intuition' (CPR: B41,176). 
Synthetic and analytic relafions 
Kant's examination of the forms of experience begins with the proposition 
that knowledge is possible in two forms; theoretical or empirical cognition (CPR: B2, 
132). These two forms of knowledge demarcate the division between the pure, 
analytic a priori knowledge that is determined by pure reason (i. e. unextended 
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matter), and the empirical, synthetic a posteriori knowledge that is determined by 
sensory experience (i. e. extended matter). 
These two levels of knowledge, however, are mediated by a third kind of 
judgment that is a priori but is also determined by knowledge 'borrowed' from 
experience. This third, intermediate category of knowledge is the synthetic a priori, 
found in forms of reason in which universal truths are proven by both unextended and 
extended concepts, such as geometry and arithmetic; for example, Kant tells us that 
the necessary and universal elements of a triangle - i. e. its three angles combine to 
form 1800 - can be determined both by a geometric method (unextended ideas) and 
by experience (extended diagrams or figures) (CPR: B9,140). 
Geometry, therefore, is a heterogeneous form of knowledge, insofar as it is 
constituted by both unextended and extended matter, delivering its objects in both an 
a priori and a posteriori form. Kant explains the nature of this formation in the 
sciences (such as, geometry, philosophy or the 'critique of pure reason'), in which 
judgments are generated through a particular 'method' of construction that attaches 
'given concepts' to others 'completely foreign to them'. These attachments, he 
continues, are called analytic or synthetic judgments and express two distinct kinds of 
relafions or unifies between the subject and predicate (CPR: A7/ B 11,130). As we 
will see in the following chapters, the nature of analytic and synthetic relations is a 
key discussion in each of the methods. In the CPJý however, Kant defines the 
judgments as follows; an analytic judgment defines an agreement between the two 
parts, e. g. B belongs to A, which describes what is already contained in the 
constituent parts. Analytic judgment is, therefore, determined by identity or similarity 
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because B does not introduce any contradiction into the relationship, but is 
legitimised by virtue of its agreement with A. ' The principle of contradiction, 
therefore, determines Kant's definition. In contrast, we will find Leibniz construct a 
quite different notion of 'analyfic' judgment in chapter 4, in which the principle of 
contradiction is transformed into a relation of infinity constituted by intensities or 
magnitudes that are differentiated intemally. For Leibniz, analytic judgment, 
therefore, is not reducible to a self-same notion of identity in the manner that Kant 
attributes to it. 
For Kant, however, heterogeneity is generated in the externally designated 
difference of synthetic judgments. A synthetic judgment, Kant writes, is 'ampliative' 
in which independent concepts are linked through a 'synthetic combination of 
intuitions'. Synthetic judgments record a non-contradictory relationship in which the 
principle of agreement is not the primary means of legitimating the relationship, i. e. if 
A is not self-similar to B, the judgment does not become invalid. Instead, the 
relationship is a manifestation of the operation that brings the subject and predicate 
together. Hence, synthetic a priori judgments propose a relationship between A and 
B, not through an additional empirical experience, but in the form of an external or 
'pure' mode of knowledge. (In chapters 2,3 and 5 we will see that Proclus, Spinoza 
and Bergson also advocate synthetic judgments). 
So, Kant tells us that judgments of experience are synthetic, since experience 
is itself a 'synthetic combination of intuitions'; for example, an extended body is 
understood to be synthetic if the external predicate of weight is taken into account 
(CPR: A9/B13,142). Mathematics is also synthetic a priori because each of its forms 
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(geometry and arithmetic) requires an external intuition in order to function. In 
arithmetic; for example, the introduction of an additional operation (e. g. addition, 
subtraction or the multiplication of numbers) is required in order to produce the 
relation between elements; and in geometry, two points are related to each other as a 
result of considering their relationship by means of the direction or length of the line 
between them. In each case, therefore, an external function or relationship is 
intrcduced (CPR: B16,144). 
Thus space and time are synthetic a priori judgments because each is 
necessarily determined by an extemal intuition, that is, geometry or arithmetic, 
respectively. In addition, when these judgments take the form of geometry they 
represent a distinct class of knowledge that is 'intermediary' to the unextended, pure 
a priori analytic judgments and the extended, apriori and synthetic judgments. Kant, 
therefore, constitutes a notion of formal difference and unity (e. g. the geometric 
figure) that is produced by external operations. As a result, although constructive 
towards a certain kind of difference, this emphasis on the external and formal 
attribution of difference produces a number of problems to thinking about time and 
space that are challenged by the other methods in this thesis, and which Kant himself 
transforms into internal operations (or powers) in the third Critique. 
Space and fim 
Kant describes space as an 'outer sense' that is 'a property of our mind', 
through which we describe our relationship to the external world. Space determines 
the magaitude of forms of appearance and the relationship between entities. Time 
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represents the internal determination of our experiences, that is our experience of our 
'inner sense', i. e. our 'soul' (CPR: A23/B38,157). Space and time, then, are 
cognitions that are derived from our experience, distinct from concepts, yet producing 
valid phenomenal understandings of our sensory experience of the external world and 
our internal experiences. Nor are they reducible to a posteriori or empirical concepts, 
instead they provide the 'ground' through which different places or events can be 
understood simultaneously or successively. 
Kant tells us that space is a metaphysical necessity; 'the condition of the 
possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent upon them, and is an a 
priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances' (CPR: A24/B39, 
158). As a result, its necessity provides the possibility for mathematics, in particular, 
geometry, for if it were a posteriori, 'the first principles of mathematical 
deterinination would be nothing but perceptions' (CPR: A24/B39,158). Spatial 
intuition, therefore, confirms the purity of geometric intuition, highlighting, perhaps, 
one of the major problems of Kant's theory of experience, which is an over-arching 
harmony that is required between the scientific and the metaphysical orders; a 
harmony which we will find Bergson criticising for its deeply-seated symbolic value, 
rather than registering a relationship of continuity, change or transfonnation. 
Space, then, is not an idea or category; it is not a 'general concept of relations 
of things in general, but a pure intuition' (CPR: A25/B39,158). Space is legitimate 
insofar as it determines the subject's relationship to other extended entities, but it 
does not account for the internal sense 'from the human standpoint' or the 
'subjective condition': 
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Space is nothing other than merely the fonn of all appearances of 
outer sense, i. e. the subjective condition of sensibility, under which 
alone outer sense is possible to us (CPR: A26/B42,159). 
Thus, Kant writes that space is the form of our sensibility, which produces 
ccorrelates' of 'things in themselves' in the form of the appearances of external 
objects, but the sensibility remains unable to 'cognize the transcendental in 
experience' (CPR: A42/B60,168). 
Like space, time is a sense-intuition of our sensibility. It is 'the form of inner 
sense, i. e. of the intuition of our self and our inner state' (CPR: A33/B50,163). But it 
is also 'the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general', in contrast to 
space that is 'the pure form of all outer intuitions' (CPR: A34/B51,163). Despite 
time being a pure intuition and, therefore, defined as synthetic a priori, Kant 
distinguishes between it and space. It is a 'general' condition for the internal sense, 
but it is also the basis for 'all actuality of appearances possible' suggesting a 
relationship to external sense (CPR: A3 I/B47,162). It is only time, therefore, which 
has a relationship to both internal and external sense-intuition and, as we shall see in 
the following chapters on the fold, passage, plenum and envelope, the scope for this 
connection between the internal and external forms of sense-intuition is a primary 
concern in this thesis. 
Kant's insistence upon the formal limits of space and time, however, prevents 
the (genetic or discursive) continuity of this relationship from being acknowledged, 
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for example, in the 'Elucidation on Time', the formal definition of limit in 
differentiating space and time can be seen in the following passage: 
Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which 
different synthetic cognitions can be drawn a priori, of which 
especially pure mathematics in regard to the conditions of space and 
its relations provides a splendid example. Both taken together are, 
namely the pure forms of all sensible intuitions, and thereby make 
possible synthetic a priori propositions. But these a priori sources of 
cognifion determine their own boundaries by that veryfact [ ... j namely 
that they apply to objects only so far as they are considered as 
appearances, but do not present things in themselves (CPR: A39/B56, 
166) [my emphasis]. 
Kant's notion of different sense-intuitions promotes a qualitative distinction 
between space and time, and synthetic a priori judgments; however, this is at the 
expense of the continuity of their relationship between internal and external sense, 
which is determined by the application of external and finite limits of form so that, 
under these over-arching terms, geometric space is an extended 'image', cut off from 
the pure intuition of unextended matter. A 'discursivity' between 'pure' geometry, 
and geometric space and time is abruptly cut off. In contrast, we will find that 
Bergson's notion of the 'image' is a highly discursive idea, in both its extended and 
unextended forms. Kant's notion of formal limit, however, which is generated out of 
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the synthetic a priori underwrites a highly problematic notion of limit that is 
determined by the division between the sensibility and reason. 
So, space and time represent modes of knowledge as intuitions, that is, a 
priori, necessary and universal fonns of cognition through which we understand the 
world around us. They are products of the sensibility through which we are affected 
by objects external to us; the means by which we experience the world. Produced by 
the sensibility, intuitions are brought into harmony by the categories of 
understanding and in this order they become understood as concepts, under the 
category of form. Thus, insofar as space and time are forms of appearance, the 
sensory world is linked to absolute intuition. But, Kant insists that space and time 
are only appearances, or fonns of our experience, not pure intuition in itself, 
registering that the relationship between geometric intuition and spatio-temporal 
intuition is determined by an exclusively formal and external limit that divides the 
powers of presentation of the sense-intuitions and the powers of a transcendental 
geometry. 
In the section below, however, we will see that that Kant considered a more 
discursive relationship between geometry, space and time in an earlier text, in which 
geometric spatio-temporal relations are constituted in the subject as a series of 
heterogeneous embodiments. 
Extemal and intemal differenfiations of sl2ac 
In the earlier essay 'Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of 
directions in space' (1768), Kant challenges Leibniz's proposition that it is 
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magnitude, not position, that provides the means by which space is differentiated 
into different parts. 4 Kant contests that magnitude is the 'ground' for determining 
relations in space suggesting, instead, that it is 'direction' that provides the 'ground' 
for the differentiation of space. Direction, Kant tells us, 'orientates' the parts of 
5 
space and 'refers to the space outside the thing' (CDS: 2,378/365). Kant wishes to 
show that 'absolute space' has 'a reality of its own', and he proceeds to prove this b 
emphasising its three-dimensionality that is derived from our sensible understanding 
of other bodies in relation to our own corporeality (CDS: 2,379/367). 
Internal and external space, therefore, are generated as aspects of direction 
which is understood both externally and internally; the notion of position, in 
contrast, does not sustain the proof of a continuous and unified reality. When 
direction is considered within the context of an embodied condition, however, a real 
set of differences can be identified; for example, our sense of direction has a 
relationship with the spatial construction of our bodies as left or right orientated 
(which will be posited by Bergson as an aspect of 'life' in his method in chapter 5). 
Kant identifies various examples of different directions of growth in nature - hurnan 
hair, snail shells, bean's growth, the direction of winds according to the lunar cycle 
and observations of the movements of the south seas - which point to an internal 
concept of direction in an individual entity and direction as a universal, external 
principle of nature (CDS: 2,380/368). A continuity between internal and external 
space in the natural world is, therefore, suggested. 
Furthermore, this is a condition linked to the perceptions and the aesthetic 
sensibility of the subject, in which 'an immediate connection between feeling and the 
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mechanical organisation of the human body' are brought together. As a result, 'clear 
feelings' of difference between the sensory and mechanical attributes of the left and 
right sides of the body distinguish the particularity of the body despite the apparent 
'great external similarity' (CDS: 2,381/369). In this essay, spatial direction is, 
therefore, an aesthetic aspect of our sense-intuition. 
Kant also tells us that differences discerned between entities or objects need 
to be understood in relation to 'universal absolute space, as it is conceived by 
geometers'. In order to make this step, Kant reintroduces the concept of planes, lines 
and surfaces through which corporeal bodies can be understood to be similar or 
different. Thus, through this mode, apparently incongruent aspects of bodies or 
unrelated bodies can be made to appear similar depending upon their relationship on a 
single plane; for example, despite the impossibility of the surface of one being 
transferable onto the other, the left and right hand can be viewed as 'similar and equal 
and yet incongruent' (CDS: 2,382/370). 
In this discussion, therefore, geometric intuition connects a series of synthetic 
and intermediate states of nature or different extended bodies to suggest a more 
discursive or genetic relationship between entities. In addition, direction produces 
both the internal spatial specificity of an embodied entity and its relation with the 
general order. Space, then, can be both similar and incongruent, derived from both an 
extended body or from the unextended principles of absolute space. 'Inner 
differences' are founded upon the difference of position between one aspect of an 
entity to another, e. g. the different positions of the right and left hands, yet are also 
related to absolute space. In absolute space they are 'true differences' determined by 
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the specific constitution of the body. Absolute space, therefore, is not constructed 
externally of our sensory perception, but is a 'fundamental concept', which grounds 
any outer concept perception which we might have (CDS: 2,383/371). Thus, space 
is both extended as part of the corporeal body, and unextended in the form of 
absolute space. 
In this essay, therefore, space is less clearly drawn as an exclusively external, 
synthetic a priori cognition; rather, its determination as a confinuity of relations 
between the internal incongruence and the external congruence of a body suggests a 
notion of space that is constituted by distinct 'figures' in a discursive order. This 
indication of a discursive continuum of spatio-ternporal relations is important here, 
since it will be identified as a significant aspect of the geometric methods of Proclus, 
Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson. 
So, Kant's examination of direction proposes a notion of spatial 'intuition' in 
which the subject produces space both in absolute and particular terms; a connection 
that in the CPR is removed. But, as is shown below, it is found in the aesthetic 
subject of the Critique of Judgment when space is understood in relation to the 
thinking body, i. e., when it is confirmed as an internally produced intuition, it is not 
reducible to an externally derived form. Instead, Kant emphasises the irreducible 
difference of the subject in terms of both external and internal space, once again 
offering the scope for a more discursive set of relations. As has been shown above, 
however, Kant does not sustain this line of inquiry in the CPR since the body is 
reducible to its a priori condition as formal appearance or extension. In this earlier 
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essay that precedes the CPR, however, space is not, exclusively, an externally 
produced and fonnal appearance of pure intuition. 6 
Acts of constructio 
If we turn to the conceptualisation of geometry and spatio-temporal relations 
in the Critique of Judgment we find that this embodied spatial intuition is 
reformulated to be an aspect of the reflective subject. In particular, in the role of the 
imagination as an intensive kind of limit in which the sensibility is given access to 
4pure' intuition, not through a formal series of appearances, but through the feelings 
of pleasure and displeasure. Here, Kant emphasises the activities of the imaginafion 
as a form of the reflective judgment in the production of concepts of nature as art. 
The imagination is an aspect of the embodied subject that is examined in terms of its 
powers of enactment. Geometry, therefore, is considered not an objective, cognitive 
knowledge but as a technical procedure that is brought about through the powers of 
the imagination. 
Kant defines judgment as 'the ability to subsume the particular under the 
universal'. Reason, in contrast is the 'ability to determine the particular through the 
universal' (Co. J. 202'). Mediating 'the connection [zusammenhang] between the 
understanding and reason' judgment produces a unique kind of concept, that is, 'the 
concept of nature as art'. It is therefore 'the concept of the technic ofnature regarding 
its particular [besonder] laws' (CoJ. 203'-204'/392-393). Thus, as we shall see in 
the discussion that follows, the ability to judge is detennined by an aesthetic relation 
in which geometry, as a scientific or absolute intuition becomes understood in terms 
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of its nature as a 'technical' or artistic condition. This is examined, in particular, in 
relation to the capacities of the imagination, which provides one of many routes of 
connection between a judgment and its objects in the CoLf (and, as will be shown 
below, in the later text, the Anthropologyftom a Pragmatic Point of View, 1798). So, 
whilst the products of the imagination may not be as 'adequate' as the 
understanding's concepts and its powers remain restricted by the necessity that it 
agrees with the powers of the understanding, it is nevertheless seen to be a 
productive faculty of cognition towards an artistic or technical understanding of 
geometry. 
The link between the productive imagination and geometry is found, in 
particular, in a 'Comment' to the First Introduction of the CoJ in which Kant 
distinguishes between the theoretical and practical parts of the critical philosophy. 
Here, the harmony between the imagination and the understanding are brought 
together in the construction of geometric figures. Kant writes that the imagination's 
capacity to 'produce' objects arises from the same principles as the understanding, 
that is, from 'the nature of things' (CoJ. 198'/388). Kant develops his explanation to 
examine the relationship between theoretical and practical geometry, suggesting that, 
whether it is practical, empirical or applied, each 'part' of geometry is derived from 
the same principles of 'nature'; that is, an absolute or 'pure' geometry. Particular 
geometric figures produced by the imagination are, therefore, 'special parts' [scholia] 
of an absolute geometry, brought under the general laws of understanding in reflective 
judgment. Kant writes: 
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Hence practical propositions that in their content deal merely with the 
possibility of a presented object (through voluntary action) are only 
applications of a complete theoretical cognition and cannot form a 
special part of a science. A practical geometry as a separate science [of 
geometry] is an absurdity, no matter how many practical propositions 
the pure science [of geometry] contains, most of which are problems 
[for] whose solution [we] need special instruction[s]. The problem of 
constructing a square by means of a given line and a given fight angle is 
a practical proposition, but [is nevertheless] purely a consequence 
[drawn) from theory. Similarly, the art of surveying ([ars] 
agrimensoria) can in no way claim the title of practical geometry, and 
be called a special part of geometry in general; rather, it belongs to the 
scholia of geometty, concerning the application of this science to 
[various] tasks (CoJ- 198'/388) [my emphasis]. 
The division of geometry into its genera is considered, therefore, to be part of 
a metaphysical whole that embraces both its theoretical and empirical forms. In 
addition, Kant emphasises the different aciii4ties or methods of construction that 
produce these different objects; geometry is both the activity of thinking and drawing 
geometrically, because each is an insufficient explanation on its own. Instead, the 
scholia represent a particular kind of geometric construction or application so that 
empirical and applied demonstrations of geometry become understood as parts of a 
pure or absolute, yet heterogeneous geometric method. Furthermore, the continuity 
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suggested between the transcendental notion of geometry and its sensible figures is a 
key aspect of this discussion, because as we will see in Spinoza's geometric method, 
the practical enactment of the 'special parts' or 'scholia' represents an extremely 
important form of intuition in his geometric method. 
In a supplementary note to this passage Kant expands on the nature of how 
the pure science of geometry is transformed into practical action, which is provided 
by the powers of the imagination that produces sensible forms of experience, 
independently of the understanding. Geometry is, therefore, transformed ftom a pure 
theoretical reason (idea) into a series of sensible forms of aclivity or enactment that 
constitute the different forms of 'practical' or applied geometric methods. In 
addition, it is the imagination's powers that provide the conduit for this passage from 
cpure' or mechanical geometric relations to the technical acts of artistic production so 
that each is brought into hannony with the other to suggest a multiplicitous notion of 
geometry: 
This pure and, precisely because of that purity, sublime, science of 
geometry seems to comprise some of its dignity if it confesses that on 
its elementary level it needs instruments to construct its concepts, 
even if only two: compass and ruler. These constructions alone are 
called geometric, while those of higher geometry are called mechanical, 
because to construct the concepts of higher geometry we need more 
complex machines. Yet even when we call compass [Zirkefl and ruler 
[Lineafl (circinus et regular) instruments, we mean not the actual 
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instruments, which could never produce those figures [circle and 
(straight) line] with mathematical precision, but only the simplest 
ways [these figures can] be exhibited by our a priori imagination, [a 
7 
power] that no instrument can equal (CoJ, Note 6: 198'/388). 
Practical geometry is, therefore, a demonstration of the possibility of a 
theoretical object, but Kant also tells us that '[a]ll other propositions of performance, 
with whatever science they may be affiliated, we might call technical rather than 
practical [ .... ]. For they 
belong to the art of bringing about something that we want 
to exist [sein]' (Cal. - 199'-200'/389-390). Thus, the nature of the geometric 
demonstration, diagram or figure, are understood as forms of an artistic 'techne'; that 
is, a 'proposition of perfonnance', an 'act' or a 'presentation of fonns' (CoJ-. 
199'/388). 8 Once again, it is evident that the scientific nature of geometry becomes 
connected with the way in which we judge nature, that is 'by analogy with an art', 
which is a 'subjective relation', rather than an objective, logical or mechanical relation. 
Judgment is, therefore, a subjective and indeterminate, yet technical power that is 
derived from nature (CoJ. 201'/390). 
So, Kant can continue to say that this 'technical' judging is a capacity of 
Lreflective judgment' in which indeterminate artistic judgments produce a harmonious 
relationship between the subject and the general laws of nature, rather than a 
'mechanical' or instrumental 'schema' (Co. J. 214'/402). Furthermore, these natural 
laws constitute a 'purposiveness' in nature, that is, an autonomous 'lawfulness' 
(CoJ. 218'/406). When nature is examined in this way 'we then consider the 
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purposiveness itself as merely subjective; by the same token, this [purposiveness] 
neither requires nor produces a determinate concept of the object, and the judgement 
itself is not a cognitive one. Such a judgment is called an AESTHETIC juckment of 
reflection' (Cal 22 F/409). 
In addition, we find a second aspect of the productive imagination in Kant's 
theory of reflective judgment; that is, the transformation of the role and function of 
the dialectic between the finite limit and infinite limitlessness from a scientific 
discussion into an artistic concern. In relation to aesthetic judgment we find that the 
imagination operates within the discontinuous harmony of the thinkirig subject 
comprising a unity that threatens the logical drive towards a determinate and unified a 
priori system. As a result, the subject and its experiences (that is, its relationship 
with the external world) becomes understood as an 'aggregate' of a reflective, 
aesthetic and autonomous subject so that geometry and space are releasedftom their 
formal appearance as intuitions and are embodied into the activities of the thinking, 
feeling subject. 
Thus, the notion of the geometric figure as a form of the reflective subject 
becomes a highly excessive and irreducible proposition; and, as we will see in the 
following chapters, the importance of this shift from the determinate or logical 
geometric figure to the indeterminate and embodied geometric figure is central to this 
discussion. Spinoza, for example, promotes the indeterminacy of the subject in his 
examination of the imagination in the production of images of space and time that the 
body creates, which are understood as continuous modifications of a living subject. 
Other geometric methods are less concerned with the imagination as a faculty, than 
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with its counterparts of sensibility, i. e. memory and perception. Leibniz, for 
example, examines the perception's construction of 'fictional' figures and its limits of 
'imperceptibility' in an intensive analytic method. Bergson also considers, not the 
imagination, but the powers of perception and memory in relation to the 'psychic' 
condition of the individual to the effect that the production of the geometric figure is 
shifted away from 'cognitive, powers or faculties to 'psychic' powers that are 
constituted as both extended and unextended matter, rather than the problematic 
division of body and mind that arises by considering the imagination to be an aspect 
ofthe mind. 
in the CoJ, however, the imagination is important insofar as it provides the 
content through which a reflective judgment can be made. Kant tells us that the 
power of reflective judgment is found in; first, the ability to reflect 'on a given 
presentation so as to [make] a concept possible' and second, the ability to 'determine 
an underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation' (CoJ-. 21 F/399). 
In addition, returning to the definition of 'aesthetic' in the CoJ, we find Kant define it 
as; 'an ability to judge an object in reference to the free lawfulness of the imagination' 
(Cal- 241/91). The imagination, therefore, is autonomous insofar as it is 'productive 
and spontaneous (as the originator of chosen forms of possible intuitions)'. But the 
link between the imagination and 'detefminate [forms] of this object' means that its 
'freedom' is only in terms of its productive powers of construction in generating 
objects or perceptions, since its products are still brought into harmony with the 
understanding (Co-J: 241/91). There remains, therefore, a contradiction between the 
freedom of the imagination and the lawfulness of the understanding, which requires 
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hartnoni sation under the categories of concepts, and the harmony that the teleological 
judgment allows. The mental agitation of production, however, is a crucial aspect of 
the imagination's powers in the formation of aesthetic judgments; that is, its 
relationship to the activity of the mind in pleasure and displeasure and the notion of 
limit. Thus, Kant posits the productive imagination in the CoJ, through which sense 
intuition and geometry are brought into harmony with pure intuition. 
In addition, Kant's investigations into the imagination continue beyond the 
third Critique; for example, we find that it is explored in some depth in a later text, 
the Anthropologvftom a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). Here, the imagination is 
productive insofar as it can create images (that is, perceptions, notions or 
projections) that are in harmony with a 'higher level' of cognition. Thus, the 
Anthropology draws out the structure of sensibility, the senses and the imagination in 
relation to the individual in a way that we will see is implied in the operations of the 
imagination in the production of reflective judgment in the Cal. In both of these texts, 
then, the imagination may be considered a 'productive' faculty in its own right. A 
short discussion of the AnthropoloAy highlights some of its capacities in more detail, 
which will also be useful for considering the role of imagination in the other geometric 
methods, especially Proclus and Spinoza. 
In the first book of the Anthropology, 'On the Cognitive Faculty of Self, 
Kant tells us that the imagination is a mode of the sensibility or the 'faculty of 
intuitive ideas'. In particular, it is the form of the sensibility, i. e. intuition 'without 
the presence of the object' (APP: §15/40). 9 The imagination is, therefore, able to 
produce images or notions of space and time that are derived from an internally 
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generated sense, independently of external or empirical objects. 
The imagination exists in two forms, productive and reproductive; when it is 
a priori and synthetic it is productive. Kant writes that it is the 'faculty of the 
original representation of the object (exhibito originaria), which consequently 
precedes experience' (APP: §28/56). Thus the sensibility as a cognition through which 
forms of appearances might be generated in the CPR is developed into a faculty 
belonging to the embodied subject. In contrast, when the imagination produces images 
from previously gained 'empirical perceptions' Kant tells us its powers are 
reproductive (APP: §28/56). Although, ultimately, Kant considers the knowledge 
generated by the imagination to be inadequate (in comparison to concepts constructed 
when the imagination is considered an intuition that produces analogous forms of 
sense experience, such as space and time), it is not merely confined to an empirical 
order of objects. But he also notes that the imagination can make forms that are 
concrete or abstract images, notions or projections, such as 'corporeal forms', which 
are represented by pictorial sensations in space (APP: §31/65). Kant suggests, 
therefore, that the 'sense' derived from the imagination may be a faculty that is of a 
'higher level' than thinking. He explains: 
All this is based upon the fact that the imagination, which supplies the 
content of understanding, that is, content to its concepts for the sake 
of knowledge, seems to give a reality to its invented notions because 
of the analogy between them and real perceptions (APP: §28/58). 
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But, since the imagination is always determined by the 'rules of sensibility' 
(i. e. it does not generate concepts or ideas), it 'provides the material whose 
association is achieved without consciousness of the rule, consonant with the 
understanding but not derived from it' (APP: §31/67). This capacity for notions 
determined by perception, however, also indicates the inadequacies of the 
imagination, in contrast to the efficacy of understanding in producing clear judgments, 
because it is not analytic or 'pure' reason; rather it is unruly and excessive. As we 
will see in the CoJ, however, it is this very excessiveness that produces an interesting 
shift from the limitation of form, which determines Kant's aesthetic in the CPR. 
In §23, 'Book IL Analytic of the Sublime' of the CaJ, Kant observes the 
transition from the power of judging the beautiful to that of judging the sublime. In 
each case the beautiful and sublime (i. e. liking and the relationship between pleasure 
and displeasure, respectively) are determined by a judgment of reflection, rather than 
of sensation or logic. This kind of judgment is, in turn, made intelligible through 
concepts by virtue of the faculties of reason or understanding, but it is also produced 
by the imagination, in part because the imagination enables a judgment to be produced 
vvithout the object being present. Kant writes: 
yet we do refer the liking to concepts, though it is indeterminate which 
concepts these are. Hence the liking is connected with the mere 
exhibition or power of exhibition, i. e. the imagination, with the result 
that we regard this power, when an intuition is given us, as 
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harmonising with the power of concepts, i. e. the understanding or 
reason, this harmony furthering [the aims ofl these. That is also why 
both kinds of judgment are singular ones that nonetheless proclaim 
themselves universally valid for all subjects, though what they lay 
claim to is merely the feeling of pleasure, and not any cognition of the 
object (Cal: 245/97). 
Kant continues to outline the four different modes of judgment that comprise 
the sublime - quantity or that which is 'universally valid'; quality or that which is 
'devoid of interest'; relation or that which is subjective and; modality or that which is 
cnecessary subjective purposiveness' - and tells us that the imagination has a role in 
the production of these judgments; for example, in the production of magnitude as 
quantity (CoJ: 245/98). In so doing, Kant attributes the imagination's productive 
capacities to the formation of aesthetic judgment. The imagination's attempts to 
comprehend the sublime, such as the division of the sublime into mathematical or 
dynamic divisions (i. e. 'sublime objects'), also produces a 'mental agitation' that is 
'subjectively purposive' in the forms of either a cognition or desire. The imagination 
is, therefore, determined by an aesthetic form of judgment whereby it produces a 
'harmony' with reason and understanding. Kant explains the aesthetic nature of the 
imagination's efforts to produce mathematical estimations of the sublime, as follows: 
the imagination is equal to the task of providing, for any object, a 
measure that vvill suffice for this estimation, because the 
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understanding's numerical concepts can be used in a progression and 
so can make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. Hence it 
must be the aesthetic estimation of magnitude where we feel that 
effort, our imagination's effort to perform a comprehension that 
surpasses its ability to encompass [begreifen] the progressive 
apprehension in a whole of intuition, and where at the same time we 
perceive the inadequacy of the imagination [ ... 
] (Co. J. 256/112). 
As a result, we can observe the extent to which Kant's theory of aesthetics in 
the CoJ extends the scientific aesthetic theory of the sensibility of the CPR into a 
theory of embodied pleasure and displeasure. In the 'First Introduction' to the CaJ, 
for example, Kant examines the relationship between pleasure and thinking, wrifing 
that 'all the powers of the human mind' cannot be brought into a single unity. 
Instead, these powers - i. e. cognitive power, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure 
and the power of desire - are disjunctive and any object that arises from them can 
only be known as an aggregate of their empirical and theoretical sources (Co. J. 206'- 
207'/395). He writes: 
Now the[re is a] connection between the cognition of an object and the 
feeling of pleasure [or] displeasure in the object's existence, [and in 
this connection consists] the determination, of the power of desire, to 
produce the object. But while this link is knowable enough 
empirically, it is not based on any a priori principle; and hence to that 
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extent the mental power form no system, but only an aggregate [] 
But in order for this feeling of pleasure to be connected with the other 
two powers in a system, this feeling must, as these other two powers 
do, also rest not on merely empirical bases but on a priori principles. 
Hence for the idea of philosophy as a system we also need a critique 
(even if not a doctrine) of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure 
insofar as its basis is not empiiical (CaJ: 207'/395). 
The presentation of an object relates, therefore, to 'the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure', which are inherently dynamic, so that an aesthetic is not detennined as a 
science but as an 'aesthetic of feeling'; for example, the 'presentation of an object' or 
the 'form of sensibility' are forms that embody 'how the subject is affected' (Co. 1- 
222'/410). The scope of the powers is directed, therefore, not towards the 
production of objects as conceptual understanding or ideas of reason, but towards a 
dynamic and indeterminate set of judgments produced by the subject. Kant 
continues: 
judgment refers solely to the subject and does not on its own produce 
any concepts of objects Therefore, if the power of judgment is 
indeed to determine [bestimmen] anything on its own, then 
presumably this can only be the feeling of pleasure; and, conversely, if 
the feeling of pleasure is indeed to have an a priori principle, then 
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presumably we can find it only in the power of judgment (CaJ-. 
208'/396). 
In Kant's Critical philosophy, therefore, we find that the imagination and its 
limits provide a link to the transcendent in the form of the sublime. The limit between 
the sensible and intelligible realms becomes a limit-operation in the form of the 
imagination and the feelings of pleasure and displeasure that it produces; first, the 
formal, mathematical and external limit is subsumed to an internal, 'agitated' and 
indeterminate limit in the efforts of the imagination to cognize, the magnitude of the 
sublime. Second, the reflective subject's feelings of pleasure and displeasure represent 
an intensive notion of limit, rather than an exclusive prohibition of the sensibility 
between the transcendental and sensible realms, so that the individual is itself 
constituted by an aesthetic limitlessness or irreducibility between the mathematical 
magnitude of limit and sensation. 
The imagination, therefore, modifies the relationship between limit and 
sensation into an embodied series of enactments that belong to the 'freely acting 
individual', such as the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. As a result, limit is an 
embodied state and can be said to reflect the shift from the objective reality of the 
mathematical geometric figure into the subjective reality of the reflective subject. For 
Kant, however, the transcendental relationship between the subject and geometry is 
still demarcated by the unknowable sublime so that the 'limitlessness' of the subject 
is registered as an excessive presentation, rather than as the eruption of an immanent 
power that constitutes the individual. The geometric method and its figure are, 
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therefore, aspects of the aesthetic powers of the reflective subject insofar as they are 
enactments of the imagination; however, they remain attendant to Kant's view of the 
absolute divisions between the powers of the sensibility and Reason or God, that 
results in a limitation of the subject's powers versus the limitless sublime. Kant's 
writing does consider this more complex and heterogeneous notion of geometric 
enactments previously, as seen in his essay 'Concerning the ultimate ground of the 
differentiation of directions in space', in which the geometric figure is distinguished 
by its extemal. and intemal spatial relations. " 
In the following chapters, however, we will encounter philosophers who 
suggest a more immanent or genetic continuum of geometric relations between man 
and nature, which advocate the powers of the subject (geometric figure) more 
strongly as aspects of the aesthetic and intuitive geometric method. " 
For the moment, however, we can say that Kant's examinations into aesthetic 
and geometry in the CPR and the CoJ are brought together and through which, in 
particular, the aesthetic subject is constructed. In the following section we will see 
that Plato offers an enactment of geometric thinking and drawing that is a precursor 
to Kant's technical acts of construction in the subject. For Kant, the production of 
geometric figures is engendered in the technical and aesthetic enactments of the 
imagination. In the Meno, however, Plato focuses, not on the role of the imagination, 
but on memory or recollection in the production of the geometric drawing. We might 
suggest that Kant's technical enactment represents, therefore, a kind of memory that 
Plato explores in the activities of drawing and recollection. 
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Drawing a line 12 
So, by taking the 'constructive' aspects of Kant's aesthetic geometry we are 
able to suggest a link between the embodied notion of limit in the productive 
imagination and the technical status of the geometric figure in relation to the act of 
drawing geometric figures in Plato's dialogue, the Meno (38013C), which itself echoes 
the Phaedo's proposition that the mathematical diagram is the site for the recollection 
of memories; 'If you take a person to a diagram [ ... 
] then you can show most clearly 
that learning is recollection' (Phaedo, 73b, cited in Proclus 1992: 45/37). 13 
TheMeno examines, principally, the nature of virtue and whether it is learnt 
or 'recollected'. During the course of the dialogue, however, Plato demonstrates the 
nature of virtue by using geometric examples to explore the Stoic principles of limit 
and unlimit, and the principles of the one and the many. Socrates, for example, 
explains that virtue is both particular to each person and exists as a 'single virtue' 
that 'permeates each of them', developing the point with the analogy of 'shape' 
(Plato: 74b-75d/357-8). Socrates continues, stating that the concept of limit produces 
a definition of shape; shape is defined as 'the limit of a solid' (Plato: 76a/359). For 
Plato, therefore, lirnit is equated with an identifiable boundary or end, which 
supports the notion of the geometric figure as a 'bounded figure'. Shape, Plato tells 
us, is limit. But Plato's identification of shape with limit is problematic, for where 
limit might produce an 'intensive' relationship with infinity (the unlimit) Plato tends 
to affirm the exactness of formal limits. We will see in the next chapter, however, that 
Proclus emphasises the discursive nature of shape and limit, not the formation of 
detenninate boundaries. 
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Geometric figures, then, are used to provide extended ideas about the qualities 
of virtue, such as its magnitude and limit. But, Plato also considers the geometric 
method in the act of drawing to constitute a distinct notion of geometric method that 
shifts geometry from a mathematical knowledge into a sensible enactment, that is, as 
intuitive acts. This is presented in two fonns; first the boy's intuitive recollection of 
geometry and second, Socrates' act of drawing figures in the sand; 'Socrates begins to 
draw figures in the sand at this feet [ ... 
]' (Plato: 82b/365). Geometric demonstration, 
therefore, becomes linked to an aesthetic and reflective set of judgments in the figures 
of Socrates and the boy (Plato: 82b-86b/365-371). The dialogue considers geometric 
intuition and recollection in the follovving section: 
Socrates: What do you think, Meno? Has he answered with any 
opinions that were not his own? 
Meno: No, they were all his. 
Socrates: Yet he did not know, as we agreed a few minutes ago. 
Meno: True. 
Socrates: But these opinions were somewhere in him, were they not? 
Meno: Yes. 
Socrates: So a man who does not know has in himself true opinions on 
a subject without having knowledge. 
Meno- It would appear so. 
Socrates: At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a 
dreamlike quality. But if the same questions are put to him on many 
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occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will 
have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody's. 
Meno: Probably. 
Socrates: This knowledge will not come from teaching but from 
questioning. He will recover it for himself 
Meno: Yes. 
Socrates: And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is 
recollection, isn't it? (Plato: 85c-d/370). 
The dialogue presents a logical reasoning of geometric intuition, beginning 
with the recognition that the ideas belong to the boy, but they are distinct from 
understanding or reason. Such ideas are indistinct, having a 'dreamlike quality' but 
they are made clear not from learning but by questioning. This, Plato suggests, is 
'recollection'. Memory is understood, therefore, to be inherent in the enactments of 
the geometric method (and which we will find Bergson proposes it in a radical form 
called 'duration'). 
So, whilst the dialogue is certainly a demonstration of a series of mathematical 
operations it is also an enactment of geometric method in Socrates' actions and the 
boy's recollections. Plato reveals the intuitive basis of knowledge in geometry, that 
is, the activities of the soul that the boy embodies to suggest that geometry is a 
discursive and immaterial procedure; for example, Socrates explains the nature of the 
soul as an active and inquisitive form of memory. Scýcrates says: 
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Thus the soul, since it is immoral and has been bom many times, and 
has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned 
everything that is. So we need not be surprised if it can recaR the 
knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once 
possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so 
that when a man ha recalled a single piece of knowledge [ ... ] there 
is 
no reason why he should not find out all the rest [ ... 
] for seeldng and 
learning are in fact nothing but recollection (Plato: 8 lb/364). 
Socrates' enactment of geometric figures also demonstrates the relationship 
between geometry and the aesthetic actions of the body. Logical geometric knowledge 
becomes discursive, therefore, in the operations of the soul and memory, but it is also 
the discursive act of drawing out geometric figures, which demonstrates a shift from 
geometry as an exter-nally derived and axiomatic order of knowledge to an intemal and 
aesthetic procedure. 
Thus, we find that Plato's examination provides an aesthetic and intuitive 
geometric method from which Kant's aesthetic subject might be drawn and provides 
the possibility for Kant's thinking to be considered a re-enactment of Plato's 
14 
metaphysics . Kant's attention to the 
imagination provides a counterpoint to the 
description of intuition that Plato provides, through which he develops the technical 
aesthetic of the geometric act. Plato, on the other hand, considers the soul as the 
discursive site of memory or intuition through which the geometric method is 
immanent within the subject. 
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Conclusion 
We can propose, therefore, that a line can be drawn between the Meno and the 
Critique ofJudgment in which geometry is expressed as an aesthetic 'act' of drawing 
and construction, indicating an overlooked geometric method and figuration. In 
particular, we find that the relationship between the 'pure' science of geometry and 
the 'sensible' act of drawing geometric figures are brought together in the boy's 
intuitive grasp of space, Socrates' drawings in the sand, and the production of 
geometric figures in the CoJ to demonstrate an aesthetic reflective judgment. Between 
these two encounters we find that the absolute geometric method becomes embodied 
into the aesthetic powers of the reflective subject. The geometric method is therefore 
presented both in the body of the reflective subject and in the geometric diagram or 
figure so that an 'aesthetic origin' of geometry is instantiated. 
Kant's Critical philosophy suggests a shift from an external to an internal 
aesthetic geometry in the first and third Critique. First, Kant's synthetic a priori 
judgment although radical in positing the particular and a priori difference of 
individual states remains a problematic notion of difference because it is determined 
by the 'external' limit. In keeping with the classical notion of 'synthetic' division in 
mathematics, Kant sustains the exclusive, formal autonomy of an individual. Kant's 
critique of the forms of knowledge and their related faculties (reason, understanding, 
intuition and imagination) in the CPR is a major innovation of a neo-Platonic thought. 
It is, however, contested by the other methods examined in this thesis, which 
prioritise the importance of the sensibility, i. e. non-cognitive knowledge of the world, 
such as perception and memory in the writings of Leibniz and Spinoza. Although the 
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powers of the imagination are promoted, the imagination is still taken to represent a 
scientific order, i. e. division or limit, rather than in its perceptual capacities. 
The possibility of internal or embodied geometric difference is, however, 
evident in texts such as 'Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of 
directions in space'. But Kant does not sustain this possibility in the CPR in the 
development of a 'pure' geometric reason and so geometry remains determined by an 
absolute division between reason and the sensibility. In the Cal, however, the 
reflective subject retrieves a notion of geometric enactment in which its 'rules of 
construction' generate a speculative and discontinuous unity. In particular, the 
cmathematical' principles of limit are engendered in the faculty of the imagination to 
form an intensive limit of feeling and sensation. In addition, the imagination provides 
an aspect of the reflective judgment that constitutes a 'technical' or artistic notion of 
geometric method and figuration, which is reflected in the intuitive recollection and 
performed enactments of geometry in Plato's Alleno. Ultimately, Kant underestimates 
the scope of the sense perception and non-cognitive activities of the body in 
understanding the aesthetic subject. In the following chapters, however, we will find 
each philosopher generating a method that is both geometric and sensory. 
Kant's Critical philosophy constitutes a key geometric and aesthetic 
encounter or re-enactment. The first encounter is in the Critique of Pure Reason 
through the concept of intuition. In its second form it is re-enacted in the Critique of 
Judgment through the powers of the reflective subject, in particular, through the 
technical powers of drawing and construction that the imagination provides. Finally, 
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this geometric aesthetic is itself retrieved from metaphysical philosophy in the 
figures of Socrates and the slave-boy in Plato's Meno, providing an additional 
cenactment' of the aesthetic that re-engages Kant's project with earlier geometric 
methods. In this chapter we have seen the shift ftorn the two figures of a geometric 
memory - intuition and recollection - into a technical form of enactment in Kant's 
reflectivejudgment. In the next chapter the Classical context of aesthetic geometries is 
considered in relation to Proclus' method, which is derived from its Platonic and 
Pythagorean origins and demonstrates a particularly discursive form of geometric 
enactment. 
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Chapter 2. Unfoldin 
For Kant, the geometric aesthetic of the third Critique was embodied in the 
reflective subject. For Proclus, the geometric aesthetic is derived from the Stoics' 
ideas of the divine One, Many, Limit and Unlimit; i. e. geometry is derived from a set 
of external and 'intelligible' powers, not internally embodied states. Proclus' 
contribution to the study is valuable, however, since it demonstrates the extent to 
which these Stoic concepts enable a relationship between geometry and aesthetics 
that is genetic, serial and continuous in both the pure and unobtainable figures of the 
Gods and the sensible figures of the circle or natural forms. In addition, his text 
provides a precursor in the shift from the external to the internal geometric method 
because the external and axiomatic, mathematical 'element' becomes reconfigured as a 
series of intermediate and immanent figures. Proclus' text also introduces some of the 
key metaphysical principles that recur throughout this discussion, such as synthetic 
and analytic figures, the imagination, the soul, limit and unlimit. Thus, Proclus' 
, 
interpretation is an important counter-point to the perception that Euclid's text is 
exclusively concerned with the production of rational and scientific principles, 
demonstrating instead that the Elements reflects Classical understandings of aesthetic 
geometry. 
This chapter focuses on the aesthetic geometric method and 'figure' that is 
found in Proclus' (410485AD) Commentary on Euclid's Elements (c. 30OBC). ' It 
considers the geometric procedure and figure of the fold/unfold that are constructed in 
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the Commentary to suggest that they are produced by the discursive movement 
between the soul and the understanding and operations of the imagination to 
represent a series of 'interme&ate' figures (as we will see in chapter 4, Leibniz also 
emphasises the importance of 'intermediacy' in a series of figures, but in an analytic 
form). The procedure of 'unfolding' and its implied figure, the 'fold', are drawn out of 
an examination of the structure of the text and its geometric 'elements' to represent 
the constituents of an aesthetic geometry. A more complex philosophical 
understanding of the Neoplatonic geometric method is generated, therefore, in which 
geomeffic method and its figures constitute a double movement and series of 
synthetic figures. 
Before examining the text in detail, it is important to note the context of 
Proclus' writing in fourth century Greece, in which mathematics and its derivatives, 
including geometry, are informed by Neoplatonic and Pythagorean metaphysics. In 
this respect, it is Proclus' aim to reveal the aesthetic structure of the technical 
sophistication in Euclid's work in the philosophical principles upon which it is 
grounded .2 For Proclus, the value of the Elements is two-fold; first, its subject matter 
is a demonstration of 'the cosmic figures' derived from Plato's Timaeus, which make 
it an 'elementary exposition' of metaphysical import. Second, its explication of the 
fundamental origins represents 'a method of perfecting' the geometric method in both 
its scientific and metaphysical potentials. For Proclus, the Elements represents, 
therefore, a paradigm of philosophical and mathematical enquiry in both the manner 
in which geometry is studied and the mode in which these 'figures' are produced 
3 (Commentary 1992: 71/58). (In his Foreword to this edition, Mueller also notes 
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Proclus' attention to the philosophical basis of Euclid's ambitions [CEE: xxx-xx)d]). 
Euclid is not, however, transformed from a mathematician into a metaphysician, but 
by emphasising the relationship between Euclid's mathematical propositions and the 
Platonic and Pythagorean principles from which it is generated, Proclus suggests an 
overlooked philosophical context through which to reconsider the fonnation of 
geometry in the text. The Commentary constitutes an important text, therefore, 
through which to re-evaluate the philosophical status and scope of geometric 
principles after Plato, and whilst it is a step-by-step explication of Book I of the 
Elements, it is the Prologues and the commentary on the Definitions that offer most 
insight to the metaphysical nature of the geometric method and its figures. 4 
Beginning with an examination of the statement that mathematics is 
'imaginative and discursive thinking' this chapter suggests that Proclus' provides a 
striking precursor to Kant's discussion about the geometric method and imagination 
outlined in chapter I (CEE: 18/17). Having considered the definition of 'discursivity' 
in relation to the understanding, the soul and the imagination, the chapter goes on to 
explore the role and function of discursivity as an aesthetic geometric procedure in 
Proclus' thinking. As in Kant's formulation in the Ciltique of Judgment, we find that 
the imagination in the Commentary is a key operation towards forming an aesthetic 
notion of geometly; for example, it is the most embodied state of mediation between 
the divine notions of limit and unlimit. Both Proclus and Kant assign the imagination 
to a position of mediation between the intelligible and sensible realms and each 
attributes the productive nature of imagination, not so much to its powers of 
imitation of insensible figures, but to its powers of division that are aspects of the 
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Stoic notions of limit and unlimit. In Proclus' Commentary, therefore, these powers 
constitute an aspect of the discursive 'unfolding' and 'folding' of the geometric 
method to generate a successive movement through a series of metaphysical orders, in 
which the divine, insensible principle of unlimit is immanent in the particular, 
sensible limit (not by means of an imitation of Plato's Ideal forms). ' 
As a result, the chapter suggests that a more discursive relationship between 
the transcendental realms of nous (intellect or intuition) and diavoia (understanding) 
is evident in which the limit and unlimit are sustained in the action of folding and 
unfolding. In addition, the chapter argues that the status of the 'geomettic figure' 
becomes dramatically altered in a shift from a principle of mathematical certainty that 
is a finite, 'bounded' and 'contained' synthetic identity, to one that is a synthetic and 
infinite unity. The relationship between the notion of the geometric figure and 'unity' 
is constituted, not by an emphasis on the different classifications of finite identities, 
rather as a result of the discursive movement between figures. Thus, we will see that 
Proclus' affinnation of Pythagorean principles retains the synthetic principles of 
construction, but situates them within a continuity of different figures. 
The chapter also considers the nature of the discursive procedure in terms of 
its aesthetic form as unfolding or folding. Proclus explicitly develops his theory of 
geometry in terms of a discursive unfolding, yet we will find that the notion of 
folding is implicit (in contrast to the explicit fold that Leibniz generates). Hence, the 
chapter suggests that the figure of the fold is present, but it too remains implicit in 
Proclus' emphasis on the double movement of discursivity and recollection, and in 
the relationship between the imagination and the soul in which recollection provides 
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an 'enfolding' as a counter-movement to the 'unfolding' of the understanding. But it 
should also be noted that the procedure and figure of the fold/unfold remain firmly 
demarcated by idealistic principles, since their discursivity is subject to the authority 
of the divine One/Many. As a result, the chapter notes that the scope of the 
imagination to produce mathematical objects remains a logical 'limit-operation', rather 
than representing a power that is generated by a fully embodied and thinking subject. 
Thus, unlike the autonomous and embodied powers of Spinoza and Leibniz's 
'infinite substance', the Pythagorean order does not enable speculative thinking to be 
generated from an autonomous and sensible order of living things, remaining 
determined by an ideal order of divine elements. In addition, we find that Proclus 
only examines the nature of matter insofar as it is a derivative of the higher levels of 
thought; although the sensible realm is a positive product from the imagination's 
hannonious unfolding of the understanding, the soul or nous, sense opinion (doxa) 
and matter remain contaminated so that the embodiment of the nous (the intellect) in 
matter is always considered less significant. 
Having examined the metaphysical structure of the 'fold', the chapter also 
considers the axiomatic organisation of the text, which reveals an analysis that is 
deeply embedded in Pythagorean principles of serial progression and notions of the 
One (i. e. limit and divisibility) and the Many (i. e. unlimit, indivisibility and 
multiplicity) that represent the highest, unknowable and transcendental realities, but 
which are also immanent in the lower realms and particular entities. As will be 
discussed below, the scope of the 'fold' in manifesting these relationships promotes a 
key argument in Proclus' examination of the Elements in which geometry becomes a 
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special site of mediation between the intelligible and the sensible realms withoul 
recourse to the 'Divided Line' that separates the intellect from the senses .7 Thus, the 
axiorn, postulate, proposition, problem, theorem, hypothesis and definition are 
considered to be both transcendent and sensible particulars, rather than merely 
sensible 'abstractions' of higher fonns of idea. In addition, the chapter observes that a 
series of relations are proposed through the 'common notion' of the figure, which 
links the highest and the lowest realms. Second, we find that the discursive movement 
between the understanding and the pure reason of the intellect (nous) represents a 
distinct 'intermediary' position between the pure, immaterial intellect or soul and the 
sensible images of the imagination or material realm of opinion (doxa). Diaonetic 
thinking demonstrates, therefore, the potential for the intellect to move between the 
ideal and the particular 'figures' in the form of an 'unfolding' from the 'simple' axiom 
or point to the complex and 'combined' figure, and the folding that is implied in the 
immanent relations between the sensible figures and the soul. In addition, discursivity 
is an activity of the understanding, but it is also generated from the internal 
irreducibility of the soul and its activities are also demonstrated in the form of the 
imagination's production Of 'emnattered images' that provide an important 
canticipation' to Kant's theory of the imagination in the third Critique and the 
aesthetic geometries of Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson. 
Discursivily 
Proclus upholds the Platonic belief that mathematics is discursive; he writes 
that its methods are 'diaonetic and imaginative thinking' and so it represents a 
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demonstration of the faculty of understanding (CEE: 18/15). He tells us that 
mathematics' powers situate it at a special level in the order of knowledge in which 
the intelligible and sensory worlds are brought together through the act of discursive 
thought (&avoia) to fonn a distinct kind of knowledge. But it is the aesthetic value of 
these powers that Proclus affirms most strongly to suggest a method in which the 
relations between its objects are as important as its forms. In the following sections 
an examination of these powers - i. e. the nous, understanding, soul and the 
imagination - will reveal the extent to which Proclus' interpretation of geometry 
constitutes an aesthetic series of unfolding and folding movements between these 
metaphysical operations. 
So, the discursive nature of mathematics is expressed from the beginnirýg of 
the Commentary. Confirming Plato's classification of mathematical knowledge, 
Proclus emphasises the discursive powers of mathematical demonstration, telling us 
that by moving from one fact to another in the construction of their respective 
objects, geometry and arithmetic are deductive procedures generating clear and precise 
descriptions of the world that mediate between the realms of pure 'intelligence' 
(nous) and the imperfect sense-perception or 'opinions' (doxa): 
Mathematical being necessarily belongs neither among the first nor 
among the last and least simple of the kinds of being, but occupies the 
middle ground between the partless realities - simple, incomposite, 
and indivisible - and divisible things are characterised by every 
variety of composition and differentiation [ ... 
]. But the 
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discursiveness of [the mathematical] procedure, its dealing with its 
subjects as extended, and its setting up of different prior principles for 
different objects - these give to mathematical being a rank below that 
indivisible nature that is completely grounded in itseýf (CEE: 4/3) [my 
emphasis]. 
Geometric procedure and its figures are attributed with a special kind of 
autonomy that is intermediate to the unknowable and the extended realms and, as a 
result of this intermediary nature, geometry brings into harmony the powers of the 
understanding and the imagination with the self-detennined activities of the soul. 
Geometry lies, therefore, between the imperfect level of sensible, empirical entities 
and the perfection of insensible, immaterial forms; 'the intermediate status of 
mathematical genera and species' lies 'between absolutely indivisible realities and the 
divisible things that come to be in the world of matter' (CF. E- 5/4). Thus, we are 
reminded that a Neoplatonic order is confirmed in which there are four orders of 
reality that move in descending order, as follows, 
1. the partless, unity of the One (union); 
2. the Ideal Fonns of Being (nous); 
3. the logoi of Mathematics (diavoia); 
4. the sensible entities of Becoming(sens). 8 
From this schema we can also clarify the Neoplatonic value attributed to the 
nous. For Proclus, the nous represents the ideal, insensible forms from which all 
63 
sensible ideas are generated and all perceptions are images of these 'first patterns of 
all things' (CEE: 16/13). The content of the nous is indivisible and non-discursive, an 
'all -at-once-grasping of totality' (CEE xx). Yet, it also provides the soul with its 
content and is, in this sense, an 'external' source of ideas for the soul (CEE: 16/14). 
As we will see in chapter 5, such a definition appears to foreground Bergson's 
concept of intuition in which the soul is conceived as a 'psychic' activity that 
Lgrasps' reality as an intuition and as a discursive activity. But Bergson's wish to 
distance himself from Platonic metaphysics, especially the problematic status 
attributed to perception and matter is, however, a crucial difference between his 
notion of 'totality' that is grounded in a 'superior empiricism' and Proclus' notion of 
a divine totality. 
Since mathematical procedure lies between the simple indivisible forms and 
divisible nature, Proclus also considers it to be commensurate with the 
understanding; 'a faculty higher in rank than opinion, but inferior to intellect' (CEE: 
12/10). But he distinguishes between the nous and the understanding because the 
understanding's activities are discursive, writing that the understanding is deductive 
and unravels the unintelligible and indivisible, pure intellect into intelligible and 
divisible forms, in a manner of 'unfolding': 
Though second in rank to intellect and the highest knowledge, 
understanding is more perfect, more exact and purer than opinion. For 
it traverses and unfolds the measureless content of Nous by maldng 
articulate its concentrated intellectual insight and then gathers 
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together again the things it has distinguished and refers them back to 
Nous (CEE: 4/3). 
The understanding makes intelligible the unintelligible 'mathematical ideas' in 
the nous, and also those of the soul (as will be explained below), to generate the 
'substantial and self-moving' varieties of mathematics such as geometry and 
arithmetic. As the explicator of pure intellect it mediates, therefore, between the 
nous ' 'originating principles' of 'partless ideas' and its own products, the sensible 
mathematical bodies (CEE: 18/15). This constant explicatory or discursive movement 
further distinguishes mathematical understanding from the nous, which is non- 
discursive, unified, ideal and constant. But Proclus also considers the unfolding 
movement to be analogous a kind of 'life-giving activity' or a genetic production of 
ideas (and, as was shown in Kant's reflective subject and as will be shown in Spinoza 
and Bergson's geometric methods especially, the relationship between notions of life 
and 'activity' is central to this discussion). The discursivity of mathematics, the 
understanding and the soul, in particular, represent a potentially creative series of 
acfivifies: 9 
By contrast mathematics, though beginning vvith reminders from the 
outside world, ends with the ideas that it has within, it is awakened 
to activity by lower realities, but its destination is the higher being of 
forms. Its activity is not motionless, like that of the intellect but 
because its motion is not change of place or quality, as is that of the 
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sense, but a life-giving activity, it unfolds and traverses the immaterial 
cosmos of ideas, now moving from first principles to conclusions, 
now proceeding in the opposite direction, now advancing from what 
it already knows to what it seeks to know, and again referring its 
results back to the principles that are prior in knowledge. Moreover, 
it is not, like Nous, above inquiry because filled from itself, nor is it 
satisfied, like perception, with matters other than itself, rather it 
advances through inquiry to discovery and moves from imperfection 
to perfection (CEE: 19/16) [my emphasis]. 
Like Plato's emphasis on geometric questions in the Meno, therefore, Proclus 
writes that mathematics is in a constant, double movement of inquiry, between the 
higher activities of the soul and the lower levels of sensible ideas. In the form of the 
understanding, its deductive powers unfold (i. e. re-produce) the indivisible, first 
principles as the extended and sensible forms. In the form of the soul it is engaged in a 
more creative and yet, reflective fonn of production in which the sensible forms are 
brought together (i. e. 'enfolded'), under the general form of the 'manifold' of ideas. 
Proclus explains, emphasising this dynamic movement in terms of powers: 
And its powers are manifestly of two sorts. Some develop its 
principles to plurality and open up the mulfifonn paths of 
speculation, while others assemble the results of these many 
excursions and refer them back to their native hypotheses [ ]. 
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Consequently it is only natural, I think, that the cognitive powers 
operating in the general science that deals with these objects should 
appear as twofold, some aiming at the unification and collection of 
the manifold for us, others at dividing the simple into the diverse, the 
more general into the particular, and the primary ideas into secondary 
and remoter consequences of the principles (CEE: 19/16) [my 
emphasis]. 
Extending in two directions, mathematics' procedure unfolds from the purest 
immaterial idea downwards to the natural and sensory world of matter and, by 
implication, in an 'enfolding' movement, upwards from its empirical applications, 
such as mechanics or optics, to the 'unitary and immaterial insights' that comprise its 
universality (CEE: 20/17). The possibility that mathematics is properly speculative 
is posited, as a result, since it is not derived merely from sense-perception, rather the 
content of the nous and soul that are unfolded by the understanding provide distinct 
kinds of immaterial ideas that affirm its a priori status. (In the following chapter, a 
brief discussion will outline the importance of Descartes' investigations into rational 
and analytic definitions of the a priori that infonns Spinoza and Leibniz's geomettic 
methods). Proclus disagrees, therefore, with the claim that 'mathematical forms' are 
abstractions 'from material things' or 'common' notions that are derived from 
sensible entities upholding, instead, the necessity of the soul and nous as the origins 
of mathematical ideas (CEE: 15/13). That is not to say that mathematics is 
completely divorced from the sensible realm, for Proclus strongly affirms the 
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imagination as the faculty through which mathematics is connected to the sensible 
world in the production of images or projections, as will be explained in more detail 
below. 
Soul 
in order to understand the relationship between the powers that constitute 
this aesthetic geometry it will be useful to consider the soul and the imagination in 
more detail. The nature of the soul is explained in detail in the first Prologue. 
Autonomous and 'self moving', it is modelled upon Plato's notion of the 'world soul' 
in the Timaeus in which Plato brings the soul and mathematics together in a series of 
divine mathematical figures. Proclus writes: 
Plato constructs the soul out of all the mathematical forms, divides 
her according to numbers, binds her together with proportions and 
harmonious ratios, deposits in her the primal principles of figure, the 
straight line and the circle, and sets the circles in her moving in 
intelligent fashion. All mathematicals are thus present in the soul 
from the first (CEE: 17/14). 10 
The soul is a higher being, closely resembling the nous in its indivisibility, but 
as mentioned in the previous section, its importance lies in its value as a 'higher' 
realm of discursivity from which geometric objects and figures are unfolded by the 
understanding. In a revealing passage on the origin of ideas in the soul, Proclus writes: 
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the soul draws her concepts both from herself and from Nous, that she 
is herself the company of the forms, which received their constitution 
from the intelligible patterns but enter spontaneously upon the stage 
of being. The soul therefore was never a writing-tablet bare of 
inscriptions; she is a tablet that has always been inscribed and is 
always writing itself and being written on by Nous. For soul is also 
Nous, unfolding herself by viruue of the Nous that presides over her, 
and having become its likeness and external replica. Consequently if 
Nous is everything after the fashion of intellect, so is soul everything 
after the fashion of soul; if Nous is exemplar, soul is copy; if Nous is 
everything, soul is everything discursively (CEE: 16/14) [my 
emphasis]. 
The soul's discursivity enables mathematics with the status, not just as a 
form of the forward movement of deduction in the understanding, but also with the 
attributes of 'recollection' or memory. As a result, the soul's expression of the 
content of the nous is of a more complex nature and so the activity of unfolding 
provides a progression from the nous to the soul, and from the soul to the 
understanding. The analogy of the soul as a continual site of inscription also 
attributes discursivity to an aesthetic image that resembles the Meno's encounter 
between the boy's act of recollecting geometric figures and Socrates' 'inscription' of 
the figures in the sand, as discussed in the previous chapter. The soul's unlimited 
powers of discursivity and recollection become represented in terms of the activities 
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of construction (i. e. recollection and inscription) so that mathematical procedures and 
their figures themselves are attributed with the potential for limitless unfoldings. 
Furthennore, the powers of recollection and writing that are brought together in the 
discursive act of inscription means that geometry is once again attributed with the 
technical (i. e. aesthetic) expression of nature and the soul, and as we will see in the 
following section, these powers are amplified, further, by the productive imagination 
of diaonetic thinking. 
The soul's productive nature is also emphasised in a number of ways. First, 
Proclus calls it the 'generatrix' through which the discursive element is produced: 
We must therefore posit the soul as the generatrix of mathematical 
forms and ideas. And if we say that the soul produces them by 
having their patterns in her own essence and that these offspring are 
the projections of forms previously existing in her, we shall be in 
agreement with Plato and shall have found the truth with regard to 
mathernatical being (CEE: 13/11). 
The geometric figure, then, is both a 'projection' and 'offspring' of the soul, 
attributing two distinct ideas of production to the operations of the soul. On the one 
hand, mathematical forms constitute imitations or images of the 'original patterns', on 
the other hand, they are considered in a 'genetic' fashion that draws attention to 
Pythagorean notions of continuity and the plenitude of forms. The nature of the 
geometric figure as a projection will be discussed below in relation to the imagination, 
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but here attention is drawn to the soul's discursivity, which becomes analogous to 
biological associations of 'life' and reproduction. As we have seen in an earlier 
section, Proclus considers this to be an important attribute of mathematic's 
discursive powers. Thus, in contrast to the understanding, which unfolds the ideas 
given to it by the nous, the soul generates its own ideas as well as receiving them 
'from elsewhere' (CEE: 16/13-14). Its relationship to Plato's notion of the 'world 
soul', which is expressed in nature, the world or the cosmos, is also made evident in 
Proclus' attention to its 'life-giving' qualifies. As a result, the notion of soul carries 
within it the idea of 'plenitude' that we will see is important to each of the geometric 
methods in which the soul is discussed, in particulaf, for Spinoza and Leibniz's 
concepts of substance. Here, however, we should be careful to note that the soul 
outlined by Proclus is primarily considered an elevated theological state and is not 
explicitly embodied as the soul of the thinking subject, rather, mathematical learning 
provides a route through which individuals should strive to reach the higher realms of 
existence. 
This need to confinn the hierarchy of the Platonic order is central to Proclus' 
argument and informs his concern that discursive learning and recollection are directed 
towards the 'discovery of pure nous' and the possibility of achieving 'the blessed 
life' (CEE: 47/38). Discursivity, learning or recollection, therefore, have an ethical 
significance that is brought about by the geometric procedure, which arises through 
the activity of thinking and it is in the activities of the soul that the immatefial, 
intelligible ideas of the nous are unfolded to become most closely associated with a 
'psychic' power. As Mueller notes, however, Proclus does, not seek to explain this 
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activity in terms of a fully embodied 'psychic' operation (in the manner that we will 
find developed in Spinoza's Ethics). But the text does suggest a 'transitional psychic 
activity' in two forms; first in mathematics' powers of discursivity and, second, in 
the soul's powers of recollection (CEE: xx). The geometric procedure of unfolding 
bears some similarity to Spinoza's Ethics, insofar as it is directed towards a 
'theological' pursuit of knowledge. In contrast, the Ethics develops this 'psychic' 
movement as an embodied knowledge in the form of a 'passage' ftom the emotions of 
the individual through to a divine love of God, as will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter. 
hnaginaýon 
The first chapter examined the production of space, time and geometry as the 
elements of the synthetic apriori and suggested that the imagination is a key faculty 
through which these ideas become formulated as aesthetic geometric figures in Kant's 
third Critique. Proclus, however, does not consider the imagination, or space and 
time, to be fully embodied into the individual, thinking subject and so, in this respect, 
Kant's examination of the formation of geometry represents a more explicit 
discussion of the embodied, synthetic a priori elements. For Proclus, the imagination 
represents a productive faculty of thinking that has the power to embody geometric 
figures and, by implication, the sense-perceptions of space and time in its empirical 
derivatives, such as mechanics or astronomy, but space and time remain implicit, 
rather than explicit orders of perception. Nevertheless, as Morrow also notes, the 
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imagination is the main innovation in Proclus' adaptation of Platonic theory that 
4 anticipates' Kant's schematism of the imagination and understanding (CEE: lix). 
The imagination is the second aspect of dianoetic thinking, contfibuting to the 
unfolding of the geometry of the nous, soul and understanding. Its contribution is 
distinct because of its relationship to matter, which means that as a source of 
geometric figures, its activities are always determined by its inherent affinity with the 
excessive or 'boundless' unlimit, rather than detennined by the orderly nature of the 
limit. (The following sections will examine this relationship in more detail). 
The imagination, then, is an embodied faculty of cognition, providing an 
original connection between its position 'in the body' and the production of images 
from the external 'undivided centre of life'. Proclus explains: 
By contrast the imagination, occupying the central position in the 
scale of knowing is moved by itself to put forth what it knows, but 
because it is not outside the body, when it draws its objects out of the 
undivided center of life, it expresses them in the medium of division, 
extension and figure (CEE: 53/42) [my emphasis]. 
In his rejection of Aristotle's classification of the imagination as 'passive' 
nous, Proclus suggests the imagination's power lies in its production of the 
multiplicity of extended beings that comprise mathematics, geometry, 'nature' and 
life. Its special relationship to extension; that is, it is an embodied cognitive faculty 
and the scope of its powers that are driven by division and indivisibility give it a 
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unique role in the unfolding of the geometric method from insensible to sensible form. 
Proclus writes; '[flor imagination, both by virtue of its formative activity and because 
it has existence with and in the body, always produces individual pictures that have 
divisible extension and shape, and everything that it knows has this kind of existence' 
(CEE: 52/41) [my emphasis]. Thus, although the imagination is restricted insofar as it 
produces images or beings that are extended, rather than immaterial, it is still a 
necessary faculty of cognition towards fulfilling the dianoetic potential of geometry. 
By giving shape to thought the imagination provides an 'intelligible matter' 
through which to describe the idea of a geometric figure; it is a kind of mathematical 
embodiment therefore, inherently concerned with the potential for divisibility and 
indivisibility (which will be exarnined in more detail in the following section in 
relation to the Pythagorean notion of unlimit that provides the imagination with an 
irreducible power of geometric figuration, further underscoring its importance in 
mathematical thinldng). Proclus reminds us, however, that the imagination does not 
produce pure ideas of the intelleM like the understanding and soul. Its images or 
projections are always secondary to the ideas produced in the understanding and 
those 'in nature' because 'the idea in the understanding is undivided, so also is the 
idea in nature' (CEE: 54/43). An ideal circle of the understanding is undivided, 
therefore, without magnitude or extension, yet 'the circle in imagination is divisible, 
formed, extended - not one only, but one and many, and not a form only, but a form 
in instances' (CEE: 54/43). But Proclus also adds that the 'abstract image' of the 
circle in the imagination provides a more adequate abstraction of the 'sensible' circle 
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in nature, which 'is inferior in precision, infected with straightness and falls short of 
the purity of immaterial circles' (CEE: 54/43). 
The imagination is, therefore, an important mathematical faculty, directed 
towards the 'blessedness' of a higher understanding, constituting a step towards the 
divine ideas of pure intellect in its ability to abstract images or projections from 
sense-objects, in contrast to the internal generation of ideas in the soul and nous. It is 
these abstractions of the sensory world (its images, projections and figures) that 
confirm its original nature of production, which is determined by its relationship to 
extended bodies and, potentially, the thinIdng subject. These powers of the 
imaginafion will also be reflected in chapter 3 in Spinoza's examination of the 
emotions and the embodied abstractions in the journey towards a state of 
blessedness; for Spinoza, imagined and projected images vAll comprise aspects of 
figures towards the 'adequacy' of the 'common notions'. In addition, although 
Leibniz explores the powers of 'perception' his notion of 'fictional' or 'approximate' 
figures as aspects of a 'sufficient reason' will also resonate with Proclus' affirtnation 
of the imagination's role in the production of extended mathematical ideas. 
Prolcus' emphasis on the acfivities of the imagination reminds us too, of 
Kant's emphasis on the dynamic nature of the productive imagination in the Critique 
ofJudgment, when he tells us that it is directed towards an activity of life because, like 
the soul, its movements are self-generated, in contrast to the 'contents' of the 
understanding which are, in themselves, static and constant. Proclus explains that the 
act of shaping matter is a form of producing extended figures in the imagination, 
noting that 'it is in imagination that the constructions, sectionings, superpositions, 
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comparisons, additions, and subtractions take place, whereas the contents of our 
understanding all stand fixed without any generation or change' (CEE: 79/64). In 
addition, the imagination's production of 'intelligible matter' forms the basis of the 
diversity of forms in nature, life and the sensory world. Proclus explains that the 
imagination provides a'common element', generating different magnitudes of a figure 
or number, such as a series of concentric circles, which are connected by the 
'immaterial substratum' of the image of the circle, yet each one distinguished by 
having a different magnitude (CEE: 53/42-3). Once again, the relationship between the 
acts of shaping and nature are brought together into an aesthetic relationship, 
anticipating Kant's concern with the 'technical' relationship between nature and art 
in the third Critique. 
The imagination has the capacity, therefore, to move in two directions; on the 
one hand, a movement travelling in the opposite direction to the unfolding of 
insensible ideas from the nous, that is an 'enfolding', which produces general 
abstractions of the sense-world. On the other hand, it represents an 'unfolding' 
movement that generates particular, extended images or projections in the sensory 
world, but is derived from the immaterial ideas of the nous. Proclus explains the 
relationship between the imagination and the understanding as follows: 
For the understanding contains the ideas but, being unable to see them 
when they are wrapped up, unfolds and exposes them and presents 
them to the imagination sitting in the vestibule; and in the imagination, 
or with its aid, it explicates its knowledge of them, happy in their 
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separation from sensible things and finding in the matter of 
imagination a medium apt for receiving its forms (CEE: 55/44). 
In addition to this activity of embedding insensible matter in sensible matter, 
the relationship between the imagination and the understanding is also characterised 
in the form of the imagination as a 'screen' onto which the understanding 'projects' 
its ideas. In this context, the imagination is a 'passive nous', but it is productive 
insofar as it provides the means through which the 'partless' ideas of the 
understanding are 'inscribed' into extended forms. Projections or diagrams provide, 
therefore, a connection between the two faculties (CEE: 56/45). 11 
in the context of the activity of 'projection' between the imagination and the 
soul, however, the imagination's images or pictures are 'passive' insofar as they are 
inscriptions of the soul's activity, yet they also represent original demonstrations of 
the imagination's powers of construction. In addition, the analogy of the imagination 
as a screen Proclus suggests that the reception of figures from the soul is a more 
'reflective' and 'inwa-d Idnd of movement: 
Therefore, just as nature stands creatively above the visible figures, so 
the soul, exercising her capacity to know, projects on the imaginafion, 
as a mirror, the ideas of the figures; and the imagination, receiving in 
pictorial form these impressions of the ideas within the soul, by their 
means affords the soul an opportunity to turn inward from the 
pictures and attend to herself (CEE: 141/113). 
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Continuing this analogy of mirror and figure in which the soul looks 'outside 
herself at the figures of the imagination, Proclus tells us that the soul is 'struck by 
the beauty' of the reflections of herself Finally, however, the soul rejects these 
reflections in favour of its 'own beauty'. Here, then, the imagination and the soul are 
brought together through the act of recollection (an enfolding) through which the soul 
distinguishes its own originality from the secondary figures of the imagination. Yet 
Proclus also acknowledges that both the soul and the imagination have an autonomy 
to move independently of the other; i. e. they are both 'self-moving'. Overall, the 
soul's abilities of recollection or reflection are more active generators of movement 
than the projection of figures received onto the screen of the imagination, but we can 
also suggest that this is a significant discussion in the Commentary when the 
imagination and the 'reflective subject' are brought into harmony in a manner that is 
highly prescient of Kant's reflective judgment. 
Thus, whilst the Commentary 'anticipates' Kant's construction of the 
synthetic a priori in which mathematics mediates between the intelligible and the 
sensible realms, the hierarchy between the two levels is more strongly demarcated in 
Proclus' thinking as a movement towards the 'blessedness' of the intellectual realm 
and the foundations of the partless One. Kant's construction of the sensible realities 
of space and time provides a more exacting embodiment of the intelligible level, even 
if it is accessible, ultimately, only through appearances. In addition, Kant's 
discussion of the imagination and pleasure and displeasure in the Critique of 
Judgment provides a more grounded psychological description of the 'double' 
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movement of unfolding and folding than Proclus' suggests, which enables a subjective 
aesthetic analysis of the imagination, space and time in relation to the insensible and 
sensible realms, which Proclus does not articulate. But, as the next two sections will 
show, despite the lack of a fully embodied psychical movement in Proclus' 
discussion, the basis of his thinking in the Pythagorean notions of limit and unlimit 
especially, provides a powerful genetic and aesthetic connection between the realms. 
Limit and unlimi 
As indicated in the previous section, the imagination's powers are distinctly 
mathematical. In this section it will be shown that Proclus' notion of mathematics is 
profoundly Pythagorean in nature, in particular, in relation to the notions of limit and 
unlimit, which radically transform the aesthetic nature of the geometric method by 
grounding its unfolding and enfolding in an irreducible and immanent continuum of the 
divine. 
Limit and unlimit amplify Proclus' Neoplatonic interpretation of metaphysics 
and science. He tells us that philosophy examines 'everything that is in anyway 
divisible as well as the nature of the indivisibles that are sovereign over them', while 
science examines and expounds 'only that indivisible nature which is appropriate to 
his first principles' (CEE: 93/76). So, under Proclus' guidance, Euclid's geometry is a 
demonstration of the metaphysics of limit and unlimit in the form of dianoetic 
thinking. Its scientific discursivity Of extended geometric figures is amplified by the 
metaphysical powers of the limit and unlimit operations. In addition, and as Morrow 
notes, the discursivity of the Commentary is itself comprised of disruptive 
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'interruptions' of Pythagorean argument (CEE: li). As we will see in the next chapter, 
these excessive interruptions or disruptive 'asides' will also be an important feature 
of the 'scholia' in Spinoza's Ethics. 
Geometric discursivity is determined, therefore, by the Pythagorean 
principles of the One, the Many, the Limit, Unlimit and Mixture. It is an ontology in 
which the divine principles are also manifest in their original sense in the sensible 
world; for example, both the divine figure, such as Number, and the sensible world, 
are constituted by a divine irreducibility (Guthrie 1987: 21). Platonic metaphysics, in 
contrast, proposes that sensible world is related to the indivisible realm through the 
mediation of another level, that is, representation or form, so that the 'contemplation' 
of the immanent divine order can only be known through appearances or 
'phenomena': 
It was different for Plato. He adopts the Pythagorean notion that 
number is the principle of order in the cosmos and life, but number as 
such to him is not yet a theion [divinity]. It points at a purely 
intelligible Number which is a'Form' [eidos] - no immanent principle 
of order within the objects, but a transcendent Example. This is the 
basic difference between the Pythagorean doctrine of number and 
Plato's Theory of Forms. Plato's philosophy is a metaphysic of the 
transcendent; the Pythagorean philosophy is a metaphysic of the 
immanent order (de Vogel 1966: 35). 
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Mathematics in Pythagorean thought constitutes, therefore, an especially 
direct demonstration of the divine laws; for example, in the operation of ratio. 
Mueller explains that the regularity of limit can be expressed in the 'even' ratio of 
2n/n (e. g. 2/1,4/2,6/3 [ ... 
]) and the irregularity of unlimit is expressed in the 'uneven' 
ratio of n+l/n (e. g. 2/1,3/2,4/3 [ ... 
]) [CFE. xxv-xKvi]. Proclus' affirmation of the 
limit and unlimit as ratios also confirms his Neoplatonic inheritance of the divine in 
the Timaeus, in which the world's soul is also expressed as a series of ratios (Plato 
1989: 36a-36b). In addition, it reminds us of the mathematical classification that Plato 
constructs in the Republic that is determined by Pythagorean principles, producing 
divisions of discrete or continuous things, which are also controlled by either, 
multiplicity (plethos), or magnitude (megethos). So, each classification is determined 
by unlimit; for example, multiplicity cannot be limited to a maximum number (poson) 
and magnitude cannot be limited to a minimum quantity (pelican) [CEE: xxvii]. 
Proclus also underlines the importance of unlimit in the Pythagorean order by 
distinguishing geometry from arithmetic because magnitude provides the grounds for 
its 'irrationality' and 'irreducibility' (CEE: 7/5). As we will see in chapter 4 below, 
these discussions of ratio, magnitude and multiplicity are important precursors to 
Leibniz's investigations into the terms in his analytic geometric method. 
Thus, geometry and arithmetic provide a discursive unfolding of the 
Pythagorean principles of the divine. In addition, the limit and unlimit constitute an 
irreducible series of originary discursive operations, in contrast to the non- 
discursivity of the ideal forms in the nous. As will be shown below, however, the 
structures of the divine powers tend to be defined in relation to the external powers 
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of the geometric figure, so that the explanation of how the limit and the unlimit might 
become 'real' 'transitional psychic activities' is not developed. As indicated in the 
section above, it is, perhaps, in the faculty of the imagination that these powers are 
embodied, however, in this respect they are considered 'sensible' rather than divine 
because they are generated from the 'impure' sources of sense-perception and 
knowledge of extended beings. 
Chapter H of the first Prologue examines the importance of lin-fit and unlimit 
in generating the discursive drives through which a totality of realities is produced. 
Derived from 'the indescribable and utterly incomprehensible causation of the One', 
they are 'all-pervading principles that generate everything from themseives' (CEE: 
5/4). So, although we find Proclus' concept of the single, ofiginal One is consistent 
with the problems of a 'formless' and unknowable 'infinity', his argument insists 
upon the discursive powers of the Pythagorean principles in the production of 
immaterial and material realities. The inexpressibility of the One is Omitted in favour 
of the discursivity that mathematics produces; for example, the discursivity between 
the geometric axioms and elements, which demonstrate the original divine 
irreducibility of the One (CEE: xviii, Note 30). 
The limit and unlimit constitute a progression of causal order. Principles 
'proceed' from them and 'go forth' into the divisions of the nous, soul, understanding 
and mathematics; for example, the stable existence of the ideal forms is determined by 
limit yet their 'variety, generative fertility, and their divine otherness and 
progression' are drawn from unlimit. Mathematical objects are the limit and unlimit's 
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'offspring', demonstrating their 'cooperation' with each other and representing 
intermediary states that 'proceed' towards infinity as a series of identifiable ratios 
under the control of limit (CEE: 6/5). But of all the 'intelligibles', that is, the 'higher 
realities', unlimit is 'the first creative cause and generative power of all things' (CEE: 
89/73). Thus, Proclus introduces a strong sense of a genetic 'plenitude' or 
development in diaonefic thinking, and an emphasis is placed on a dynamic 
discursivity grounding the notion of mathematics, to bring it into agreement with 
Plato's argument in the Republic that mathematics is the highest form of dialectic 
methods (Plato Republic: 543e, cited in CEE: 43/35). The geometric unfolding of the 
Platonic realties, from the One, nous, soul, understanding or sensible things, is 
determined, therefore, by the constitution of identity as limit, however, the plenitude 
of the Pythagorean unlimit that is immanent in all realms prevents a divide being 
instantiated between the transcendental and the sensible realms that the Divided Line 
of the Republic constructs in Book VI. 
Magnitude also provides an important aspect of the limit and unlimit in 
producing the irreducible and extended geometic continuum (and is also a key 
discussion in chapter 5 in relation to Leibniz's definition of the Monad and 
C sufficient reason). Proclus tells us that magnitudes constitute 'infinite' divisibility; 
they are 'divisible without end' yet each is 'bounded' ftom one another, providing 
another form of ratio (CEE: 6/5). For extended, geometric objects, magnitude explains 
the divisibility of matter, yet retains the irreducibility of immaterial, geometric ideas 
intact (CEE: 50/40). Magnitude constitutes, therefore, the nature of the limit and 
unlimit in extended matter, however, it is not a constituent of unextended ideas in the 
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understanding, such as the circle, which is 'one and simple and unextended'. Here 
magnitude and shape are not produced, 'for such objects in the understanding are 
ideas devoid of matter' (CEE: 54/43). Magnitude is primarily conceived in relation to 
extended entities, therefore, and so it is an important manifestation of limit and 
unlimit in the production of the geometric figure by the imagination, as is explored in 
more detail in the next section. 
lmgginafigA limit and unlimit 
Proclus undertakes a lengthy discussion of the metaphysical natures of limit 
and unlimit, and the imagination in his analysis of Euclid's first Definition; '[a] point 
is what has no parts' (Morrow 1996: 86-96/70-78). He distinguishes between the 
idea of the limit from the idea of what is delimited. Limit produces different kinds of 
figures; 'immaterial things', 'forms that require matter' and 'objects that appear in the 
imagination'. In immaterial things, limit is the indivisible unity of the thing in itsetf, 
whereas, in imaginary and material objects it is the boundary of what is contained by 
limit. 
Perfection, Proclus states, is found in the simple and primary entities rather 
than composite substances. Thus, in the immaterial things of the nous and soul the 
conditions of limit constitute the things in themselves; that is, indivisibility, 
uniformity and unity are attributable to the perfection of their interml causes. By 
contrast, extended forms are determined by external causes in which the notion of 
unity is 'imported'. For the shapes and objects of the imagination and sensible 
objects, therefore, boundary or limit is prior to matter; for example, we think of three 
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dimensional objects by attributing 'planes' to provide a limit or 'containment' to the 
figure. Two kinds of 'forms' are possible from this relationship of limit and matter; 
first, forms that can be separated into idea and matter (such as mathematical ideas) 
that sustain their own agency, that is, unity that arises from 'boundaries existing in 
themselves' and; second, those forms that are inseparable from matter, which are 
constituted by limit as 'parts' that are 'filled' with matter. The inherent 
'boundlessness' of matter represents a contaminating aspect in the possibility of an 
autonomous limit-unity being established, therefore, and results in ideas forgoing 
'their native simplicity for alien combinations and extensions' (Morrow 1996: 86/71). 
Proclus' concem vvith the metaphysical potential of limit and unlimit also 
leads him to distinguish between the 'offspring' of limit and unlimit that are generated 
by the nous and soul in relation to the 'point'. He suggests that the point constitutes 
an autonomous limit, 'completely without parts' and yet also 'secretly contains the 
potentiality of the unlimit'. Significantly, by insisting upon the more radical 
Pythagorean concept of limit in which matter is constitutive of limit as difference 
within the monad (rather than an external application of classification or forni), it is 
possible for Proclus to state that the particular, extended, geometric figure is an 
example of 'self-sufficient' limit '[t]he point, then being a limit, preserves its 
character when things participate in it' (CEE: 88n2). The axiomatic point therefore 
outwardly expresses limit, whilst also inwardly, that is, 'secretly' possessing unlimit 
from which its potential for discursive and indivisible plenitude, 'everywhere' in the 
cosmos, is defived (CEE: 92/75). 
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This paradox of the partless limit introduces an important operation in 
geometric thinldng, which Proclus goes on to consider in relation to the imagination's 
powers (and also precedes the power of 'vice-diction' in Leibniz's discussions, as we 
will see in chapter 4). Proclus emphasises that the indivisibility of the point is given 
to the imagination by the nous and soul. Once received by the imagination it is 
shaped and divided into extended matter and, because it has the 'double character of 
indivisibility and divisibility', the point is understood to be both divided and 
undivided in 'intervals' (CEE: 95/78). 
The Pythagorean definition of the point underscores this condition; the point 
is 'a unit that has position', which arises from it being produced 'in the bosom of the 
imagination [so that it] is therefore enmattered' (CEE: 95n7). Proclus explains that, 
as a unit (number or arithmetic), it is determined independently of position, whereas 
as the point (figure or geometry), it is determined by position. The relationship 
between the point, imagination and embodiment is, therefore, a shift from an abstract 
intellectual concept of (pure) Number into a concept that is inherently concerned 
with extension and limit: Jbly contrast the point is projected in imagination and 
comes to be, as it were, in a place and embodied in intelligible matter' (CEE. 96/78). 
The faculty of the imagination is central, therefore, to the relationship between limit 
and unlimit in the geometric method and the point's status as a kind of 'interval'. 
(This is an important development in which to note briefly, that space and 
time are implied as limits of the imagination. The discussion has a resemblance to the 
discussions about space and time's iffeducible unity in Leibniz's Monad and 
Bergson's discussion of 'perception' in chapters 5 and 6. The succession of 
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'impressions' in time and the simultaneous occupation of space is also implied, 
which Proclus argues prevents the collapse into pure divisibility. In addition, in the 
following paragraphs Proclus writes that indivisibility is also a characteristic of time: 
a discussion, however, that is too large to be expanded here, in detail). 12 
But in answer to the question; 'how is the indivisible point possible if the 
imagination is determined by limit, shaping and divisionT Proclus writes 'that the 
imagination in its activity is not divisible only, neither is it indivisible' (CEE: 95m). 
The imagination is neither, exclusively, divisible or indivisible, rather, it moves 'from 
the undivided to the divided, from the unformed to what is formed'. If the 
imagination was divisible 'it would be unable to preserve in itself the various 
impressions of the objects that come to it, since the later ones would obscure those 
that preceded them - just as no body can at the same time in the same place have a 
series of shapes, for the earlier ones are erased by the later'. Or, he continues, if it 
were only indivisible, the imagination would 'view everything as undivided', as do 
the understanding and the soul, and could not 'exercise form-giving functions' (CEE: 
95/77). 
An irreducible indivisibility defines the point, Proclus concludes. It is 'the 
being' of the point and, as a result, because it is derived from the point, the line is 
also determined by partlessness. Limit, therefore, attributes extension in the form of 
the point or 'interval'. Proclus writes that; '[p]ossessing this double character of 
divisibility and divisibility, the imagination contains the point in undivided and 
intervals in divided fashion' (CEE: 95/78). 
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This infinite partlessness forms the basis for Proclus' explanation of 
Definition 11 in the Elements; ja] line is length without breadth' (CEE, 97/79). 
Employing the ]Pythagorean principles of the divine monad, dyad, triad and tetrad 
Proclus explains the discursivity between one geometric principle and another. 
Geometric limits are shown to express a confluence of divine states; for example, the 
point is equated with the monad because it is 'a limit only', but it is also 'twofold' 
because it is neither 'wholeness nor parts'. in addition, he observes that a 
'forthgoing' dialectic between the attributes of the monad and dyad is produced in the 
definition because the line has parts and is a unity; that is, the line is infinitely 
divisible since it is an extended entity (monad) and because it is 'extended oneness 
and generates duality' it also demonstrates the properties of the dyad (CEE: 98/80). 
But, ultimately, limit and unlimit are divine states, existing independently of 
matter and are, therefore, 'intelligible' not sensible 'agents', of extension. As we will 
see in the following chapters, these definitions will become increasingly 'embodied' in 
Spinoza and Leibniz's theories of discussions of infinite 'substance'. Now in the 
follovAng section, limit and unlimit are examined in relation to the discursivity of the 
geometric objects, elements and figures. 
Discursivi1y of the element 
In this section the axiomatic structure of the text, its elements and figures are 
examined in more detail, preparing the way for the following chapters on Spinoza and 
Leibniz in which we will also see that the axiomatic structure of each text contributes 
to the aesthetic form of the geometric method; for example, Spinoza employs it to 
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emphasise, of his 'affirmation' of an indivisible God and Leibniz uses axiomatic 
statements in order to underpin an infinitely divisible limit. 
In the Commentary, Proclus writes that mathematical figures are produced in 
the nous as immaterial forms. But the plenitude of an inherent indivisibility in the 
dianoetic method means that they mediate between the divine and the matefial 
worlds. Thus, 'numbers, points, lines, planes, and all their derivatives' mediate 
between the insensible and sensible objects 'since they are independent of matter', 
but they also have attributes of extension, insofar as they can be divisible into parts; 
that is, they have a certain kind of 'mathematical matter' (CEE: p. Iviii). 
Geometric objects are immanent to their method, each determined by the limit 
and unlimit so that 'unfolding' is itself a form of geometric figure, an expression of 
the dialectic of the limit and unlimit operations. Dianoetic or 'imaginative and 
discursive thinking' is, therefore, 'triadic' because it is comprised of a 'mixture' of the 
three orders of knowledge and their respective cognitive powers; the nous or 
intuition, the understanding or discourse, and sense or opinion are brought together to 
constitute 'a texture of all these strands' (CEE: 35/29). Thus, an inherent continuity 
underpins the term 'element', Proclus explains: 
We call 'elements' those theorems whose understanding leads to the 
knowledge of the rest and by which the difficulties in them are 
resolved. As in written language there are certain primal elements, 
simple and indivisible, to which we give the name [ ... 
] and but of 
which every word is constructed, and every sentence, so also in 
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geometry as a whole there are certain primary theorems that have the 
rank of starting-points for the theorems that follow, being implicated 
in them all and providing demonstrations for many conjunctions of 
qualities; and these we call 'elements' [ ... 
] (CEE: 72-73/59-60). 
Proclus' promotion of the unlimit as the first 'creative cause' of both simple 
and complex elements underpins his analysis to reveal the potential of the 
discontinuity in the discursive geometric method; for example, the discontinuous 
potential of the figure is evident in Book One of the Elements in the form of problems 
and theorems that provide explanations 'interwoven' into the ends of sections (CEE. 
82/67). Proclus tells us that problems and theorems represent two different modes of 
a proposition; problems are 'the construction offigures, the division of them into 
sections, subtractions from and additions to them, and in general the characters that 
result from such procedures'. Theorems are 'concemed with demonstrating inherent 
properlies belonging to each figure' (CEE: 77/63) [my emphasis]. Thus, a proposition 
is a figure, defined by two different modes of operation; construction or 
demonstration. Furthermore, the theorem is concerned with the general whereas, the 
problem is concerned with the particular; '[i]n general, then, all cases in which the 
property is universal, that is, coextensive with the whole of the matter, must be 
called theorems; but whenever the character is not universal, that is, does not belong 
to the whole genus of the subject, then it must be called a problem' (CEE: 80/65). 
Thus, Proclus defines theorems as analytic because they contain 'only a given 
attribute, not its antithesis also', and problems as synthetic because they 'admit the 
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possibility of antithetical predicates in its matter - the attribute sought as well as its 
opposite' (CEE: 80/65), Problems, then, represent an ampliative figure because their 
subject matter is comprised of different elements, whilst still being considered as 
particular versions of propositions. Contained within the different branches and 
operations of the PrOPOsitions, therefore, a range of analytic or synthetic figures 
becomes possible. (The possibility that geometry is both synthetic and analytic 
remains an important discussion in the following chapters, in which Spinoza and 
Leibniz offer divergent solutions). 
Proclus' analysis of the diversity of the elements states that, like theorems 
and problems, axioms and postulates are distinct from each other in a similar fashion. 
Both axioms and theorems 'take for granted things that are immediately evident to 
our knowledge and easily grasped by our untaught understandings'; for example, that 
a straight line is the shortest distance between two points (CEE: 179/140). Second, 
axioms are 'clear knowledge without demonstration', just as theorems are 'knowing 
from demonstration' (CEE: 179/140-141). So, axioms and theorems display 
characteristics of completion and a unitary identity. 
Postulates and problems undertake a more speculative form of deduction, 
assuming that a figure can be posited as a simple idea without demonstration; for 
example, a spiral, or an equilateral triangle, can be easily be assumed without 
demonstration, but in the act of drawing 'complex motions' are revealed (CEE: 179- 
181/140-142). Postulates and problems require an additional act of construction in 
order for them to be realised, that is, each is determined by the production of an 
image or figure; they are determined by the act of figuration, each aided by the 
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construction or 'exhibition of a character'. So, although postulates are given the same 
general character as axioms insofar as they are 'undemonstrated starting point', yet 
they differ because they require an additional construction to be completed. Proclus 
tells us that postulates are considered to be specific to geometry, therefore, whereas 
axioms are generic (universal) to all the sciences of quantity and magnitude (CEE- 
182/142). He concludes that there are three ways of distinguishing between axioms 
and postulates stating that; a. postulates 'produce' and axioms 'know'; b. postulates 
are the particular 'subject matter of geometry' (for example, drawing is required to 
prove 'that all right angles are equal') and; c. (in agreement with Aristotle), that 
postulates demonstrate proof, whereas axioms are beyond demonstration (CEE: 182- 
183/142-143). Thus, we can suggest that the postulate and the problem produce a 
more explicit discursive link to the sense world because they are more complex, 
requiring demonstration of the unextended idea through the act of drawing the 
extended geometric figure. Once again, like Plato's Meno and Kant's concern with the 
technical actions of the imagination, an emphasis on the synthetic act of geometric 
thinking reveals that an aesthetic act ofconstruction is required. 
The importance of the multiplicity of the geometiic method is further 
suggested in Proclus' examination of the elements, the 'lemma' and the 'porism'. A 
lemma designates 'any proposition invoked for the purpose of establishing another' 
and requires a particular 'mental aptitude' which directs two methods of explication: 
analysis and '&aeresis' (division), or the 'reduction to impossibility'. Proclus 
considers 'diaeresis' to be a kind of 'lemma' because it 'does not directly show the 
thing itself that is wanted but by refuting its contradictory [nature] indirectly 
92 
establishes its truth' (CEE. 212/166). Thus, a lemma is an intermediate or partial 
figure and is produced as a result of the difference existing between two other 
elements. 
Second, Proclus defines the 'porism' as a particular kind of problem that 
designates the liberation of 'some other theorem', and is 'an incidental gain resulting 
from the scientific demonstration'. It is a kind of by-product, 'bonus' or discovery, 
therefore, that lies between problems and theorems and is explained in two forms. 
First, it is 'a theorem whose establishment is an incidental result of the proof of 
another theorem, a lucky find' and second, it is 'problems whose solution requires 
discovery, not merely construction or simple theory' (CEE: 212/166). A porism is, 
therefore, a figure produced by speculation or hypothesis, rather than by a deductive 
and deterministic construction. In addition, like the lemma, it is an intennediate 
figure. Proclus wfites: 
But to find the centre of a given circle, or the greatest common 
measure of two given commensurable magnitudes, and the like - these 
lie in a sense between problems and theorems. For in these inquiries 
there is no construction of the things sought but a finding of them. 
Nor is the procedure purely theoretical; for it is necessary to bring 
what is sought into View and exhibit it before the eyes (CEE: 
302/236). 
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So, even though Proclus endorses the scientific necessity of geometry that is 
based upon 'self evident' and 'determinate first principles' he repeatedly emphasises 
the complexity within and between elements and, in particular, the eruptions of 
difference that are produced in the aesthetic acts of drawing and thinking (CEE: 
75/61). As a result, we find that the construction of the elements is constituted by 
multiple, discursive operations that unfold an aesthetic geometric method. In the final 
section of this chapter we will look more closely at the structure of the figure, in 
order to show the extent to which it further intensifies these differences within a 
discursive continuum. 
Figure 
Section MV of the Definitions analyses Euclid's tenn figure; a 'figure is that 
which is contained by any boundary or boundaries' (CEE: 136-146/109-117). 
Proclus states that it is 'something that results from change, wising from an effect 
produced in things that are struck, or divided, or decreased, or added to, or altered in 
form, or affected in any one of various other ways'. To demonstrate the figure's 
discursivity, Proclus outlines the ascending hierarchy of figures in six levels; 1. the 
sensible figures of 'art', 2. 'nature's craftsmanship', 3. the 'heavenly bodies' or 
'intelligible forms', 4. 'figures of souls', 5. the 'intelligible figures' and finally, 6. the 
C unknowable gods'. Figure, then, is a notion that is 'derived from the first causes' of 
the gods and, although there is an increasing descent from the perfection of the gods 
to the imperfect material figures, Proclus rejects the Neoplatonic suggestion that 
sensible figures are incomplete versions of the higher forms, stating that they too 
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c contain the primary cause of their products'. Nor does he accept the suggestion that 
the immaterial figures of souls or intelligible figures 'lack reality' (CEE: 139-140/111- 
112). Rather, immaterial and material figures are shown to have a certain kind of self- 
sufficient agency, similar to the reflective agency of the soul. Each figure contains 
'self-moving ideas' of 'other things' that are external to it, which 'unfold' internally 
in the figure to 'bring back all things to themselves and enclose them'. Thus, at each 
level, the figure has the ability to apprehend itself depending upon the magnitude of 
its powers; for example, the gods have knowledge of the universe, souls have 
'immaterial thought and spontaneous knowledge' and figures in nature 'create 
appearances' (CEE: 141/112). 
Having made these distinctions, Proclus explains the relationship between 
movement and the figure through a Pythagorean principle; '[c]learly, then, the self- 
moved figure is apriori to what is moved by another, the partless is prior to the self- 
moved; and the prior to the partless is the figure which is identical with unity' (CEE: 
142/113). The figure becomes multiple in its potential forms, therefore, structured 
through 'movement' in which the divine exists in all states. But although the scope of 
this movement is restricted to the hierarchical order of perfection in which the sense 
object will always be less autonomous than the divine, the figure is not reduced to a 
merely formal categorisation of a 'static' identity. 
In debating the nature of 'unity' in the geometric figure Proclus also reminds 
us that the figure produced in the imagination is extended and bounded, exhibiting the 
'twofold progression of the limit and the unlimited' (CEE: 143/114). He then 
considers the validity of Euclid's definition of figure suggesting that, although it is 
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contained, the figure is nevertheless considered as a 'whole', rather than a separation 
of matter and boundary. So, according to Proclus' examination, the self-sufficiency of 
the figure and 'the powers it contains' are affirmed. (Furthermore, this emphasis on 
the 'autonomy', 'powers' and 'self-sufficiency' of a heterogeneous series of figures 
will also be important discussions for Spinoza and Leibniz). 
Figure constitutes, therefore, a multiplicity of limits or boundaries in which 
containment is undermined so that a figure is conceptualised by its own 'self- 
sufficient' singularity, rather than measured as an imitation of a primary 'genus'. This 
discursive distinction is also promoted in the emphasis on the relationship between 
the figure as a successive 'interval' or singularity in the unfolding method. The 
geometric figure represents a qualitative series of differentials that are 'irreducible' to 
the reductive notion of a single essence or limit so that the 'primary cause' of the 
figure becomes, not 'incomplete processes', but a generative power or movement 
unfolding between and intemally within each figure. 
Finally, in a series of definitions of the figure, which we will see recur in the 
writings of Spinoza and Leibniz especially, Proclus summarises the origins of the idea 
of figure and suggests that its mulitiplicity is determined by five conditions. First, the 
idea of the figure is descended from the limit and unlimit, i. e. it is a 'mixture' of the 
two and is, therefore, inherently irreducible. Second, it has a unity that is constituted 
by 'different forms'; for example, the different parts of a circle or rectilinear figure. 
Third, it 'has the potency of thoroughgoing plurality', exhibiting an infinity of shapes 
and magnitudes in an unceasing 'unfolding'. So, just as the One is contained in the 
idea of the figure, circular lines 'are implicated in straight [lines] and straight in 
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circular'. But, as we will see below, this notion of continuity, though appealing is 
problematic because of the synthetic nature of the geometric figure (Leibniz, on the 
other hand, produces a more successful notion of analytic continuity). Fourth, figure 
is commensurate with the successive development of complexity and the 
'inexhaustible' discursivity of arithmetic and number. Fifth, it has a 'secondary' and 
harmonious internal order of unity which can be divided into similar extended or 
unextended parts; for example, the division of a triangle or square into smaller 
versions (CEE: 144-145/115-116). 
Thus, although there is a transcendental hierarchy of perfection towards the 
divine limit and unlimit, the concept of boundary or limit is nevertheless immanent to 
each figure's autonomy (CEE: 146/116). Extended georneffic objects are aesthetic 
demonstrations of the method's discursive movement providing the possibility for a 
continuous unfolding or continuum between the states to be expressed. The geometric 
figure of the 'fold' is understood, therefore, to be an unlimited, limit operation, 
however, because it is determined externally by the divine principles of discursivity, 
limit and unlimit; the scope of internal differentiation remains undeveloped. 
Conclusion 
Proclus constructs an aesthetic and discursive continuity from Euclid's 
geometric method and figures in the Commentary, however, the nature of the 
transformative principle of the unfolding is problematic insofar as it is determined by 
external differences of limit and unlimit that constitutes its 'synthetic' status. We are 
left with the problem that the geometric figures are derived from synthetic and, 
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therefore, external differences; for example, difference is reliant upon the external, 
synthetic status of the limit, unlimit and mixture, which limits the extent to which 
Proclus can distinguish the internal changes that generate different figures. Thus, 
although each figure is a discrete, differentiated limit within the irreducibility of 
unlimit, they are determined by the 'external' powers of limit and unlimit. This will 
be returned to as a key discussion in chapter 5 in which Leibniz provides an analytic 
order of change to articulate an intelligible transformation between geometric figures, 
in the form of an internal and intensive limit or ratio. 
So, to the extent that the figures of unfolding and folding (the fold) are 
deten-nined by the divine and original causes of the limit and unlimit, they represent 
discontinuous unifies. Pythagorean principles generate the discursivity of geometric 
figures and elements, counteracting the precedence of a representational and formal 
order. In addition, the theological, metaphysical and aesthetic powers of these 
principles suggest a series of discontinuous unities. But, although the discursive 
movement still upholds the transcendence of the nous, World, Soul/Reason in the 
form of the mystical powers of the limit and unlimit the actual internal changes 
between its figures are not defined in analytic terms, meaning that the claim that 
multiplicity exists is still at odds with a clear understanding of the empirical forms of 
geometry. Sensible beings are imbued with a Icind of iffeducibility; however, this 
explanation relies upon a 'mystical' solution, rather than intelligible psychological 
explanations. 
In addition, although the self-sufficiency of figures is suggested, their internal 
discursivity is not as clearly defined in terms of embodied or human 'psychic 
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activities'. The importance of an internal folding and unfolding is hinted at, lessening 
the emphasis on external reason, but the imagination and the soul are primarily 
characterised as 'logical functions' rather than embodied 'physio-psychic' processes 
generated by the subject. 
Finally, although the 'synthetic' order admits the intermediary status of the 
geometric figure, such as the mixture, it is not considered in terms of a series of 
internal differences. Each figure's singularity is a finite identity limit, versus the 
infinitude of an internal and analytic continuum in which the figure's unity is 
constructed through synthetic and analytic differences. In the following chapters, 
however, we will find Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson propose aesthetic geometries in 
which the method and figure become fully commensurate with the internal, 
autonomous irreducibility of the thinking subject. 
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Chapter 3: Passag 
For Spinoza, the geometric method is 'expressed' in the axiomatic structure of 
his text, the Fthics. ' But, in contrast to Proclus' named procedure of 'unfolding', 
Spinoza does not classify his aesthetic procedure so that the figure of the 'passage' 
proposed in this chapter is not a term that can be found written in the text itself 
Rather, it is presented here as a mode of reading or thinking (i. e. engagement) that 
emerges as the text develops. Passage, therefore, is a kind of 'comportment' or ethic 
that is produced in the reader by the text; the text represents an aesthetic geometric 
method because it brings the axiomafic scientific method together with the aesthetic 
experience of reading the text to produce an ethical subject or reader. As a result, a 
'forgotten' aesthetic geometry is configured through the reader's enactment of (or 
attentiveness to) modes of livin& rather than in the form of a 'drawn' or 'technical' 
geometric figure that Proclus or Kant propose. 
Before analysing the Ethics, however, it will be useful to insert a short 
cscholia' to explain the context of the geometric method that Spinoza inherits from 
his readings of Descartes' philosophy and indicating the extent to which Spinoza's 
method engages with Cartesian developments in geometric thinking. 2 
Geometric method after Descartes 
Descartes' writings on scientific method include the Discourse on Method 
(1637) and the Principles ofPhilosophy (1644) and Spinoza's understanding of these 
texts provides a critical, yet respectful, exanunation of Descartes' Cartesian 
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metaphysical principles. In his 'Commentary on Descartes Principles' (1663) 
Spinoza agrees with Descartes about the value of a proper scientific comportment for 
providing 'clear and distinct' ideas. Both philosophers view the analytic and 
synthetic forms of science to be the best way in which understandings about the 
perfection of God can be reached. Geometry is conceived, first and foremost, as a 
scientific discipline that provides evidence of clear and distinct ideas about God's 
perfection. 
The importance of the analytic and synthetic method to both philosophers is 
made evident in Lodewijk Meyer's introduction to Spinoza's Commentary. Meyer 
cites Descartes' definition of the two methods to distinguish between the different 
modes in which the mathematical, axiomatic method produces results from 
'Definitions, Postulates and Axioms'. Descartes' definition of analytic method in his 
Reply to the Second Objections (1642) is that 'which shows the true way by which 
the thing was discovered, methodologically, and as it were apriori'; and his definition 
of the synthetic method is that: 
which uses a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms and theorems, 
and problems, so that if a reader denies one of the consequences, the 
presentation shows him that it is contained immediately in the 
antecedents, and so forces his assent from him, no matter how stubborn 
3 
and contrary he may be' (Curley 1985: 1,129,5-13/226). 
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In addition, Meyer notes that Descartes' contribution to the development of 
the axiomatic method is its modification into the rational, analytic form and its 
subsequent impact on other sciences and philosophy. Descartes' concern with the 
analytic and the synthetic methods, therefore, inform Spinoza's Commentary. 
But, although Meyer considers Descartes' innovations to be concerned with 
the analytic method, this chapter will emphasise the extent to which Spinoza's 
method is most strongly defined by the synthetic method, in particular-, in his use of 
the 'scholia'. I-fis Commentary, for example, is organised according to Descartes 
analytic method in the Principles but, like the Ethics, it also demonstrates Spinoza's 
own deliberate investigations into the synthetic procedure. The Prolegomenon of the 
Commentary states, for example, that Descartes' analytic method 'brought to light 
solid foundations for the sciences, and finally, by what means he freed himself from 
all doubts'; however, Spinoza also highlights the importance of the synthelic form of 
the results that are produced by the mathematical method (Curley 1985: 1,141,8- 
9/23 1). He writes that Descartes' clear and distinct ideas are significant because they 
do not represent a series of discrete conclusions but 'should all be seen in a single act 
ofcontemplation, as in a picture' (Curley 1985: 1,141,8-9/23 1) [my emphasis]. The 
form of the results has, therefore, an aesthetic significance for Spinoza, in addition to 
their analytic structure. 
This attention to the aesthetic manner in which the geomet6c method 
produces its forms is also evident in Spinoza's emphasis on the different 'modes of 
thinking' that constitute Descartes' thinking subject, which provides a key difference 
between the two philosophers. In the Prolegomenon and repeated throughout the 
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Commentary Spinoza draws attention to the way in which Descartes' thinking is 
constituted by different modes of thought, some of which provide clear 
understanding and some less, depending upon their cause. He writes: 
So when he said, I think, all these modes of thinking were understood, 
viz. Doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, not willing, 
imagining and sensing. 
But here the chief things to be noted - because they will be 
very useful later, when we deal with the distinction between the mind 
and body - are (i) that these modes of thinking are understood clearly 
and distinctly without the rest, concerning which there is still doubt, 
and (ii) that the clear and distinct concept we have of them is made 
obscure and confused, if we wish to ascribe to them anything 
concerning which we still doubt (Curley 1985: L 145,15-23/234-235). 
Later, in his Corollory to Descartes' Proposition 4, Spinoza explains that 
knowledge of our body is less clear than knowledge of our mind, writing; '[hjence it is 
evident that the mind, or thinking thing, is better known than the body f ... 
]' (Curl ey 
1985: 1,53,5-7/242). Thus, although Spinoza recognises that the body is distinct 
from the mind because it does not produce clear understandings of the subject, it is 
still a necessary mode of man's existence. In addition, Spinoza follows Descartes' 
analysis of the 'different degrees of reality, or being' to emphasise that the modes in 
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which an infinite substance exists are not matters of 'accident' but are distinct states 
of being. Considering Axiom 4 he writes: 
This axiom comes to be known just from the contempLaiion of our 
ideas, of whose existence we are certain, because the are modes of y 
thinking. For we know how much reahty or perfechon the idea of 
suhstance affirms of a suhstance, and much the idea of mode affirms of 
a mode. Hence we necessarilyfind that the idea of substance contains 
more objective reality than that of some accident (Curley 1985: 1,155, 
1-5/243). 
Descartes' clear, analytical distinctions of the different and special parts of 
the thinking subject is a major source from which Spinoza's geometric method is 
developed, enabling him to produce both an analytic and a synthetic examination of 
the human subject in the axiomatic or geometric fonn. But Descartes' and Spinoza's 
thinking differs most with respect to the definition of substance and the resulting 
union between the mind and the body (see also, Curley's Preface to the Commentwy 
in which he states that the main difference lies in Descartes belief that the mind is a 
distinct kind of substance [Curley 1985: 22 1]). 4 In addition, by higbligWng 
Spinoza's attention to the 'modes' of thinking in Descartes' method in the 
Commentary, we can see how Spinoza develops his notions of the union of the tnind 
and body as particular modes of an infinite substance, rather than relegating the body 
to an unthinking or 'accidental' form of substance. 
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Geometric method in the Ethics 
Spinoza's Ethics (1677) is a text that provides a distinctly 'human' 
understanding of the geometric method. Spinoza employs the geometric method in 
order to demonstrate the proof of God's existence and omnipotence and to provide a 
5 
practical' guide about how to achieve this understanding. The axiomatic method is 
considered, therefore, to be a meaningful procedure through which to demonstrate 
metaphysical, theological and psychological steps towards 'perfection'. 
On the one hand, we find that it is confinned as a scientific procedure, and on 
the other, it demonstrates the route through which the senses (i. e. emotions) can 
become a productive aspect of understanding, that is, of a joyful life. The Ethics is a 
significant teA in the very least, because it affirms the possibility of a science of the 
emotions, constituting an early form of 'psychology' that brings together the 
scientific form of the geometric method with the mutability of the emotions. Thus, 
unlike Proclus, who is silent on the details of the senses and their union with the 
higher ideas, Spinoza proposes that the aesthetic formation of geometric ideas is a 
valuable means through which to demonstrate the unity of the immaterial 'mind' and 
the material 'body' in a study of the senses. In Spinoza's method, therefore, we see 
precursors to Kant's aesthetics in which the sensibility is considered to be both a 
meaningful subject of the apriori scientific method (cf. Baumgarten's 'aesthetic') and 
representative of the subject's experiences of pleasure and pain that constitute the 
passage towards a transcendental notion of the subject. (In addition, reading the 
Ethics is a demanding undertaking for the reader, since he/she is expected to engage 
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with a text that is technically intense, both as a scientific and an aesthetic 
experience). ' 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the geometric method was a 
discursive and synthetic unfolding from the mystical powers of limit and unlimit. 
Geometric figures were, therefore, comprised of a transcendental multiplicity and 
sufficiency, driven by Proclus' Pythagorean commitment to the hierarchy of 
unextended intellect over extended matter. Under these principles infinity was 
primary, but its source was an immaterial, unknowable infinity (the One). As a 
result extended things - e. g. the body, senses and extended Nature - were reduced to 
impure versions of the pure, higher intellect, and situated into a continuum of figures 
that were unexplained in terms of the structure of the union between their immaterial 
and material constituents, the body, soul and mind. Recollecting that Proclus' 
geometric figure of the fold was implied in the operations of the soul, understanding 
and the imagination, it also remained limited to a set of ideal elements because it was 
not explained in relation to its potential as an embodied subject. Thus, the figure of 
the fold was always an implied action in the discursive 'unfolding'; its acts, although 
described as intermediary figures, were grounded in an ideal notion of development, 
synthetic but not yet developed into a clear union of unextended and extended 
substance. In addition, the method tended to represent 'general' ideas of the soul, 
understanding and imagination that did not describe the transition from the immaterial 
realm into a conduct of living-, for example, the discursivity of the soul and its 
relationship to the imagination was explained through the analogy of representations. 
The possibility of a 'reason' derived from the emotions was denied and so the 
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unfolding structure of Proclus' method never made the transition from the abstract to 
the corporeal figure. 
For Spinoza, however, the relationship between the body and mind is central 
to his metaphysics, positing a notion of unity that is brought about through 
inherently embodied human conditions; the emotions. In addition, infinity is not 
restricted to the immaterial realms, but is the basis, ultimately, for the single 
indivisible substance (God as Nature). The possibility of 'real' expressions of a 
transcendental infinity in multiple and extended beings is central to Spinoza's 
thinkin& as Feldman notes in his introduction to the Rhics; 'how does extended 
substance come about from unextended substanceT and, 'how do the two interact if 
they are self-sufficient? ' (Ethics 1992: 9). 7 As a result, we will see that these 
questions lead to two persistent levels of metaphysical inquiry in the text: first, a 
defence of substance, not as extension, but as existence, which situates God as 
substance, i. e. as Nature, rather than God as an abstract idea that is separated from 
the material world. 
Second, the text examines embodiment in terms of a series of modes of 
existence in which different modes of the multiplicitous substance are underpinned 
by the modality of the axiomatic procedure and the scholatic episodes. As a result of 
its various modes of expression, therefore, the geometric method is considered to 
generate intrinsic differences in which each mode is a distinct, self-contained 
expression. In addition, the 'parallel' attributes of the mind and body are suggested in 
the 'logical' unfolding of the axiomatic method and the intuitive and 'corporeal' 
scholia that reflect the indivisible infinity of Spinoza's univocal substance. 
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Thus, in contrast to Proclus, for whom discursivity is a route of ideal 
knowledge and relations, discursivity in Spinoza is re-configured into an embodied 
passage through the sensibility. The Ethics provides an examination of the unity 
between the unextended mind and extended body that are derived from a 
multiplicitous substance, representing a passage through the emotions in which the 
union of the immaterial and the material is not just given by the faculty of the 
imagination, but arises from the unruly, excessive affects of the sense-perception and 
demonstrates the immanent expression of God. Proclus' concept of unfolding passes 
into a method in which the notion of the figure becomes the body in process, a lived 
body or subject, so that 'truth' and the 'stepping-stone' towards it is presented as a 
life j oumey, a theological and a psychological path. " 
The chapter begins the discussion, therefore, in an examination of the notion 
of substance in relation to the dialectic of limit and unlimit, in order to demonstrate 
the text's metaphysical structure and geometric 'discursivity' as it is embodied in 
God, Nature and man (also notin& briefly the differences between Spinoza and 
Leibniz's strategies). The chapter then examines the key 'elements' of Spinoza's 
method that demonstrate this infinite substance - that is, the attributes, modes, 
affects and 'common notions' - to suggest that Spinoza demonstrates the unfolding 
of his infinite substance in a step-by-step way, which he describes as 'ordine 
geometrico demonstrala' (E: 7). 9 This discussion also affirins the infinite perfection 
of God that is laid out in the deductive procedure of the geometric method and points 
to the importance of 'practical' demonstration in Spinoza's thinking, i. e. how to 
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achieve a 'perfect' unity between body and mind. This discussion then leads to a 
brief examination about the development of the imagination and memory in which 
Proclus' cognitive faculty becomes more closely associated with the 'psychical' 
operations of Kant's understanding of imagination and Bergson's examination of 
memory. 
Having established the 'elements' of the geometric method, the chapter tums 
its attention to its textual delivery that represents a passage through the axiomatic 
and scholatic forms, and considers the manner in which geometric examples are used 
to provide particularly 'embodied' forms of geometric thinking in the 'scholia'. The 
chapter suggests, therefore, that the aesthetic structure of the text demonstrates the 
heterogeneous and internal structure of the geometric figure of 'passage' and its 
development between these elements and the scholia (which also extend the text's 
possibility into a series of 'extemal' states). 
Sulistance 
As noted in the earfier 'scholia' on Descartes, Spinoza's break from the 
Cartesian tradition is most strongly expressed in his argument for a univocal, yet 
infinite, substance. Challenging Descartes' postulation that extension and thought are 
two distinct substances Spinoza proposes that there is one, indivisible substance that 
immanently manifests the infinity of God in nature and man. The E6Wcs provides, 
therefore, a continuation of the Stoics' belief in the divine principles of the indivisible 
One and the Many in the context of seventeenth century debates of finity and 
infinity, substance and 'atomism'. 10 (It is a text that is informed by the various forms 
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of these debates, including theories of atomism, bodies and motion in the natural 
sciences and physics, in addition to aesthetic and metaphysical concems). This 
discussion, however, focuses on how Spinoza's theories of substance, attributes, 
modes and affects embody the transcendental limit and unlimit and suggests that 
these 'elements' represent a set of geometric and 'aesthetic' conditions. 
As this and the following chapter show, both Spinoza and Leibniz tackle the 
problem of Cartesian substance through the dialectic of the limit and unlimit in 
relation to its corporeal embodiment. For Spinoza, the solution is found in positing a 
cunivocal' substance in which the synthetic notions of limit and, unlimit are 
reconstructed as the union of the emotions and the corporeal subject. Leibniz takes a 
route in the opposite direction in which limit and unlimit become analytic magnitudes 
of difference. A number of important similarities between the two methods are 
evident, however; 
1. the geometric method is a process that constructs both internal and external 
relations, but is generated fi7om within the individual subject. For Spinoza, the 
modalities of human emotions (the affects) enable the subject to understand the 
external enviromnent and objects and, for Leibniz, the infinite divisibility of the 
Monad produces a continuum between its interior and exterior; 
2. Spinoza's affects and Leibniz's limit generate discursive geometries that are 
characterised by intensity, rather than logical or mechanical relations of agreement 
thereby providing important precedents to Kant's concern with 'feeling' in the 
Critique ofJu6kment, 
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3. formal difference is constituted internally and is expressed externally, i. e. it is not 
derived from an extemal source. 
So, the dialectic between divisibility and indivisibity is the primary generator 
for Spinoza's axiomatic discussion of substance, which sets out to define the 
conditions of infinity in relation to a divine notion of the One (E: 31). Part 1, 
'Concerning God', begins by explaining that finity and infinity are the causes of God 
and Nature, which affirms the 'divine' origins of the world. In addition, these 
principles form the basis from which Spinoza constructs a geometric method that 
unifies God's immaterial infinity with extended or embodied modes of being. 
In Definition 1, Spinoza tells us that God 'exists' absolutely and is 'self- 
caused'. -In the following five Definitions and Explication, God's absolute, infinite 
existence is distinguished from the 'limited' finitude of things, thought or bodies. 
Although God is unlimited, bodies and things are limited, insofar as one thought will 
limit another, one body will limit another. Different modes of substance, therefore, 
cannot affect another kind, so that limit is determined by the nature of substance, 
rather than the nature of the entity or thing in which it is expressed. So, Definition 3 
explains Spinoza's concept of substance: 
By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself, that is, that the conception of which does not require the 
conception of another thing from which it has to be formed (E 1992: 
31). 
III 
In contrast to the Neoplatonic belief that the higher realms of intelle4 reason, 
the world and the gods constitute a distinct kind of knowledge that is inaccessible to 
man, Spinoza's theory of substance provides the ground through which unextended 
(i. e. thought) and extended matter are derived from one, infinite 'substance'. God, 
thought and bodies, therefore, share the qualifies of substance; that is, each is a 'self- 
caused' existence in itself, and so Spinoza distinguishes between the infinite 
substance of God and the limited but autonomous divisions of substance into thought 
and body. Substance, therefore, is constructed under three metaphysical principles; 
infinity (and finitude), existence and immanence. In particular, because it is relieved of 
its restrictive definition as 'extension' or matter its essence is posited as existence 
that 'belongs to the nature of substance' (E: 1, Prop 7/34). Extended matter becomes 
one mode in which substance is expressed, therefore, rather than the defining 
principle by which it is understood. Instead, a multiplicitous notion of substance is 
considered to be the primary cause of extended and unextended beings, and evidence 
of God's infinite powers; for example, Spinoza writes, '[albsolutely infinite 
substance is indivisible' (E: 1, Prop 13/39). 
Later, in Part 1111, Spinoza emphasises the necessity of existence, not in 
relation to the divine, but as a question of life or duration in the individual entity. 
Here, the relationship between existence and substance is given its biological duration 
in the 'conatus' or the entity's power to strive to exist (which we will find is also 
crucial to Bergson's 'progressive' philosophy). Spinoza explains: 
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Therefore, the power of any thing, or the conatus with which it acts or 
endeavours to act, alone or in conjunction with other things, that is 
[ ], the power or conatus by which it endeavours, to persist in its own 
being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing (E: 111, 
Prop 7, Proof/108). 
The conatus is specific to the finite mode of substance and points to a 
secondary mode of temporality that is determined by the attribute of body; '[e]ach 
thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being' (E: III, Prop 
6/108). God's existence, on the other hand, is not limited; it is infinite. Man's 
conatas, then, is limited as a duration, determined by the temporality of the body; 
'[t]he conatus with which each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing 
but the actual essence of the thing itself (E: IH, Prop 7/108). Man and God-as- 
Nature are again differentiated because of the durational, i. e. limited, 'life-force' that 
determines man's essence: '[t]he being of substance does not pertain to the essence of 
man; i. e. substance does not constitute the form (forma) of man' (E: 11, Prop 10/69). 
In addition, as this statement suggests, substance is distinct from the extended form 
of man, while being immanent to mind and body, because it is the principle of 
existence. 
Substance's essence is, once again, confirmed to be existence, not extended 
matter or form. In addition, extension itself is not determined by the limit of form, 
but by the limit of a durational existence; i. e. the endeavour to exist. Extended bodies 
are not eliminated, therefore, from the metaphysical definition of existence and the 
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bodies that it produces, but are legitimately considered to be one mode of substance's 
infinite potential. As a result, extended things display the paradox of division and 
infinity. Infinite substance is, therefore, the primary cause of a triumvirate order of 
c existence', the attributes, modes and affects. So, as God or Nature, infinite substance 
is indivisible, however, in its multiple forms of existence it has discrete and finite 
limits; for example, our imagination can divide water into parts, but our 'intellectual' 
understanding of it as a 'substance' considers it to be indivisible. Like Proclus, 
therefore, Spinoza also considers the imagination to be a key operation in the 
production of limit, in contrast to the indivisibility of a pure intellect (see, below for a 
detailed discussion). He writes: 
We conceive water to be divisible and to have separate parts in so far 
as it is water, but not in so far as it is corporeal substance. In this 
latter respect it is not capable of separation or division. Furthermore, 
water, qua water, comes into existence and goes out of existence; but 
qua substance it does not come into existence nor go out of existence 
(E: 1, Prop 15, Schol/42). 
God is not just an Omnipotent and immaterial power but is also Nature, and 
Spinoza promotes this immanence further by highlighting its 'creative' or productive 
activity when he states that; 'God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all 
things' (E: 1, Prop 18/46). Scholium of Proposition 29 also draws attention to the 
definition of Nature as a creative cause, distinguishing between its active sense as 
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producer or 'nature nabifing' (Natura naturans) and its passive sense as product or 
'nature natured' (Natura naturata). Nature is defined explicitly in terms of its powers 
of production and the modes in which these powers are manifest; thus, God's 
creative cause requires that all attributes 'cannot be conceived without' him and, in 
turn, attributes themselves are discrete expressions of his 'eternal and infinite 
essence' (E: 52). God as Nature, then, is the immanent cause, expressed in the infinite 
attributes and modes of existence. " In addition, immanence generates the singularities 
of extended substance; for example, the general idea of nature or man, or a particular 
embodiment of substance, such as an emotion or individual creature or person (the 
soldier or the peasant). 
So, as shown above, substance is consistent with the metaphysical notions of 
limit and unlimit that form a continuum of metaphysical relations and orders. Both 
Spinoza and Proclus produce ontologies affinning the notion of an absolute, infinite 
God/One. The distinction between Proclus and Spinoza is made, however, because 
Spinoza's dialectic does not sustain the hierarchy of an unextended limit and unlimit 
over extended limit. Rather, by constituting God, Nature and man as 'self-caused' 
existences limit and unlimit become embodied into the notion of man himself 
Extended bodies are manifestations of this existence, rather than impure derivations 
of the pure transcendental and immaterial sources. Spinoza's concept of extension is 
not reduced to an opposing 'materialist' power (although it has been defined as a 
Q materialist' metaphySiCS12) , 
but it is determined by the infinite nature of existence; 
i. e. the 'essence' of extension is existence. Spinoza's 'univocal' substance is, 
115 
therefore, imbued with the dialectical paradox of limit and unlimit, divisibility and 
indivisibility, but defines them through examining the unities of unextended and 
extended materialities. 
Attfibutes, modes and common notions 
In the following paragraphs Spinoza's construction of an 'embodied reason' is 
explored in the form of the triad of interdependent operations (the attributes, modes 
and common notions), which produce a highly complex union of the different orders 
of human nature. In geometric terms, the discussion suggests that these operations 
constitute; a. the strands that unfold from the unity of indivisible substance, and; b. 
the 'elements' of the method that express the different figurations of unity in a series 
of increasingly defined stages, developing from the attributes of the mind and body, 
to the 'modes' of emotions and, finally, to the unity of the 'common notions'. As a 
result, there is a shift from the logical deduction of a geometric method into one that 
is both embodied - i. e. intimately concerned with the extended body - and is 
attributed with 'psychic' powers of transformation (i. e. the emotions). Thus, 
Spinoza's axiomatic explication of univocal substance provides an embodied and 
aesthetic expression of geometry. 
Substance is first expressed through the two knowable attributes, the intellect 
and the body; each attribute intrinsically embodying both the common and the 
particular forms of existence. Thus, the complexity of the indivisible substance is 
made clear and distinct through its divisions (i. e. limits) into attribute, mode and 
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common notions; however, because division or limit is consistent with the notion of 
existence and is intrinsic to the entity, it does not collapse into merely formal 
definitions of form or identity. 
Attributes express the essence of God or Nature. Spinoza writes; '[b]y 
attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its 
essence' (E: 1, Def 4/31). Prior to modes and affects they express the infinity of 
substance in its extended and unextended states. Part Il examines their structure in 
detail, highlighting the extent to which they are aspects of God's infinite existence, 
for example, '[flhought is an attribute of God; i. e. God is a thinking thing', and 
jejxtension is an attribute of God; i. e. God is an extended thing' (E: H, Props I and 
2/64). Mind and body are distinct, yet unlimited attfibutes that constitute the unity 
of God's powers and existence so that, once again, existence (or reality) is 
reconfinned as the fundamental ground of substance in all its forms of expression. 
Spinoza explains; '[t]he more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has' 
(E: 1, Prop 9/36). Or, 'nothing in Nature is clearer than that each entity must be 
conceived under some attribute, and the more reality of being it has, the more are its 
attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity' (E: L Prop 10, Schol/36). 
Nevertheless, despite each attribute being autonomous from another attribute, 
they are brought together under a commonality of 'ideas. Substance, in the form of 
the intellect, is continuous with substance in the form of the body so that the 'idea of 
the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body' (E: 
11, Prop 21/80). Hence, Spinoza maintains the notion of agreement between different 
modes of the extended and unextended, because they are a unity that is derived from 
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an indivisible unity (the univocal substance or idea). In addition, by insisting on a 
common agreement between two distinct attributes, the discrete singularities of the 
mind and body are brought into a synthetic union in which neither is conflated with 
the other, since each expresses a specific capacity of substance. 
But Spinoza also distinguishes between the general expression of God and the 
particular capacities of the attributes in themselves. These are expressed through the 
modes which are 'the affections of substance; that is, that which is something else 
and is conceived through something else' (E, 1, Def 5/3 1). 
Modes provide a third level of distinction to the universal substance and, once 
again, the principles of finity and infinity determine the development of particular 
and infinite modes; IfIrom the necessity of the divine nature there must follow 
infinite things in infinite ways (modis), (that is, everything that can come within the 
scope of infinite [intellect]' (E: 1, Prop 16/43). So, the triadic, causal structure of 
substance is reconfirmed; developing from the primary, indivisible God or Substance; 
into the second level of the attributes of mind and body and, finally; to the third level 
of definite modes: 
Every mode which exists necessarily and as infinite must have 
necessarily followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute 
of God or from some attfibute modified by a modification which exists 
necessarily and as infinite (E: 1, Prop 23/ 48). 
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Modes are finite; for example, as the body and the mind they are two distinct 
limits of substance's existence. They are also self-caused or autonomous; '[b]y 
'body' I understand a mode that expresses in a definite and determinate way God's 
essence in so far as he is considered as an extended thing' (E: IL Def 1/63). 
Attributes, extension and thought represent general 'essences' of God and Nature, 
however, modes constitute distinct kinds of ideas (reason, imagination, love, desire or 
hate, etc. ) and bodies (animals, plants, man, woman or the individual, etc. ). 
But modes also express the unlimited agreement in which Nature and God are 
unified into a multiplicity of modal types. In one of the most important examples of 
this agreement Spinoza tells us that the idea of the mind cannot be said to exist unless 
the parallel state of the body also exists. He writes; '[m]odes of thinking such as love, 
desire, or whatever emotions are designated by name, do not occur unless there is in 
the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. ' (E: H, Ax 3/64). 
Thus, there is an increasing definition of limit or finitude in the sequence of 
causal relations. Modes sustain the 'connection' between the different versions, but 
they also have a greater definition of autonomy than attributes and hence, power. 
Like Proclus (and, as will be shown for Leibniz and Bergson), there is an increased 
continuity of change that is generated, in particular, between the different kinds of 
agreement in different modes Of ideas and things. The discursivity of the geometric 
method, for example, is suggested in the modal continuity of one idea of a circle 
passing into another idea, or in the passage ftom one extended form of a circle passing 
into another (E: 67). Although the synthetic 'parallelism, between thought and body 
is evident - i. e. thinking cannot become extension - there is also a sense in which the 
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particular differences between the modes become less clearly demarcated as either 
thought or extension. In particular, the emotions or affects produce the most 
ambiguous kind of unity that is both expressed as thought and body, and in the case 
of adequate ideas or common notions, constitute embodied modes of reason. 
Discursivity or the step-by-step deduction of the geometric method is 
augmented, therefore, by the 'agreement' or commonality that unlimited substance 
inheres in the multiple modes. Second, underlined by the creative production of God 
as Nature (i. e. Natura Naturans), an immanent and genetic discursivity is inscribed 
into the axiomatic procedure of the Ethics. But a clear understanding of the agreement 
between the mind and body still needs to be outlined. Much of Parts H and IH 
explore the union in detail. First, Spinoza states that each is 'the object of the idea' of 
each other, confirming the unity of the affections and the body (E: 11, Props 12 and 
13/71). So, in the Scholium to Proposition 13, he can say that 'the human Nfind is 
united to the Body' pausing, however, to note that this can only be proved if there is 
'adequate knowledge of the Nature of the body' (E: 72). This leads him to define the 
particular nature of the human body in order to cast light on the particular nature of 
the human mind. It is, he suggests, understood through a principle of proportion (i. e. 
ratio); for example, the 'proportionate' activitY of the body that is reflected in the 
mind of its accompanying body. 13 Developing here, then we see the notion of 'ratio' 
(i. e. reason) in which a unity is produced out of the relationship between two 
independent aspects, which will also be considered a crucial aspect of Leibniz's 
method in the following chapter. 
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In addition, in Proposition 19,11, Spinoza defines the particular way that the 
union is constituted, even more closely; i. e. the way in which we can understand the 
body. He writes that it is in 'the ideas' and the 'perceptions' of the affections 'by 
which the body is affected' (E: 80). Thus, the body is understood through forms of 
appearances, as ideas and perceptions of 'affections', rather than arising from its 
nature as an extended thing, which correlates with the human mind's knowledge of 
itself 'except in so far as it perceives ideas of affections of the body' (E: 80-81). 
In this context, therefore, we find Spinoza suggesting an intermediary form of 
knowledge not dissimilar to Kant's theory of forms and appearances. For Spinoza, 
however, the emphasis on 'expression' provides a more immanent mode of relation 
than Kant allows, i. e. Spinoza considers the emotions to be the route through which a 
divine perfection can be attained. Kant, by contrast, considers the emotions to be 
limited to the sensible realm. Nevertheless, this confluence between Spinoza and 
Kant is apparent in the aesthetic potential of the emotions, insofar as they represent 
the movement (passage) between pleasure and pain, as will be shown below. In 
addition, Spinoza's conception of the imagination bears a strong resemblance to 
Kant's productive imagination in the third Crilique. 
But the embodied powers of the emotions are, however, only relevant to the 
unity of the individual's mind and body, and do not mean that the individual has 
knowledge of other external bodies, unless it is through the 'ideas of affections of its 
own body' (E: 111, Prop 25/82-83). As we will see in the following section, these 
affects define man's modal autonomy and internal 'sufficiency', representing a kind of 
c sufficient reason' through which the internal and external nature of the individual is 
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brought into being. Furthennore, like Leibniz's 'sufficient reason', we see the nature 
of the affects considered in terms of their intensity, introducing an important shift in 
the powers of demonstration and construction in the geometric method. But in 
contrast to Leibniz's concept of the Monad, we find that Spinoza's unity relies on a 
synthetic hannony, whereas, Leibniz's 'sufficient reason' is generated from an 
analytic continuum or unity. 
Affects or the emotions represent the unique mode of existence in the human 
subject and indicate to the unlimited power of the agreements and commonalities that 
may exist between the attributes and modes. Crucial to the possibility of a 
harmonious embodied subject, they represent the level in which the agreement 
between the thinking and extended subject is considered in tenns of its capacities for 
happiness, sadness, agency, passion, activity and passivity. 
Parts Ill and IV conduct an intense explication of the emotions as the 
particular powers of expression that man embodies. Here, then, the transcendental 
'plenitude' of the unlimit is expanded in tenns of the 'physio-psychic' condition of 
man. The emotions represent a set of 'transitive' powers that are continuously and 
internally produced by the subject yet they are expressed in its external modes to 
constitute the active, autonomous subject and the realisation of a 'joyful' life. 
Part HI presents Spinoza's extended analysis of the emotions as affects, 
examining their production and duration in the subject through their activity in the 
form of adequate ideas, and passivity in the form of inadequate ideas. Spinoza 
explains these relations further, stating that adequate ideas are the embodiment of the 
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active state, whereas inadequate ideas are the embodiment of the passive state. In 
each case, neither the cause and effect is independent of the other, instead, each 
reflects the other; for example, the inadequate idea produces the passive state, not 
because the body leads the mind to passivity due to its limited nature, but because 
the relationship does not share a commonality. The body is not judged to be an 
external impurity or obstruction towards an active notion of being (i. e. becoming), but 
Spinoza does require that it be harmonised into a unity with the emotions in the 
realisation of perfection. Perfection is the underlying drive, therefore, through which 
active and passive emotions are brought together in the fonn of the conatus, or the 
drive for existence. 
In themselves, however, the affections do not constitute adequate ideas; 
rather, they are 'confused' ideas of the body and external entities (E: IL Prop 28/83). 
Propositions 29-31 underline the inadequacy of this confused, fragmentary and 
discontinuous kind of 'knowledge'. In the following propositions, however, Spinoza 
explains that ideas and affects do attain a unity and truth when they are constituted 
in God (E: 11, Prop 32/85). Adequacy is that which is 'common and proper' between 
things, so that affects and ideas can be conceived as adequate once they are attributed 
with a commonality and a definiti on of limit in relation to 'the whole' (E: II, Prop 3 8- 
39/87-88). 
In addition, the examination of activity and passivity leads Spinoza to 
consider their manifestation as pleasure and Pain that reaffirms a temporality in the 
passageftom one state to another, or from an inadequate to an adequate idea. Thus, 
the duration of the conatus is, in part, defined through the movement between active 
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and passive emotions. 'Adequate' knowledge, for example, can be produced from 
inadequate passions and confusion; ja] passive emotion ceases to be a passive 
emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it', or '[t]here is no affection 
of the body of which we cannot fonn a clear and distinct conception' (E. V, Props 3 
and/204). 
In the final development of the 'modalifies' Spinoza tells us that adequate 
ideas constitute the 'common notions', which are 'those things that can lead us as it 
were by the hand to the knowledge of the human mind and its utmost blessedness' 
(E: 63). 14 Common notions are the clear, distinct and embodied ideas through which 
we can come to understand the perfection of God and, hence, the axiomatic method 
(i. e. geometry) provides a step-by-step outline of the agreement between mind and 
body as expressions of a human 'perfection' or unity. Common notions represent, 
therefore, the irreducible unity of the (human) figure that reflects the perfection of 
God as an idea (and therefore a reality) in the agreement between an emotion and the 
body. " 
So, Spinoza inaugurates an agreement between man and God based not merely 
on the existence or essence of substance, but through the different distinctions of 
limit and unlimit. In addition, as we pass through his metaphysical levels the 
definitions of unlimit become more clearly demarcated, to the extent that the 
emotions are embodied as kinds of 'reason' derived from unlimit, but brought into 
proportion (ratio) with the body towards a joyful existence. As a result, the notion of 
agreement is not just determined by a synthetic union, but it is also a consideration of 
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magnitude, i. e. intensity. Agreement becomes defined in terms of 'agreeing more' (i. e. 
active emotion or happiness), or 'agreeing less' (passive emotion or sadness). 16 As a 
result, Spinoza's conception of 'harmony' is determined by degrees intensity in the 
emotions that also suggests a kind of agreement that we Aill find important for 
Leibniz in the following chapter, which represents a shift from a purely synthetic 
agreement into an analytic agreement. 
Common notions represent the most 'unified' form of geometric figure in the 
text, therefore, in which the power of the subject is engendered as an agreement 
between its immaterial and material modes of existence. In addition, Spinoza insists 
upon the modes or affections as the primary means through which the knowledge of 
an infinite unity can be generated, and which embody the 'transitive' powers of 
change and duration. A shift takes place, from the external activities or powers of the 
cogaitive faculties (especially, the hierarchy between the understanding and the 
imagination in producing 'knowledge' for the affects), to an emphasis on the way in 
which the humanfigure is constituted by active or passive powers and the extent to 
which harmony or unity are possible. Thus, the notion of an intemal aclivity of each 
csufficient' subject is promoted in favour of the external 'independence' of the 
faculties of the understanding and imagination. 
The shift from the production of a synthetic unity by means of a 'mixture' of 
states to the 'affective' modes that comprise the common notions also represents a 
greater emphasis on the aesthetic of the 'sensibility' that Kant promotes. Common 
notions are important, therefore, not merely as quantifiable differences between 
states (such as the differences between a man and horse), but represent the 
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modulation of embodied &fferences: a kind of adequate and transient 'reason' or 
figures of Passage'. Thus, their geometric status is not logical but derived from the 
sensibility because their existence is determined by the continuous change in the 
emotions. As a result, the relationship between God (i. e. the knowledge or 'love' of 
God) and the mode of expression (i. e. the mode or method) is also continuously and 
necessarily under transition. So, for Spinoza, the common notions become 'real' 
kinds of embodied knowledge granted a kind of 'reason' and registering a range of 
adequate or inadequate states, so that Spinoza can propose that 'love' or 'desire' 
represent embodied expressions of an infinite substance. 
Second, they represent a fonn of aesthetic unity, in which the particular 
expressions of the indivisible substance are brought into a harmony of understanding 
with God and constitute a series of indivisible, yet embodied unities. Providing the 
most complex and unified level of geometric figures - i. e. they are an adequate idea or 
unity - the common notions' sufficiency represents the unity of body and mind. 
That is, they are the figures through which Spinoza explains the problem of union 
between unextended and extended matter. Thus, we also see that there is a shift from 
the unfolding of understanding, which is an extensive movement 'down' from the 
immaterial idea to the extended body, to its reverse, an intensive 'enfolding' in which 
the unity of God is confinned as a result of the particular powers (affects) that the 
common notions embody. Moreover, this 'enfolding' also represents a precursor to 
Kant's reflective judgment in which knowledge of the universal is developed out of 
the particular; for example, Spinoza states, '[tlhe more we understand particular 
things, the more we understand God' (E: V, Prop 24/214). in contrast to Kant's 
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schema of the faculties of the understanding and imagination, however, Spinoza 
posits the emotions as the 'powers' through which knowledge of God can be 
developed. Thus, we find that Spinoza's concern with the emotional experience of 
pleasure and pain represents an aesthetic dynamic of unity and sufficiency. 
But, in the context of inadequate ideas and duration - i. e. limit - Spinoza also 
acknowledges that the imagination is significant; for example, its powers of division 
link it to the inadequate idea. Like Proclus, therefore, Spinoza considers the 
imagination to be an embodied limit-operation, emphasising that its powers are 
determined by its corporeality. In the lengthy Scholium of Proposition 15,1, he 
explains: 
I reply that we conceive quantity in two ways, to wit, abstractly, or 
superficially - in other words, as represented in the imagination - or as 
substance, which we do only through the intellect. If therefore we 
consider quantity as it is presented in the imagination - and this is what 
we more frequently and readily do - we find it to be finite, divisible, 
and made up of parts. But if we consider it intellectually and conceive 
it in so far as it is substance - and this is very difficult - then it will be 
found to be infinite, one, and indivisible, as we have already sufficiently 
proved [ ... ] (E: 42). 
In Part 11 the imagination's powers and products are examined, in which it is 
described as 'a conception of the mind' that produces 'images of things that we 
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imagine' (E: 97). The imagination and its products, images or words are 'constituted 
solely by corporeal motions, far removed from the concept of thought' (E: 11, Prop 
49, Schol/97). As has been explored above, however, ideas are the source of 
4commonality' between the mind and the body, which constitute understandings of 
the mind and body in a unity. The imagination is important, therefore, as one mode of 
producing ideas and perceptions; but its powers are, ultimately, restricted. 
Spinoza also considers the images of absent objects and ideas in which the 
imagination produces memories of the 'affections' that the body perceives (E. II, 
Prop 17, Coroll and Prop 18, Schol/77-79). Here, imagination provides a common 
ground between the images of the mind and the perceptions of the body. Spinoza 
explains that memory is; 'simply a linking of ideas involving the nature of things 
outside the human body, a linking which occurs in the mind parallel to the order and 
linldng of the affections of the human body' (E. 79). The imagination provides, 
therefore, a continuous link between the internal perceptions and ideas of the body 
and its exterior and, as we will see later in chapter 5, this continuous passage of 
perceptions and images from the interior to the exterior, is a key aspect of Bergson's 
discussions about matter and memory. 
The geometric method constructed in the Ethics suggests, therefore, a shift 
away from an idealised, divine unfolding in which internal operations remain implicit 
(because, according to the Neoplatonic belief, embodied perception is less desirable 
than ideal identity). Instead, Spinoza proposes a series of modes in which the 
geometric figure is irreducible from its material, bodily expressions, in particular, its 
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evolution from a multiplicitous substance. Extension is the productive condition of 
the geometric figure, in particular, in the form of the thinking and emotional subject 
so that unity is defined as forms of agreement between distinct kinds of existence, 
which are 'common' elements of the single, originary substance. 
How, then, does the Ethics constitute a geometric method? Up until this point 
in the discussion we have seen that it posits axiomatic propositions towards the 
construction of an ontology of a univocal, yet modal substance that can be 
understood as an extensive explication. But the common notions also carry in them a 
shift from an 'unfolding' to the reverse movement, an 'enfolding', in which the 
general is produced out of the particular. In addition, we have seen that the extensive 
movement is succeeded by an 'intensive' movement between the emotions; thus, 
Spinoza's geometric method may be considered as extensive and intensive, unfolded 
and enfolded. 17 These reverse movements produce an important shift in the 
development of form that is generated from the particular, rather than the general, and 
in which the emotions or affects are intrinsic 'origins' in the pursuit of unity, 
harmony or concord between the mind and the intellect. The geometric method is 
given a distinct point of departure through the corporeal irreducibility of the 
emotional subject (not the transcendental immateriality of God). In addition, the 
emphasis on the powers of an intensive development, i. e. the actions of the emotions, 
results in variable movement. Thus, the 'form' of the elements underpins the extent 
to which the dialectic of limit and unlimit provide the diverse commonalities of the 
method. Form is produced out of the productive powers of the elements, rather than 
as an externally derived classification or identity. Modes, whether they are active or 
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passive emotions, are sufficient in themselves to the extent that they are intenne&ate 
states on the way to a state of 'blessedness', but their form is most reflective of the 
enfolding and unfolding movement between the general, external states of unity and 
the particular, inner unity of the subject. 
In addition, the common notions are akin to the 'all-in-one totalities' of 
intuition, but are derived from the sense perceptions and body, versus the intellectual 
step-by-step procedure of the discursive geometric method. Thus, Spinoza's 
detailed, axiomatic explanation of the common notions is underscored by the 
irreducibility of the emotions, which are always in duration and at different 
'speeds'. " In addition, the emotions always 'go forth', since we can have the same 
emotions, but the sequence of their transition and their duration is always different. 
Through them the extended body is always a durational experience. We can propose 
that geometric di scursivity in the Ethics is the following, therefore; 
a. the relationship between the substance, attributes and modes in an increasingly 
intensified dialectic of limit and unlimit, i. e. the affections represent the most distinct 
and intensive forms; 
b. the passage of one emotion into another. Emotions are also determined by the 
plenitude of unlimit and pass from one into another state. The emotional modes 
represent the routes through which to get to the common notions, they are the 
4 stepping stones' to the common notions; 
c. common notions represent the highest state of geometric 'figure' in which pure 
intellect becomes accessible to the individual, i. e. in the form of the adequate ideas 
through which we pass. They are produced out of the union between the n-ýind and 
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body, rather than given as pure intellect from outside and are akin to intuition or the 
soul; 
d. limit becomes intemalised (i. e. a physio-psychological discussion); the individual is 
constituted by the internal limits in the 'thresholds' of the emotions and body. 
Passao through the text 
Hence, as an effect of this method, we find that the experience of reading the 
Ethics requires that we 'agree' with the text. Geometry becomes an 'affective' or 
'felt' method; first, as it lays out the nature of the emotions, and; second, because it 
is intended to lead the reader towards the understanding of God and 'a joyous life'. 
Thus, the text brings together geometry and the sensibility in the conjunction 
between feeling and the scientific geometric method in a rigorous and 'affective' 
document that employs scientific and aesthetic methods to the extent that if the 
reader does not engage My - i. e. become 'affected' - the scope of its potential 
remains limited. Thus, the reader is propelled through the text so that it becomes not 
just a logical experience of geometric order, proposition, analysis and argument but a 
felt or embodied sensibility that is intended to endure in us as a 'practical' 
philosophy; it is an aesthetic experience of the geometric method In the last section 
of the chapter an analysis of some of the aspects of the axiomatic and scholatic 
structure of the geometric method will underpin this intention, but first it will be 
useful to be reminded of the metaphysical argument in the text in its passage through 
the five Parts and underlining the 'ethical' development of the geometric method. 
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Part I examines the fundamental structure of the world, in its most essential 
substance, i. e. God. God is the only form in which substance can be equated with 
absolute certainty with extension, but as a self-detennining, internal expression of 
this ultimate, infinite substance. For Spinoza, the truth of a multiplicitous substance 
is derived from the existence of God but is infused with nature and physics. The 
Ethics begins, therefore, by positing its own internal constitution in definitions that 
express the substantial elements and operations of Spinoza's method. Taking each 
definition in turn reveals the multiPlicitY of each of these statements, which operate 
within a geometric method that unfolds and enfolds its project. 
The propositions and proofs in Part 11 provide an analysis of the structure of 
man in the pursuit of an understanding of God through which the transcendental 
capacities of God become expressed in the fundamental 'structures' of man - i. e. 
thought and extension. In order for this journey to be achieved, it is necessary for 
Spinoza to prepare the way to show how these attributes may join together in 
agreement and to promote as great a sense of joy as possible. An emphasis on the 
powers of man (i. e. the emotions or affects) is established so that the subsequent two 
parts of the Ethics are an intensive examination of these powers, undertaken by 
means of a 'practical' method, so that they become the active agents towards the 
realisation of 'blessedness' in the individual (that is, the reader). 
Part 1H presents the analysis of the modes of the body and mind, i. e. its 
affects, exarnining the production and relationship between the inadequate idea and 
the adequate idea. Adequate ideas are the active state between ideas and the body in 
which each reflects the power of the other. Inadequate ideas produce passivity in 
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which a confused relationship between the body and mind remains limited by 
contradiction, so that the body and mind are unaffected by each other and the 
movement towards an active state of happiness is obstructed. Happiness (i. e. 
absolute affirmation), therefore, is a form of self-knowledge (self-cause) that is 
determined by the movement between the 'power-knowledges' of the mind and body 
which 'bind' its energies towards perfection. 
Part IV examines this perfection and man's ability to achieve it in a study of 
man's emotions and his potential in achieving an adequate and ethical life. Here, the 
embodiment of man's emotions is assessed in relation to the qualitative effects of 
good and bad, however, the Preface also emphasises how these qualities are 
themselves expressions of a substantive unity; 'perfection and imperfection are in 
reality only modes of thinking' (E: IV, Preface/153). So, when someone changes 
states from perfection to a lesser perfection it is not a change of essence 'but that we 
conceive his power of activity, in so far as this is understood through his nature, to 
be increased or diminished' (E: 154). Spinoza's emphasis is not just on the moral 
qualities that come from being 'guided solely by reason' but also promotes a reason 
that is derived from the emotions (E: 192). It is, therefore, an argument for 'the right 
way of living' through a 'practical' examination of the emotions (E: 195). 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that, for Spinoza, the most perfect 
mode of happiness is 'blessedness', which 'is nothing other than that self- 
contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God' (E: IV, Appendix/196). 
The common notions represent, therefore, the unity of Desire with Reason to form 
the 'intuitive knowledge' produced from an agreement between the mind and body. 
133 
Embo&ed reason is, therefore, the mode that is examined in the final Part of 
the Ethics. But it also amplifies 'the method, or way, leading to freedom' because the 
geometric method becomes an aspect of the continuously changing and embodied 
activity in the individual, not a totalising set of truths (E. 201). Part V represents 
Spinoza's most explicit challenge to Descartes' 'occultist' confusion of the 
mind/body relationship, therefore, in which he argues that Descartes' notion of the 
pineal gJand fails to account for a properly embodied state because it gives no clear 
explanation of the 'union of mind and body' arising from his insistence upon the 
distinction of two kinds of substance (E- 202). Spinoza, on the other hand, liberates 
this confusion by returning to the primai-y examination of the mind and body union, 
demonstrating how blessedness can be realised and affirming the possibility that the 
subject can be considered with the same qualitative value (or reality) as the divine; for 
example, he states that passivity is transformed into activity once it becomes an 
adequate idea (E: V, Prop 3/204). So, in Part V, rather than reason and emotion. 
opposing one another, exclusively, Spinoza argues that they are expressions of the 
same unified substance and are more 'truthful' realities through which to conduct a 
life. Emotions become intimately tied to reason, rather than being rejected as confused 
or inadequate. 
This is undertaken in a return to the realities that affect the subject, i. e. ideas, 
images and, ultimately, God. But the limited endurance of the body still remains a 
fundamental limitation to the scope of human power and hence, perfection, which 
constitutes an important distinction between the nature of the method (the power to 
love) and its goal (God). The geometric method might, therefore, be considered the 
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most 'perfect' human way to strive for blessedness; insofar as it is the most divine 
expression or manifestation of God it is the 'third kind of knowledge', i. e. intuition, 
through which the subject can be led to the greatest contentment (E: 215). Thus, the 
teýa and its objects become passages through which perfection is made possible. In 
addition, the final Part is also a summary of the aesthetic unity that the method 
produces, insofar as embodied reason represents a 'sensibility' or 'aesthetic'. 
Metho 
In this final section of the chapter we will see that the passage through the 
text is achieved by Spinoza's delivery of the geometric method in a highly rigorous 
fashion that comprises of both the scientific axiomatic elements and figures and the 
'intuitive' asides of the scholia. 
The axiomatic method is used to affirm the a priori nature of Spinoza's post- 
Cartesian project, in which the a pfiori definition of 'clear and distinct' ideas is 
developed into a discussion about adequate and inadequate ideas. The geometric 
method becomes a means, therefore, through which perfection is addressed in relation 
to the scope that a modified mathematical procedure enables for configuring new 
'standards' of truth. Furthermore, we find that Spinoza develops Descartes' 
axiomatic method (that uses sceptical doubt) into an affirmative and 'productive' 
practice. 
As shown in the previous sections, Spinoza uses the axiomatic method to 
propose a substantial relationship between God, nature and man, so that the notion 
of the geometric figure is concemed with the scope of embodiment as a 'vital' 
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expression of God. In addition, we also find that Spinoza brings together both the 
embodied figure with the 'scientific' figure insofar as the axioms themselves represent 
different figurations of this relationship; for example, in Part 1, the axioms represent 
the figure of God; in Parts H, 1H and IV axioms constitute the figure of man and 
finally, in Part V, they represent the figure of the 'reflective subject' that is an 
internalised union of God in the subject. Thus, in Part I the axiomatic method 
provides affirmation of the single infinitely expressed substance that is God-or- 
Nature; in Part H it explicates the specific attributes that belong to man (that is 
thought and extension); in Part 1H the power of man's nature, i. e. his expressive 
potential, is outlined in the analysis of the emotions or affects; in Part IV the 
relationship between the intellect and the emotions is examined as an issue of moral 
development and; finally, in Part V, active self-knowledge of the subject (agency) is 
explored in relation to the divine in the realisation of a concrete inmianence (i. e. the 
construction of a transcendental subject). 
in this respect, the geometric method enables Spinoza to 'invent' a series of 
intrinsic geometricfigures - especiay, in the form of the common notions - that are 
the formative elements for understanding God and represent 'real' truths. The 
axiomatic methcd generates, therefore, an increasingly concrete series of geometric 
figures that enable Spinoza to demonstrate the power of God through an increasingly 
'embodied' series of divine, scientific, emotional, moral, adequate and inadequate 
ideas. In the Axioms of Part 1; for example, Spinoza employs the scientific figure of 
the a3dom in order to posit a series of embodied, irreducible and aesthetic figures in 
the following ways: 
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1. Modes of singularity in figures: All beings exist inherently in themselves or in 
another being, and that being is conceived 'through another thing', and when this is 
not so, 'through itself. Thus, being is predicated upon a finitude that is also 
expressive of an underlying infinity (Axioms I and 2). 
2. Expressions of realities asfigures: More than one reality exists at any one time. 
Any reality (being/entity/fonn) is an expression of a preceding cause or reality 
(Axiom 3). 
3. Knowledge of realities andfigures: The greater the knowledge of the realities, i. e. 
its effect and cause, the greater the scope of the effect. The scope of the being is 
dependent upon the knowledge of the cause (Axiom 4). 
4, Agreement, indiwduality and commonahty between figures: When there is nothing 
in common between things they cannot involve/causelaffect another (Axiom 5). 
Agreement provides the ground, i. e. the 'truth' of an idea. Ideas, when true, are 
concrete expressions of other realities, i. e. they are made real in conjunction with 
other expressions of them. They are, therefore, a kind of internal expression of an 
external set of relations (Axiom 6). 
5. Limit and infmity offigures: Limit and unlimit provide the possibility of realities 
(Axiom 7). 
The axioms propose, therefore, a series of operations that are specific to each 
individual figure so that each is an 'unfolding' expression of an absolute infinity but 
which also embody increasingly concrete demonstrations of finitude (the modes and 
affects). 
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In addition, the propositions generate the diverse modes of reality - 
substance, attribute or mode - that express a divine infinity, but which can be 
explained through logical and discrete statements, situating them into a 'genetic' 
description of geometric figures that also reveals their intrinsic relationship to one 
another. We can suggest therefore, that Spinoza's axiomatic method is a synthetic 
demonstration of the power of production (creation), from the divine through to an 
intellectual and embodied subject, and its reverse. As a result, this form of 'creation- 
production-demonstration' suggests a highly reflexive method of delivery in which 
the geometric method becomes invested with a genetic and immanent status, rather 
than being understood as a representational or transcendental structure that is un- 
reflexive of its content. While this 'genetic' discursivity reminds us of Proclus' 
thinking, the emphasis on the reflexivity of the actions that result from the activities 
of the emotions will be shown to be a significant aspect of Bergson's thinking in the 
last chapter. 
This reflexivity is most strongly 'felt' in relation to Spinoza's invention of 
the scholia, which constitute a dramatic shift in the 'comportment' of the method 
from the logic of a scientific procedure into a series of rhetorical 'interruptions' or 
interlocutions. '9 Thus, the Ethics is not merely a scientific hypothesis of 
commonality and agreement but a series of textual expressions of agreement 
disruption or commonality running side-by-side with the deductive scientific method 
that is reminiscent of the movement between the Pythagorean and Platonic discourses 
in Proclus' text. The scholia's specificity lies in their status as embodiments of the 
passions, affects or emotions and through which the axiomatic argument is ftirther 
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amplified. As such they represent figures, singularifies or common notions that 
expand and intensify the method, confirming its value in the production of 
multiplicity rather than the uniformity of 'One'. The Scholium to Proposition 15, 
Part 1, for example, presents one of the most forceful arguments about the divinity of 
extended matter and uses a scientific example of geometry to make its case (E: 41-42). 
Spinoza is concerned, therefore, with revisiting the geometric method (i. e. the figures 
and modes) in order to emphasise the necessity of an adequate 'truth' with an infinite 
God, but we also find that he returns (an enfolding, perhaps) to the mathematical 
principles of geometry in order to add weight to an embo&ed aesthetic of geometry in 
the scholia. 
Thus, scientific geometric examples enable him to propose a discursive set of 
relations and to demonstrate the divine in the extended figures because, although they 
represent mathematical arguments, they also constitute 'scholatic' elements in which 
they represent particular embo&ments (i. e. modes) of the geometric figure. 
Geometric matter is not merely constrained to scientific reality, therefore, but also 
represents an aesthetic example of the 'common notions', in particular, in the 
cscholafic' episodes in which their material status is most prominent. Occurring 
principally in Parts I and Il these examples are used to distinguish the relationship 
between substance, limit and extension in the production of the common notions; for 
example, in the first scholium of the text, they comprise an extended proof that 
C substance is necessarily infinite', in contrast to the confused or imagined notions 
that trees talk or that man is derived from stones (E- 1, Schol 2, Prop 8/34). In this 
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respect, Spinoza introduces a geometric example to demonstrate the 'eternal truth' of 
infinite substance, witing: 
No definition involves or expresses a fixed number of individuals, since 
it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For example, 
the definition of a triangle expresses nothing other than simply the 
nature of a triangle, and not a fixed number of triangles (E: 35). 
Here, therefore, a geometric definition of a triangle is not a quantitative 
disfinction, it does not suggest lin-ýt or quantity to the nature of triangles that exist 
rather it expresses that intrinsic notion of a triangle which is a qualitative state, 
without expressing limit. The definition of a triangle endorses the limitlessness of 
God, presenting a mode of knowledge through which a 'sufficient reason' can be 
produced, rather than understandings that are determined by the limits of the 
imagination. Re-emphasising the essence of an entity, including a geometric one, 
Spinoza argues that if Nature were to be determined by notions of 'fixed number' 
(e. g. that twenty men were to exist), it would need to be demonstrated through 
external causes, but since existence is the essence of substance it must be intrinsic. 
Alternatively, in Proposition 11, L Spinoza addresses the production of the 
attributes, which reflect the infinity and causal relation of substance, and in the 
Proposition's Second Proof a geometric example is used to prove that God 
necessarily exists as a substance of infinite, attributes, which expresses the 'eternal 
and infinite essence': 
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For every thing a cause or reason must be assigned either for its 
existence or for its non-existence. For example, if a triangle exists, there 
must be a reason, or cause, for its existence. If it does not exist, there 
must be a reason which prevents it from existing, or which annuls its 
existence. Now this reason or cause must either be contained in the 
nature of the thing or be external to it. For example, the reason why a 
square circle does not exist is indicated by its very nature, in that it 
involves a contradiction [ ... ]. But the reason 
for the existence or non- 
existence of a circle or a triangle dcws not follow fi7om their nature, but 
from the order of universal corporeal Nature (E: 37). 
So, in quick succession, Spinoza incorporates geometric figures into an 
affirmation of 'corporeal' or 'real' Nature, which suggests that the value of the 
mathematical figure as a standard of truth is not held apart from the natural order of 
Nature but is, rather, an additional expression of it. Thus, epistemological divisions 
between mathematical knowledge (and, therefore, merely limited to an ideal form that 
produces abstract notions of the world) and the sensible realm are brought into 
'commonality' through an emphasis on embodied and divine realities. This genedc 
discursivity is also evident in the explan"on of the order of ideas and things in the 
Scholium to Proposition 7, H. Spinoza states that- 
Consequently, thinking substance and extended substance are one and 
the same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under 
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th at [ ... 
1. For example, a circle existing in Nature and the idea of the 
existing circle - which is also in God - are one and the same thing, 
explicated through different attributes [ ... 
] (E: 67). 
In addition, this scholium amplifies the statement that the 'order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things' (E. 66). God is 
the cause of both an unextended idea of the circle and a drawing of a circle, so that the 
scholium demonstrates that the form of the circle is produced from a continuous 
series of unextended and extended figures (E: 67). Thus, the geometric figure is a 
'formal being' that expresses the 'order of the whole of Nature' or of God, and the 
geometric procedure is one mode of the immanent expression of the divine, not a just 
an order of representation. 
The geometrical method is presented, therefore, as a 'volifion' or 'a mode of 
thinking' that is an affirmation of the 'conception' or idea; for example, in the Proof 
to Proposition 49, H, the geometric figure is the affirmation of an idea insofar as the 
idea of a triangle is an affirmation of its essence, i. e. that a triangle must involve the 
idea that 'its three angles are equal to two right angles' (E: 96). As a result Spinoza 
suggests that an affirmative mode of thinking belongs to the 'essence' of a thing; and 
so we can say that the geometric figure is affirmative of the order of both ideas and 
Nature. 
In addition, in the Preface to Part III Spinoza addresses the use of the 
geometric 'manner', considering it to be an expression of 'the universal laws and rules 
of Nature'. He illustrates this point by stating that emotions 'follow from the same 
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necessity and force of Nature as all other particular things'. They are attributed to 
'definite causes' or have specific 'properties' that can be understood and may, 
therefore, be examined in the same manner as God and 'the mind'. To this extent 
Spinoza considers 'human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into 
lines, planes, or bodies' (E. 103). The geometric method is, therefore, removed from 
its abstract and lofty generalisations, and given the scope to be a meaningful, 
embodied and particular matter or reality. Spinoza produces a relationship or passage 
between the text and the reader that constitutes an 'affective' geometry, that is, an 
intensively expressed procedure through which the text situates the reader into an 
immanent relationship with God's power, for example, with respect to the scope of 
the axiomatic method for affirming the power of the emotions. 
Conclusi 
This chapter has argued that Spinoza develops a notion of the geometric 
figure as an expression of the subject in its various modes of intellectual, spiritual and 
emotional embodiment. In addition, these configurations constitute an embodied 
geometric passage or an aesthetic experience. In particular, not only do Spinoza's 
common notions express the scope of the aesthetic project of geometry from one 
mode to another (such as, the passage from the scientific geometric method into the 
aesthetic), but they also suggest a progressive procedure insofar as they constitute a 
practical demonstration, 20 The geometric method is not limited to a single mode of 
representation, but is extended into a range of embodiments and these geometric 
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figures demonstrate a certain kind of passage that can be drawn between 
mathematical, philosophical and aesthetic series of relations. 
The Ethics is, therefore, an embodiment of passage as an aesthetic realisation 
(i. e. it produces an immanence in the forms of an affirmation of a 'passage' through 
different modes of 'reality' or figures). The j ourney from the divine to the concrete is 
staged in five parts that provide a 'practical' philosophy of ethical development in 
which the scope of the geometric method is incorporated into a complex 
metaphysical process. Each part develops a path through which the structures and 
modes of expression in a totality of metaphysical realities are expressed - i. e. nature, 
God, man, intellect, bcdy and the emotions are examined- In addition, this passage 
emphasises questions of enactment and comportment - e. g. 'how they work? ' - 
rather than 'what is the object that is producedT As a result, we find that not only 
does Spinoza enable the geometric method to be invested with an expressive and 
productive scope for philosophical enquiry, but he also argues that it is a method 
through which 'truth' is reinvested with an internal transcendental structure. 
The geometric method is used as a rigorous procedure through which a 
unified, yet complex and irreducible, substance is generated. As a result, the scope of 
the geometric method is shifted from a concern with idealistic truths - which are pre- 
given and yet are not accessible - to a journey towards God, through a series of 
embodied and specifically human conditions. A certain kind of reason determines its 
activities, therefore, but rather than the production of limited identities or 
representations, the process is infused with a highly speculative notion of nature, 
God and, hence, man. The geometric method becomes a demonstration of embodied 
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reason towards a speculative truth, rather than a repetition of a pre-given knowledge, 
which reflects Spinoza's life that was itself comprised of dangers, risks and 
confrontations, which meant his own 'journeying' was interspersed with disruptions. 
Spinoza represents, therefore, an intennediary position between the 
thoroughly synthetic geometric method posited by Proclus and Leibniz's analytic 
method, which will be outlined in the following chapter. The modes present an 
ambiguous moment in the development of the geometric method, in which the 
synthetic divisions between mind and body become less distinct as a result of the 
focus on the intensive movement of the emotions. In addition, we find that Spinoza's 
concept of the idea (especially, the adequate idea) presents a complex version of 
treason' or an indivisible ratio between the body and mind that is derived from the 
emotions. Thus, representing a distinct shift in the development of the geometric 
method, Spinoza's project is brought also into close proximity with Kant's notion of 
aesthetic judgment and, as will be shown in the last chapter, bears a strong 
resemblance to Bergson's notion of an 'intuitive' geometric method and figure. 
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Chapter 4: The Plenum 
In Leibniz we find a philosopher whose writings demonstrate an especially 
intensive examination of geometry in relation to the principles of division and infinity 
(i. e. limit and unlimit). Leibniz's construction of a unique mathematical form of 
geometry in Calculus is evidence of the extent to which these principles of quantity 
are constructed into a continuum of differential magnitudes offigures. This chapter 
suggests that, in addition to these particularly analytical, mathematical geometric 
figures, Leibniz also develops an aesthefic geometric method and aesthefic, figures that 
are imbued with the characteristics of an infinitely divisible and qualitative notion of 
magnitude. Considering these discussions in the MonadoloAy (1714) this chapter 
explores the structure of Leibniz's aesthetic geometry to suggest that it is constituted 
by two kinds of magnitude that register the inherent infinite divisibility of the 
aesthetic geometric figure (e. g. the plenum); first, a corporeal magnitude through 
which an intensive extension is constructed and second, an incorporeal magnitude, 
comprised of the unextended 'forces' of perception and appetite. In addition, these 
discussions are developed with reference to earlier texts in which the development of 
the principles can be observed, and suggest that Leibniz's philosophical and scientific 
writings display an ongoing concern with the nature of limit and unlimit in both 
mathematical and aesthetic geometric thinIcing. 
As a result, Leibniz's geometric method provides an intermediwy between 
Spinoza's predominantly synthetic method, Kant's reflective subject and Bergson's 
method of duration, especially as a result of his attention to the internal constitution 
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of limit and unlimit in theform ofintensive magnitudes within the subject (or Monad). 
Leibniz's method is unique amongst the other geometries examined here in the extent 
to which he promotes an analytical understanding of the subject, as will be discussed 
below. In addition, there are other notable threads that run between Leibniz's, 
Spinoza, Kant and Bergson's texts, most persistent of which is the problem of the 
unity between body and mind; for example, Leibniz's notion of substance and 
perception has several traits that are similar to Bergson's ideas of 'matter and 
memory'. But Leibniz's method is distinct from Bergson's in one important aspect; 
the place of Reason. Reason, for Leibniz, represents a necessary harmony with the 
divine, which we will see Bergson consider to be an artificial 'symbolism' that limits 
the irreducible unity to a pre-given value and, hence, the freedom of the individual is 
restricted to an intellectual form of ratio. Bergson's solution to the issue will place an 
even stronger emphasis on the scope of the intemal 'transcendental' powers of the 
subject in the form of the psychic activity of memory that suggests the pure and 
external intellect is relegated to an obsolete symbolism. Leibniz's analysis of the 
infinitely divisible subject presents, however, an inventive and rigorous predecessor 
to both Kant and Bergson's thinking of the transcendental subject; in the next 
chapter, we will see that Bergson's metaphysics of duration is also an engaged 
critique of geometry in his predecessors, especially, of Kant, Leibniz and Spinoza's 
understandings of science. In this chapter, however, it NNill be shown that Leibniz's 
development of an internal &fferentiation of substance is an important precursor to 
Bergson's re-thinking of matter and memory. 
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Recalling the last chapter, we saw that Spinoza's geometric method 
constructed geometric difference through the indivisible substance and finite modes 
that affirm geometric infinity insofar as the subject is an irreducible limit. But, as will 
be shown below, magnitude is a special geometric 'limit' function in Leibniz's 
writings, in which the notion of divisibility and indivisibility are reconstructed to 
form a continuously changing series of irreducible and aesthetic figures. Geometry, as 
a science of magnitudes, therefore, can be described as the construction of bodies that 
are brought about through the division of bodies into parts. So, according to this 
scientific definition, Euclid's explication of the point, line, plane or surface represents 
a series of geometric figures or abstract notions that are constructed through a 
principle of division into finite bodies. Leibniz, however, amplifies the principle of 
division or magnitude into a radically new form that is an aesthetic principle of unity, 
which further augments the infinite divisibility of the scientific form. Magnitude 
becomes, understood not merely as the scientific operation that generates discrete and 
finite divisibility, but is promoted as a distinctly aesthetic geometric method. 
In addition, in the previous chapter it was noted that Spinoza's conception of 
infinite totalities was developed through a synthetic method. In magnitude, however, 
Leibniz, constructs his discrete, yet infinite, figures through a particularly analyfic 
understanding of limit and unlimit; for example, as an analytic mathematical 
procedure, magnitude produces intermediate states between figures or limits, such as 
the different calibrations between the curve and the straight line or the curve and the 
circle; geometry is redefined, therefore, as an analytic procedure of infinite 
differentiafion. 
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Focusing, therefore, on the notion of an aesthetic geometric magnitude in 
Leibniz's Monadology, this chapter suggests that two forms of the operation are 
expressed; first, magnitude and substance (that is, extensity) and; second, magnitude 
in the fonn of perception and appetite. Magnitude as extension (body) and as a 
psychic activity (mind) provides, therefore, a unique version of the 'limit operation' 
that has been outlined in this thesis to construct an analytic and aesthetic geometric 
method and its figures that are characterised by internal intensities or magnitudes. 
Having examined the constituents of Leibniz's aesthetic magnitude, the discussion 
goes on to consider his principle of 'sufficient reason' in which a qualitative notion of 
ratio (or reason) is produced. Finally, the chapter explores the formulation of this 
aesthetic magnitude in the geometric figure of the 'plenum' (i. e. the Monad or soul). 
The MonadoloAy is a demonstration of the geometric method in which the 
notion of limit is transformed into a concem with an internal and intensive 
magnitude. Leibniz heightens the operation of division in the geometric method so 
that the finite geometfic identities of the whole and part become a continuous 
plenitude of irreducible singularities; Monads or souls constitute intensive 
magnitudes. In addition, the chapter also suggests that the Monad constitutes the 
cpIenum', a geometric figure in which a qualitative notion of intemal space is 
generated through the emphasis on a continuum of material and immaterial relations 
that are both internal and external. The plenum represents, therefore, a kind of 
topological figure, through which the relationship between the internal structures are 
continuous with the external form, rather than derived fi-orn a finite limit between the 
interior and exterior that constructs the discrete autonomy of the geometric figure or 
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Monad. (Topological geometry will become important again in the following chapter, 
which suggests that Bergson's notion of the 'envelope' is a particularly topological 
development and bears a strong resemblance to the figure of the plenum). 
This chapter also suggests that the text, itself, represents a kind of 'plenum' 
because it is a space in which the geometric principles of division and identity (i. e. 
limit whole and part) are re-thought and its internal differentiation is promoted; for 
example, the form of the text demonstrates both the continuity of geometric relations 
between its elements and the division into axiomafic sections that operate under the 
principle of intensive magnitudes, constituting a text that is highly condensed, yet, 
also extensive, and is reminiscent of the double movements of unfolding and enfolding 
in Proclus' text. Thus, we find that geometry is reconfigured through an aesthetic 
magnitude, both in the metaphysical argument and in the form of the text itself 
Simple, indivisible and qualitative, internal orders of differentiation are promoted in 
favour of the scientific geometric methods that generate only extemal and formal 
difference. In partictdar, we will see how Leibniz's concern with the powers of 
perception and appetite and his principle of 'sufficient reason' generate this intensive 
and aesthetic magnitude. 
Rejecting the dualism that is derived from Cartesian philosophy, the text and 
its figure of the Monad (or plenum) are constructed as a result of Leibniz's resistance 
to the opposition between the mind and the body (or movement versus extension); a 
resistance that was previously expressed in Leibnizs earlier writings on the 
mechanistic opposition between solid and fluid states. ' Instead, we find that Leibniz 
considers mathematics and, especially, geometry to be valuable as a set of 
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interine&ate operations through which its figures are not limited to a reductive, 
representational identity but are understood to inherently represent the difference or 
ratio between two individuated states or magnitudes. Geometry and its figures are 
promoted to the status ofparticular &fferentials, ratios or 'reasons', when 'reason' 
designates a particultv idea, rather than a general 'truths. (See, especially the 
discussions about 'little perceptions' and sufficient reason below). 
First, however, a more detailed discussion about the development of a post- 
Cartesian analytic geometric method will show the extent to which Leibniz provides a 
particularly original position in this discussion and point to some of the connections 
that link his concepts with the other methods explored here, especially the shift from 
a concern with discrete and synthetic figures in a continuum that has been suggested 
characterises Proclus and Spinoza's methods, to a continuum of discrete, yet analytic 
figures. 
The transition from aynthefic to analylic geometry 
A brief consideration of the shift from the Neoplatonic, synthetic geometric 
method to a post-Cartesian, analytic method will help to clarify the differences 
between Leibniz's method and those of Spinoza and Proclus. Leibniz's georneuic 
method resists a synthetic order of difference in which the identities of its figures are 
generated out of a series of external limit operations. In the second chapter, for 
example, we saw that Proclus' definition of the element or limit was intensive, insofar 
as it produced an infinite notion of the axiom; however, it was still defined by the 
notion of a synthetic order of difference, attributable to the a priori oppositions of 
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limit and unlimit. Leibniz, however, registers the invention of infinity as an analytic 
differential, that is, as an intensive limit operation. Its basis in an analytic theory of 
infinity reflects the re-thinking of atomism in the seventeenth century in which 
atomism loses its synthetic structure, from the indivisible 'seed' of the soul that is 
surrounded by matter, to become an analytic discussion of infinite differentiation 
(Arthur 2001: x1viii). It would seem that, for Leibniz, the inheritance of the 
Pythagorean principles of limit and unlimit enables him to generate unusually 
canalytic' conclusions about the limit, atom and axiom in which the structure, 
function and operations of limit and unlimit are radically reformulated, not towards 
producing exclusively discrete identities, such as the definitive and unchanging 
external differentiation of limit in the curve and the circle, but towards expressing 
their relationship through an order of internal degrees of &fference. Robert Latta's 
commentary on Leibniz's method succinctly highlights this important shift in 
understanding geometry as a system of infinity ftom the syntheiic to the awlylic 
geometric figure and method (Latta 1985). Developments in mathematics in the 
seventheenth century modify the synthetic relation of external difference and 
magnitude that underlies geometry in the ancients to become an intemalised series of 
differential changes. Latta explains this 'transition' from synthetic to analytic 
geometry, as follows: 
Early in the seventeenth century a considerable advance was made in 
the science of Mathematics, mainly through the work of Kepler, 
Cavalieri and Descartes. The Geometry of the Greeks was synthetic 
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or synoptic. It dealt with the ideal figures as discrete wholes, not 
taking into consideration the possibility of them being analysed into 
elements, of which they are combinations or functions. Thus the 
relations of the figures to one another are considered external. Each is 
what it is: no one is regarded as having in it the possibility of passing 
into another. A rectilineal figure is one thing; a curvilinear figure is 
another. The barriers between them are insurmountable, at least by 
the methods of exact or demonstrative science. Thus a curve is still a 
curve, however small may be its curvature. A polygon is still a 
polygon, however numerous may be its sides. And the kinds of 
curves are each independent of the others. An ellipse is still an 
ellipse however distant one focus may be from the other. 
Kepler's introduction of the notion and name of infinity into 
Geometry was the beginning of a great change in mathematical 
models. The geometrical figures of the Greeks were all finite, and 
therefore capable of representation to the eye, or, in the other words, 
capable of being pictured [ ... 
]. Kepler, in order to attain a greater 
exactness in the statement of mathematical relations, suggested that 
finite (or definite) figures might be regarded as consisting of an 
infinite (or indefinite) number of elements (Latta 1985: 75-76). 
An 'intensive notion of substance' is generated, then, when the mathematical 
principle of division is, literally, made more substantial so that the infinite 
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relationship between the curve and straight line are demonstrated, rather than the 
cpurity' of the finite difference in synthetic geometry. As a result, this brings in a 
shift between the opposition of quality and quantity in which these two modes of 
difference are brought into a single concept of magnitude that is a qualitatively 
different kind of agreement not a 'mixture' as the Stoics propose, but qualitative 
degrees of difference in a continuum. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Spinoza also reflects the 
seventeenth century debate about infinity and its relationship to the problematic 
Cartesian dualism of the mind and body. The notion of an indilvisible, yet 
multiplicitous, substance provides Spinoza with his solution to the problem in which 
internal difference is proposed through the finite modes or affects. For Spinoza, unity 
or 'figure' is synthetic since, although it is indivisible as an irreducible union of 
modes, it is also determined by a finite notion of limit in each singularity. Leibniz, 
however, proposes multiple and infinite substances that generate infinitely divisible 
unities or figures. The notion of limit is intensified as a result of its infinity, 
therefore, (not by means of an indivisibility) that represents an analytic, rather than a 
synthetic, solution. 
Second, it was suggested that Spinoza's concept of substance is 
predominantly extensive and modal, that is, its powers were promoted as discrete 
external modes. Leibniz, on the other hand, produces a notion of extended bodies or 
figures that are intensive and multiple. Each method resists the Cartesian premise of 
mechanised substance that reduces limit to the finite divisions of the whole and the 
parL In addition, in Leibniz's philosophy, this challenge is developed by a heightened 
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emphasis on an analytical understanding of 'infinity, which is both a metaphysical 
and a mathematical invention, i. e. CaICUIUS. 
2 Leibniz's theory of Calculus generates a 
mathematical version of the intensive limit-operation that enables, for example, 
analytic geornettic knowledge to be applied to the development of the physical 
sciences. (Spinoza, in contrast, invents synthetic geometric ideas that articulate an 
early form of psychology in the relationship between geometric ideas and sense 
ideas). Thus, both philosophers adopt a critical position towards the assumed 
Cartesian split between mind and body and Leibnizs magnification of division or 
limit enables notions of geometric intensity to be generated ftorn a rational logic that 
is itself expressive of a particularly intensive substance. In addition, Leibniz's 
substance provides a fascinating 'parallel' to Spinoza's conceptualisation of extensive 
substance, especially because each philosopher's scepticism of the divisible body is 
expressed through the affirmation of an inherent immateriality in substance, reflecting 
Neoplatonic discussions about the soul. Thus, Spinoza proposes the 'common 
notions' as a form of this irreducible unity and Leibniz proposes the Monad 
(Entelechy). In each case the soul is expressed as the site of a complex, irreducible 
substance that is inherently related to matter, yet independent &om it and 
constitutes a continuity between extended and unextended matter. 
Infinity is immanent in both geometric methods; in the Fthics it is understood 
as an indivisible condition of unity in a univocal substance, whilst for Leibniz it is an 
infinitely divisible operation or logic, that is, a notion of unity in which the concept 
of the infinite is augmented through an intensive analysis of infinitely divisible 
substances. As an analytic operation then, infinity becomes an active principle 
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through which intensive substances are generated and the connection between the 
soul and the body is more clearly comprehended as a continuum of aesthelic and 
differential magnitudes. 
In Spinzoa's modal differentiation, however, the details of the relationship 
(i. e. cause) between the different affects or emotions remain defined as sensible 
concepts and are undefined in logical terms. Spinoza attributes causality to the 
powers mind and body, in which a creative God is immanent, so that the modes 
register a genetic evolution of differentiation, but are emphasised as attributes of the 
infinity of God, therefore, accounting less for the incremental changes that take place 
between the internal and external states or the shift from the sensory to the divine. 
Thus, because Spinoza posits the indivisibility of the divine One as his premise for 
extended infinity, which also underpins the principles of movement or causation, the 
clarity of explanation that an analytic method brings to the understanding of infinity 
is overlooked. For Leibniz, however, cause is explained as distinctly differentiated 
internal forces (such as perception and 'appetition', which are immanent in the 
individual Monad) and the multiplicity of these substances is prioritised over the 
indivisible One, SO that God's powers, although omnipresent, are not the first order 
of expression. 3 Thus, Leibniz's geometric principles of extended and unextended 
ideas and bodies are characterised by an analytical infinity (i. e. magnitude), rather 
than by an indivisible modal substance. This demonstrates the extent to which his 
geometry re-thinks the production of synthetic, absolute truths or bodies, into a 
procedure that is an analytical and intensive magnitude. 
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Leibniz's analytic method is also distinct from Kant's notion of geometry in 
the Crifique of Pure Reason. ' In the first chapter, Kant's concept of analytic and 
synthetic agreement in the first Critique were distinguished; Kant writes that analytic 
identity is an internal agreement between two related elements and synthetic identity 
is comprised of an external agreement between two independent elements. For Kant, 
therefore, qualitative difference is generated in the heterogeneity of a synthetic 
operation, whilst an analytic operation is homogeneous because there is not an 
external, i. e. independent difference. Leibniz, however, adopts the analytic difference 
as a means through which to generate internal, heterogeneous difference in quantity 
(i. e. magnitude), thereby preventing the closure of the 'analyfic' agreement into a 
determinate unity. In the CPR, therefore, these agreements do not appear to take the 
Pythagorean notion of limit into account. In the Critique of Juckment, however, Kant 
considers the nature of an infinite and differentiated magnitude in terms of the 
relationship between limit and the imagination in the production of the sublime, 
which is similar to Leibniz's concern with 'fictional figures' (see below). 
Nevertheless, Kant's argument sustains the status of the synthetic limit and the 
imagination's powers of synthetic production so that the scope of an analytic 
definition of limit remains under-powerful in his philosophy. For Leibniz, however, 
the inherent 'ratio' (i. e. the irreducibility of an analytic notion of magnitude) is 
6 
precisely where the power of his method in constructing geometric figures lies. But 
in the aesthetic or reflective subject of the third Critique we find more 
commensurability with Leibniz's notions of geometric figures, in particular, the 
emphasis on the discrete, yet continuously changing, autonomy of the singularity. 
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As a result, the a priori definitions of quantitative magnitude that persist in 
the Cartesian and Neoplatonic methods are reconfigured in Leibniz's analytic 
geometric method into infinitely divisible and qualitative difference. The division of 
substance and concept into finite entities is broken insofar as the finite indivisibility 
of limit (i. e. the whole and the part) becomes understood as a series of relations of 
magnitude representing different ratios. Each of the previously necessary geometric 
relations of whole/part, divisiblefindivisible or quality/quantity, become disrupted to 
form continuously changing multiplicities or differential geometric states. This 
inauguration of internal difference, in which an irreversible shift is made from 
quantitative and homogenous (i. e. undifferentiated) magnitude, into qualitatively 
differentiated or heterogeneous magnitude, radically distinguishes Leibniz's geometric 
method from his predecessors'. Later in the chapter we will consider Leibniz's 
amplified differentiation of substance by means of a qualitative notion of &fference or 
incorporeal magnitude in the form of perception and appetite. First, however, the 
structure of corporeal magnitude needs to be examined in order to explain the 
corporeal aspects of his aesthetic geometric method and figures. 
Co1poreal magnitud 
Leibniz's examination of magnitude (and incommensurable figures, such as the 
diagonal) can be traced back to a discussion about incommensurable figures in which 
he describes magnitude as 'the multiplicity of parts' in the essay 'On the Nature of 
Corporeal Things' of 1671 (Arthur 2001: 345), and in the essay 'On the Secrets of 
the Sublime, or On the Supreme Being' of 1676. Magnitude, he writes, is 'the 
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constitution of a thing by the recognition of which it can be regarded as a whole' 
(Arthur 2001: lxxii). The Monad is a geometric figure, therefore, that it is constituted 
out of a long-standing investigation into the principles of magnitude and limit. 
Moreover, the Monadolqýy's exploration of these geometric principles strongly 
reflects an engagement in geometric thinking that can be drawn from Euclid's 
Elements, Proclus' affirmation of unlimited limit in the axiomatic method and 
Descartes' development of the analytic method. 
In §3, for example, Leibniz calls Monads 'the Elements of things', positing an 
explicit relationship between the substance of the Monad and Euclid's term 'element' 
(Monadolo, gy 1973: 25 1). 7 In addition, if we recall Euclid's first element that a 'point 
is that which has no part' (Heath 1956: 153), we find the paradox of limit and 
divisibility present in both the notion of the point and the Monad. But it is Leibniz's 
notion of limit that provides an analytic version of division. Rather than defining the 
notion of atom, point or element in terms of a discussion about a synthetic 
relationship of limit and unlimit, Leibniz constitutes the notion of the Monad in 
terms of an irreducible, analytic magnitude. So, by examining the initial sections of the 
text we find that the notions of magnitude, infinity and substance produce a highly 
complex kind of entity or geometric figue in which division or limit are dramatically 
redefined. 
In §1 Leibniz calls the Monad a 'simple' substance 'without parts' and the 
following secfions develop this instantiation of the Monad in relation to magnitude 
(M. 251). It is expressed in the concepts 'aggregate' in §2; in §3 it is 'Atoms of 
Nature' that are 'neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility'; and 'indissoluble' or 
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without beginning in §§4-5. Magnitude, then, as a principle of geometric construction, 
is clearly posited in the first axiomatic statements of the Monadoloýy. 
The operations of divisibility or limit are complicated so that the notion of 
limit as the pre-given division in a concept of unity, such as the division into the 
whole and part, is upset through the introduction of an expanded and multiple kind of 
division. Division becomes a multiplicitous operation, registering limit and unlimit 
together, rather than the notion of the limit demarcating a divisible magnitude such as 
a finite whole (e. g. a circle) and its parts (e. g. two semi-circles), or, lapsing into 
'indivisible' infinity. Thus, both limit and unlimit are constituted through a procedure 
ofinfinite divisibihly and from which geometric figures become more strongly imbued 
with magnitude and the powers of unlimit and plenitude. 
Leibniz's critique of substance, in conjunction with seventeenth century 
debates of atomism and geometric division, is also clearly indicated in the engagement 
with mathematical and Cartesian traditions in the text; for example, the notion of the 
Atom is neither a simple geometric point, nor a concrete, unchanging entity. ' Instead, 
the Monad reflects the Cartesian discussions of unity between material and 
immaterial capacities (i. e. mind and body are a brought together into an infinite 
unity), that is, it is an expression of an infinite substance or extensity in which the 
indivisibility of the Monad and its corporeality are affirmed. In addition, it reveals 
the problem of those theories that are constituted through a synthetic diVision of the 
whole, part, soul, matter and mind. Importantly, Leibniz constitutes the notion of the 
simple 'element' or atom, not as an abstract notion, but as an active 'substance' so 
that 'limit' becomes immanently concerned with concepts of difference in relation to 
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life in the multiple, 'simple substances. But neither does he restrict the Monad to a 
finite, extended corporeality, since that would limit it once again to a determinate 
quantity or magnitude. 
Later, in §§4048, Leibniz examines how God lends another essential 
expression of a qualitative infinity to the Monad, providing the connection between 
the Monad's limit and all other realities. In §40, Leibniz states that God is infinite; he 
is 'a pure sequence of possible being' and contains 'as much reality as possible', and 
in §43 God is the source of existence and essences: 'the source of whatever there is 
real in the possible' (M. 259-260). But his infinitude is determined not just by the 
magnitude of everything actual and possible (i. e. the 'immensum'), but in his 
perfection, as §41 explains: 
God is absolutely perfect, perfection being understood as the 
magnitude of positive reality in the strict sense, when the limitations 
or the bounds of those things which have them are removed. There 
where there are no limits, that is to say, in God, perfection is 
absolutely infinite (M. 259-60). 9 
'Created things' are determined by their natural limits, however; for example, 
the 'natural inertia' of bodies versus the unlimited perfection of God (M. - §42,260). 
Thus, extended beings represent a limit-threshold of magnitude that is determined by 
their own internal capacities whereas God's infinitude is distinct in having no limit- 
threshold of perfection. §§45-48 continue this examination of the magnitude of God's 
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infinite perfection. §47 states, for example, that he is the 'ultimate unity or the 
original simple substance' from which all other realities are derived (M. 261). Like the 
Ethics, therefore, the Monadolqy affirins the primary cause of God to be infinity or 
unlimit. Leibnizs geometric method, however, emphasises the corporeality of the 
infinite and intensive extension to a greater extent than Spinoza, insofar as the notion 
of the divine is not the first proposition of the text, rather it is the definition of the 
Monad's internal magnitude. For Spinoza, however, God is the first principle of 
infinity that is examined in the text (see also note 3 of this chapter). Later in the 
chapter, this distinction will also be shown to be important in Leibnizs principle of 
sufficient reason in which internal ratios are defined as the cause through which man 
and God are brought into han-nony. 
So, the Monad represents a notion of substance that is both immaterial and 
material, intensive, yet also extensive. In addition, its relations are determined not by 
the production of either, a single divisibility (limit), or an indivisible unity, but as a 
result of degrees of an infinite divisibility. Thus, we find that divisibility and 
indivisibility also come under the terms of the principle of magnitude, i. e. of a 
qualitative difference of degree or intensity, rather than limit and unlimit representing 
two opposing kinds of quantity, which will be important in the discussion about the 
incompossibility or vice-diction of sufficient reason. 
In this respect, magnitude is a continuum in itself, generated through an 
internally differentiated limit, not an external and synthetic difference. The premise of 
finite division of the whole and part is transformed into a sequence of infinite 
evolutions in which the Monad represents a geometric figure that can be generated 
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from a logic of discrete elements, such as the axiom, but is also constitutive of 
concrete and sensible relations. Magnitude, then, is consistent with the aesthetic 
continuum of the unextended idea into the extended figure, rather than being a purely 
mathematical determination, since simple and discrete corporealifies are shown to be 
inherently incommensurable and refute the imposition of finite beginnings or ends 
that are commonly associated with quantitative magnitude. 
As magnitude that is inherently concerned with the plenitude of 'extensity', 
(and in contrast to Spinoza's univocal substance), Leibniz tells us that there are 
multiple substances, rather than one infinite substance. The concept of existence is 
expressed, therefore, in relation to infinite substances that are divisible into infinite 
parts. Substance is considered to be infinite, not because of its formal limits, but as a 
result of its relationship to memory or the soul (i. e. an intensive extensity), so that 
'wholeness' becomes untenable because the notions of pre-given limits - e. g. 
beginnings and ends - are unthinkable (this emphasis on the immaterial forces of the 
Monad also recalls Spinoza's concern with the conatus and prefigures Bergson's 
discussion of duration). Once again the notion of the definite divisibility of the whole 
or part becomes highly problematic and it is a discussion to which Leibniz returns 
throughout the MonadolqAy; for example, in §8 he writes of the continuous change in 
the plenum that cannot be reduced to a division of whole and parts (and is discussed 
in greater detail below). Thus, by positing the notion of multiple 'simple substances', 
such as the Monad or the 'plenum', an infinite notion of division and difference is 
posited in one term that also reinforces the double operation of limit and infinity. 
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In addition, infinity is priorifised in the statements that the simple substances 
form 'aggregates' or'composites', rather than finite wholes (M- §2,251). Magnitude 
is significant only in relation to conglomerates or aggregates, not finite entities, 
because it is concerned with continuous differentiation, rather than being limited to 
either, the infinitely small (e. g. 'infinitessimals') or to the largest quantity (e. g. the 
'immensum'). Instead, as will be shown below, the notion of limit becomes a kind of 
c approximation' or 'accident', rather than a determined or pre-given 'end'. 
Summarising the discussion so far, therefore, we find that the scientific and 
quantifiable notion of geometric magnitude (represented by the whole and the part, 
finite limit and indivisible infinity) is untenable in the following ways; 
1. it is aligned with the Cartesian notion of a mechanical division of substance that 
overlooks the possibility of an immaterial extensity; 
2. the divisibility into whole identifies does not admit the provisionality of a 'ratio' 
or 'sufficiency' in the operation of infinite divisibility. Wholeness is an inadequate 
notion of identity because magnitude is only partially explained, rather than being 
considered an intensive operation in an infinite continuum, and; 
3. the part cannot be a smaller or finite imitation of the whole. So, Leibniz considers 
the geometric multiplicity of the Monad's magnitude (i. e. that which defines its 
unity) to be founded on; a. differential limit or divisible infinity that cannot be 
reduced to a finite part or whole and; b. infinite divisibility in extended matter and 
unextended thought. 
In addition, because the Monad is promoted as a shift from an abstract 
principle (i. e. the point) to a metaphysical substance, Leibniz augrnents the potential 
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of a connective principle of infinite change by bringing together a highly defined 
mathematical concept and an ontological enquiry, in order to propose that the Atom 
and Element are aspects of 'concrete' realities. The Monad constitutes, therefore, the 
geometric principles of limit and unlimit together with notions of nature and life. As a 
result the implication of a finite diVIsIon in Euclid's statements become radically 
altered into an aesthetic and qualitative discussion. The following section explores 
these immaterial magrfitudes in more detail. 
Inc=Qreal magLiitud 
We have now looked at the notion of magnitude as substance (extension), 
however, Leibniz also develops a notion of magnitude as qualitative and incorporeal 
differences (forces) in the fonn of perception and appetite. 
In the following chapter, we will find that Bergson also constructs an 
aesthetic geometry in relation to the psychic activities of the individual that on first 
sight might be said to be closer to Spinoza's theories of psychic activities than 
Leibniz's theories of 'internal activities' since Spinoza's emotions represent more 
developed modes of psychic definition and activity than Leibniz's 'logical' 
conditions of perception and appetite. 'O Perhaps, however, this is too sharp a 
distinction because, as will be shown in this section and in the following chapter, 
Leibniz's theories display a strong resemblance to Bergson's theories of 'matter and 
memory', which are clearly more developed as psychic activities but have, 
nevertheless, similar traits of intensive corporeal magnitude that Leibniz proposes in 
his writings on perception and appetite. " Although Leibniz grounds infinity in 
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analytic and mathematical operations, the psychic activities of the Monad prevent it 
from being merely an inert, yet infinitely divisible, thing. Thus, Leibniz's discussion 
of perception, appetite and the soul are important constituents of the Monad's 
geometric aesthetic unity and agency. 
Perception is the incorporeal principle of change, which determines the scope 
of a Monad's unity and represents the condition through which the soul and body are 
brought into continuity. It is, therefore, a kind of 'magnitude', an intensive limit or 
ratio; for example, in §14 Leibniz defines it, stating; '[t]he passing condition which 
involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is 
nothing else than what is called Perception' (M. - § 14,253). 
Leibniz then turns his attention to address the mistakes of those Cartesians 
who consider the consciousness of perceptions to be the defining atirihute of 
existence, not the founding principle through which existence is given or in which the 
virtual is a real, independent state (M. §14,253). Perception, for Leibniz, however, 
resists the Cartesian principle of exclusion between the soul and the body. 
Furthermore, as a result of the suggestion that the soul and the body are separate 
from each other, Leibniz accuses the Cartesians of having 'adopted the Scholastic 
error that souls can exist entirely separated from the bodies, and have even confirmed 
ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal' (M. 253). The Monad, by 
contrast, is not a version of division that is, once again, determined by the 
constituency of the synthetic whole or part. Instead, its perception and, by 
implication, the soul, exist as a series of embodied intensities. Thus, Leibniz 
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considers souls to be 'indestructible' as a result of the relationship between the 
differing intensities of activity (or awareness) that constitute substance and the mind 
(as we will soon see in the discussion below). 
So, Leibniz explicates perception's multiplicitous nature that produces all 
perceptions, even those of which we are not aware (e. g. dreams), explaining that it 
constitutes apperception or consciousness. Perception is the psychic level of activity 
through which different levels of hannony and order are produced in different states 
of intensity; and, in relation to the singular capacities of the Monad, it is not just a 
symbolic relation but the Monad's capacity for intensification and 'attention' that 
generates different degrees of harmony (showing that, once again, this discussion 
bears a strWng resemblance to the notion of perception and the virtual that will be 
examined in Bergson's writings). In addition, Leibniz's figures of 'small perceptions' 
are continuous with Bergson's concept of memory (see below for further discussion). 
Having demonstrated that perception is consciousness in general, Leibniz 
explains the production of particular degrees of awareness and directed thought in the 
principle of 'appetition', again emphasising the embodied nature of perception rather 
than its value as a cognitive operation. Appetition is the 'internal principle' that 
'brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another' (M. §15, 
253). This 'desire' (Pappetit) strives for 'the whole of perception' but does not attain 
it; however, in doing so appetition reaches 'new' perceptions. 
in § 17 Leibniz explains that perception and its appetites are not reducible to 
symbolic explanations in the form of 'mechanical causes' and the 'figures and 
motions' that they produce. Here, therefore, we observe the preparation towards 
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Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, which will further demonstrate that the 
mechanics of causal change, such as sequential order and oppositional truths, are 
inadequate explanations to describe the infinity of the Monad and its internal 
structures (M. § 17,254). Leibniz elaborates, writing that perception and its products 
are not reducible to a mechanical diagram of magnitudes, parts and wholes, such as 
the analogy of the internal workings of a mill. Perception, he tells us, is 'sought' in 
the simple substance (rather than the 'composite' substance or the 'machine') 
through which the 'internal activities' of perceptions and their changing appetites 
resist the reductive form of a mechanical or composite set of elements. Perception, 
therefore, represents an internally differentiated force that reflects Spinoza's 
discussions of modes and affects, insofar as both are inherently expressive of the 
'life' of the unity and are necessarily expressed in qualitatively different thoughts, 
ideas or images. 
in the following passages, Leibniz considers the qualitative nature of 
perception as an infinitely &visible magnitude in the fonn of 'little perceptions'. §21 
posits the different qualities of perception in which different states can be observed, 
and in which Leibniz tells us that these perceptions are 'weak [ ... 
I in which nothing 
stands out disfinctively'; for example, the act of 'spinning around' which causes the 
Lpower of perception' to be weakened (M. - 251). Alternatively, these little thoughts' 
are akin to states of 'undirected' or 'approximate' perception, such as 
unconsciousness or drearns, in contrast to the suggestion that the loss of 
consciousness in sleep results in a non-thinking substance (§§21-23). 
Perception, then, endures continuously in the Monad, and this continuous 
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passage through different states of awareness means that any given perception is 
always a concatenation of its past and fitural states; '[e]very present state of a 
simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that 
its present is big with its future' (M. §22,256). So, in §23, Leibniz is able to 
demonstrate the 'virtuality' of perception when the present perception is understood 
to be part of a previous perception (that Bergson's discussion of the contraction and 
expansion of memory will strongly echo). Leibniz writes; 'for one perception can 
come in a natural way only from another perception, just as a motion can come in a 
natural way only from a motion' (M. §23,256). In addition, the emergence of 
perceptions from preceding perceptions is reminiscent of both the enfolding and 
unfolding of images that was observed in the relationship between the imagination 
and soul in Proclus' Commentary, and the duration of Spinoza's conatus in the 
embodied subject. 
Alternatively, in §25, Leibniz tells us that the perception of the soul 
'represents that which goes on in the sense-organs', reinforcing the relationship 
between the unextended capacities of the soul and the qualitative differences of 
perceptions that are generated in the sensing body, so that here a 'concatenation' also 
exists between Leibniz's idea of perceptions and Spinoza's theory of affects because 
each philosopher posits an intensive, psycho-physical relationship between 
unextended and extended mateiialifies. 
These 'small perceptions' or memory represent therefore, different states of 
embodied perception in which memory is an internal kind of reason that is not 
generated as an embodied idea; '[t]he memory fijmishes a sort of consecutiveness 
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which imitates reason but is to be distinguished from it' (M. §26,256). In addition, 
like Bergson, Leibniz also reflects on the natural sciences and the how memory is 
expressed in an animal's perceptions; for example, suggesting that animals 'are led by 
the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the 
preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had 
before' (M. §26,256). Thus, in the analogy of a dog remembering the pain that comes 
from being struck by a stick, Leibniz suggests that 'reason' arises out of 
representations (i. e. images, 'reasons' or ideas) generated by the memory, which is a 
unity of a continuous series of perceptions. Here, therefore, the strength of a 
perception of an image or 'picture' is dependent upon the magnitude derived 'from 
the number of the previous perceptions' (M. §27,257). In this context, perception is 
proposed as the operation through which action is explained, countering the Cartesian 
belief that bodily actions are the effects of external mechanical causes, to an 
understanding of embodied activity that is determined by autonomous and internal 
perceptions, memory and appetites. 
Having expressed the corporeal forces that produce the embodied Monad as a 
series of intensive limits, Leibniz devotes the following sections to a detailed 
explanation of the incorporeal unity, that is, the soul. On the one hand, the soul 
designates the Monad's nature as a unity, as a 'simple substance', and on the other, it 
represents the principle of sufficient reason (ratio) since it provides the unity of 
internally produced reason and divine Reason (see the following section, especially). 
But we have also seen that the Monad is an embodied, perceiving entity and Leibniz 
makes this connection between a continuously perceiving substance and the 
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incorporeality of the soul explicit, stating that if we 'designate as soul everAing 
which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, a 
simple substances or created Monads could be called souls' (M. §19,255). 
Thus, for Leibniz, the Monad is a particular unity of perception and appetite, 
rather than a general class of entity, which requires greater definiti on, for whilst it is 
true that a Monad is, in general, a perceiving entity, the previous discussion has 
emphasised that it is the Monad's capacity for memory, i. e. perceiving as a duration, 
that distinguishes its definition as a soul from a simple Monad (i. e. entelechy). In 
addition, we will see that the Monad is a corporeal kind of infinity (i. e. sufficient 
reason), in contrast to the problematic 'potentiality' of infinity that is produced in a 
c pure reason' of infinity. " 
'Soul', then, is really only applicable to those Monads in which perception is 
more distinct than a general 'feeling'. An entelechy or Monad designates perception 
whereas a soul has perception that is more defined and produced in part by memory; 
that is, 'the term Soul [refers to] those whose perception is more distinct and is 
accompanied by memoi-y' (M. §19,255). Thus, in the following §20, the soul is 
considered to be enduring and as a result confinns the possibility of different states 
of consciousness such as dreams or fainting. Soul is greater than merely perception as 
consciousness and can pass through one state into another; that is, the loss of 
consciousness in dreams, sleep or fantasy is not the removal of consciousness or the 
loss of existence or soul, but evidence of different kinds of intensity in consciousness 
in the Monad, rather than a singular kind of Perception (M: §20,255). 
In addition, Leibniz also considers the soul to be the infinite unity through 
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which a special kind of reason is constituted. In §§29-30 he explains that the mind is 
the rational soul' that distinguishes us from 'lower' Monads by 'the knowledge of 
eternal and necessary truths' (M. 257). The rational soul or mind constitutes the 
faculty of reason that connects us to the 'necessary' laws and 'abstractions' of nature 
and enables us to perform 'Reflective Acts'. Moreover, it provides our understanding 
of God as principle of perfection. Thus, the mind is defined as a particular kind of 
perceptive reason that situates us into a natural order of infinity and perfection and 
the reflective acts provide the basis for fortning the concept of the self-conscious 
subject (the T). For Leibniz, then, the soul is the principle of sufficient reason 
insofar as it generates an aesthetic magnitude that is derived out of the harmony 
between the internal activities of perception, desire and memory, and the external 
laws of God and nature. " Like Spinoza, Kant and Bergson, therefore, Leibniz's 
affirmation of the autonomous thinking subject provides an important continuity 
between their geometric methods. 
The Monad is constituted by self-generated reason or internal action, 
therefore, rather than being detennined by external causes. Interiority and the internal 
activities of the Monad become primary concerns so that Leibniz defines the notion 
of limit in the Monad in terms of its 'internal activities', intensifying the aesthetic 
geometric unity of the Monad so that it is neither, reducible to an external notion of 
form, nor determined by external laws of mechanical cause and effect (M, - §18,255). 
Instead, the intensive, corporeal and intemal qualities of the Monad are generated 
through an internal continuum of magnitude. This marks an important shift in the 
scope of the geometric method on two counts; first, the dominance of the exteriority 
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of geometry is dramatically recast by the introduction of intensive, internal relations 
that produce the notion of differentiated figures and limit, thereby undermining the 
precedence of fonnal, exterior space and; second, a concrete (i. e. rational) explanation 
is given for the previously mystical notion of limit (as indivisibility) that was 
observed in Proclus' method. As a result the notion of limit is brought into an internal 
and embodied series of relations, rather than remaining an abstract principle of 
production; for example, §7 contains the famous description of this autonomy, which 
states that the Monad is completely independent from all external causes or affects: 
There is also no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered or 
changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no 
possibility of transposition within it, nor can we conceive of any 
internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or 
diminished there within the substance, such as can take place in the 
case of composites where a change can occur among the parts. The 
Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go 
out (M. §7,25 1). 
The Monad is defined, therefore, by an internal imperafive. In addition, the 
notion of change is released from the mechanical premise of a chain of external cause 
and effect to an aesthetic principle of life. In the follovAng sentences of §7 Leibniz 
explains the integrity of an internal difference in the Monad by distinguishing a 
distinct concept of attribute' in contrast to Spinoza's modal notion. He writes; 
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'[t]he Attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside 
the substance, as could sensible species of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither 
substance nor attribute can enter from without into a Monad' (M. 25 1). So, in 
contrast to Spinoza's finite modes, Leibniz promotes the infinite magnitude of 
internal attributes. Externality, however, is also a real state, since it is in the external 
relations between Monads and a natural order to which Spinoza's modes and 
Leibniz's 'sufficient' reason correspond. The Monad is, then, both extensive and 
intensive; a singularity or an irreducibly discrete entity with its own agency. §12, for 
example, introduces the concept of the Monad as 'manifold, which is an expression 
of the changing extensity of a differential and intensive substance. Leibniz explains 
that the manifold 'constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the 
simple substance' (M. § 12,253). He continues this explanation in § 13: 
This manifoldness must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that 
which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by degrees, 
there must be something which changes and something which remains 
unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a 
plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts (M-. 
13,253). 
Change, then, is not just a single, consistent measure of intensity, but is as 
varied as the multiple states of difference existing within the manifold, rather than 
being derived from an external force, or dividable into units or parts. The manifold or 
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continuum, therefore, displays the characteristics of intension and extension that have 
been observed in Proclus and Spinoza's theofies and which will constitute the 
continuity of duration in Bergson's philosophy. 14 
A further correspondence with Spinoza's geometric ideas is evident in 
Leibniz's examination of the perceptual limits of the body as an intense magnitude 
and Spinoza's concepts of adequate and inadequate ideas in terms of action and 
passivity. Thus, the Monad's capacity for action is also brought under the condition 
of intensive magnitude because when a Monad is active, it has 'distinct perceptions' 
and when it is passive, 'it has confused perceptions' (M. §49,261-262). Active and 
passive expressions of its forces, 'endeavours' or conatus display its 'perfection', 
therefore, by transmitting the Monad's internal order of magnitude into external 
actions of magnitude or limit (§52). In addition, we find the discussions of active and 
passive forces have geometric scope in the production of 'fictional' geometric figures; 
for example, the inaccuracy of small perceptions, such as dreams or dizziness, 
produce infinite figures that are similar to the imperceptible states of change, which 
are registered as the calibration from a curve to a straight line; that is, 'small 
perceptions' represent the mathematical invention of 'approximate' or 'indiscernible' 
figures in Calculus (as will be discussed in the following section in more detail). 
Sufficient reas 
In the principle of sufficient reason we find Leibniz invent a theory of logic or 
ratio that produces the aesthetic geometric unity of the Monad or soul. Underpinning 
the aesthetic premise of the Monad, sufficient reason operates by means of an 
175 
analytic logic to generate the internal, autonomous and reflective T of the Monad, in 
particular through the shift from a relationship of contradiction to 'incompossibility' 
or 'vice-diction'. Thus, it is the construction of qualitative reason in which 'truth' is 
equated with the idea of the 'best' or most 'fitting' relationship in a continuous series 
of possibilities. Such a notion of reason means that the predicate and its agreement 
(such as, the opposites of mind and body, internal or external relations) are brought 
together, not as quantitative magnitude, but as a qualitative ratio of&fferent relations. 
Sufficient reason is first expressed in §18 following Leibniz's definitions of 
Perception and Appetition. Leibniz tells us that the perfection of the Monads is to 
be understood in tenns of their 'sufficiency': 
All simple substances or created Monads may be called Entelechies, 
because they have in themselves a certain perfection [ ... ]. There is 
in 
them a sufficiency [ ... ] which makes them the source of their internal 
activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons (M. 
18,254-5) [my emphasis]. 
Monads are perfect insofar that they have a sufficient source of internal 
relations that comprise their 'incorporeality'. Sufficiency is equated with the 
composition of the Monad as substance and immaterial principles so that, in the 
following sections §§19-28, Leibniz explains sufficiency in terms of a continuum of 
perceptions, duration and memory; that is, as a sensuous and feeling entity. In §29 he 
turns to the particular knowledge of self and God - i. e. self-consciousness - which he 
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designates the 'Rational Soul or the Mind' (M. 257). It is through the rational rnind 
that we are able to construct a unity of thinking substance in the form of the 
'reflective 1'. 
Leibniz distinguishes further between the principles through which we 
produce reason, drawing the distinction between the internal structure of sufficient 
reason and 'reason' that is gained through the principle of contradiction (M. 258). 
These two principles are explained in §31-32; Leibniz states that contradiction 
enables us to produce the notions of 'truth' and 'false', whereas, sufficient reason 
provides us with a contingent notion of truth based upon the fact that the existence 
of any truth is itself a sign of its own sufficient reason. Truth, under the principle of 
sufficiency, therefore, becomes a contingent or substantial 'reason' in the existence of 
a fact. In §33 Leibniz continues, writing that there are two kinds of truth, which are 
produced by reason - Reasoning and Fact. Reasoning is necessary, whereas facts are 
contingent allowing the existence of the contradictory facts in the same statement. In 
addition, he notes that reasoning can be divided into 'simpler ideas and simpler 
truths' until primary truths are given; for example, in the progression of mathematical 
or geometric proofs. 
§34 is an explanation of the geometric method in terms of an analytical 
understanding of reason, rather than as a synthetic prInciple of reason which is 
determined by the exlernal &vision of contradiction; for example, the analytic 
relationship between the axiom and the problem is not one of external difference, 
rather, in the analytic method there is the principle of change from within. 
Mathematics, Leibniz tells us, 'resolves' speculations into axioms, definitions 
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or postulates; speculations are not false since they do not 'contradict' the primary 
principles of axioms, but nor do axioms exclude difference, since they contain internal 
differences, such as the hypothesis of the speculative problem, so that in §35 Leibniz 
wntes: 
There are finally simple ideas of which no definition can be given. 
There are also the Axioms and Postulates or, in a word, the primary 
principles which cannot be proved and, indeed, have no need of proof 
These are identical propositions whose opposites involve express 
contradictions (M. 258). 
Thus, if we take Leibniz's cTitique of the finite axiom and his emphasis on 
'infinite divisibility', the geometric 'element' (such as the axiom or proposition) 
becomes, not a certainty, but a principle that can hold a 'mixture' of differences or 
contradictions within itself, that is, geometric elements and their products are 
comprised of 'incompossibilites' of contradiction (or, as Deleuze writes, 'vice- 
diction' [Deleuze 1997: 46]). 15 Geometry becomes, therefore, not a system of finite 
coherence and the production of 'laws' as finite truths, but expressive of a 
continuously changing continuum of internal and 'sufficient'reason. 
Sufficient reason is constructed upon similar principles of sufficiency as 
Leibniz's reformulation of intensive magnitudes in which a magnitude represents a 
'fiction', agglomeration or 'approximation' of truth. Arthur refers briefly to the 
'fictional' quality of Leibniz's geometric figures, noting 'the connection of the 
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doctrine of petites perceptions with the analysis of geometric figures as fictional 
entities approximated arbitrarily closely by polygons, (Arthur 2001, xxvi). Three 
consequences arise from this observation; first, more than one geometric figure is 
produced out of a continuum; second, each figure is connected to 'virtual' or 
imperceptible, yet embodied, conditions of thought and matter (i. e. the petite 
perceptions or memory), and; third, fictional figures confirm geometric principles of 
c sufficiency' rather than finite perfection. 
Thus, the concept of sufficient reason upholds an insistence on the 
'substantial form' of the Monad or soul that has the capacity to produce reason 
through its own activities. Nevertheless, this internal and individuated reason does 
not exclude a relationship with the 'perfect' and infinite reason of God, which is not 
merely 'sufficient'. In this respect, sufficient reason is always in relation to an 
external principle of sufficiency and infinity, rather than limiting the Monad's 
sufficient reason to an unregulated agency or, "ill. 
Sufficient reason, therefore, is not merely necessary for the internal harmony 
of the Monad, but is also required for discerning the relationship between the 
individual entity and the external world, God or nature. The internal sufficiency of an 
entity is always contingent, therefore, to the infinitude (plenitude) of the world, so 
that the 'truth' of the external world becomes infinitely and immanently enfolded 
(implicatio) within it. §36 states: 
But there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or 
truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which 
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extend throughout the universe of created beings, where the analysis 
into more particular reasons can be continued into greatest detail 
without limit because of the immense variety of the things in nature 
and because of the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of 
figures and of movements, present and past, which enter into the 
efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are 
an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositions of my soul, present 
and past (M- §36,259). 
Such a concept of harmony extends between God as reason and the 
perception or embodiment of reason, representing two different kinds of perfection, 
one infinite and one sufficient (M. §37,259). Thus, in §38 sufficient reason is 
described as 'sufficient' substance, that is, a 'substantial' reason or God. Leibniz 
explains God's sufficiency in the following passage, §39; '[n]ow, since this substance 
is a sufficient reason for all the above mentioned details, which are linked together 
throughout, there is but one Go4 and this God is sufficient' (M. 259). Here, then, 
Leibniz reinforces the harmony of a metaphysical order in which sufficient reason 
(the embodied, yet Rational Mnd) is a more appropriate form of reason, in contrast 
to the disembodied, pure reason that is exclusive of matter or the body. Instead, 
sufficiency is originated in the body and its perceptive powers are confinned through 
the internal and external harmony of the infinite substance, God. Thus, according to 
this argument, reason (ratio) is produced by a thinking substance, rather than merely 
representing a product of idealised intellect. 
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Sufficient reason, therefore, is an aesthetic geometric principle, insofar as it is 
a demonstration of the relationship between the internal and external relations or ratio 
of discrete and universal infinites so that geometric figures are understood to express 
a continuum of aesthetic differences of 'reason' (ratio), Reason itself, then, becomes 
understood as a continuum of magnitudes, a kind of limit-operation from within the 
geometric figure or body, rather than merely an imitation of an external agency, law or 
'Reason'. 
Thus, sufficient reason is one of Leibniz's logical demonstrations of the 
powers of the soul, memory, perception and appetition, perfection and, sufficiency 
that produce an infinitely divisible series of 'ratios', ideas or concepts, rather than a 
logic in which perfection designates the finite idea or body. Leibniz distinguishes 
between reason and 'sufficient reason' in his demonstration of the structure of 
Monads as autonomous, incorporeal entities and in so doing reason becomes 
understood as a differential principle -a ratio - that is not reducible to finite 
representations. In the following section we will see the manner in which the 
intensive and extensive qualities of this aesthetic are expressed in the geometric figure 
of the plenum. 
Theý Inm 
-1 ý1ý 
Leibniz is the philosopher in this thesis whose method can be said to most 
clearly generate a continuum of differentiated figures. Arthur has pointed to this 
continuum (or plenitude) of figures in Leibniz's writings that include the 'net' and the 
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'fold'; for example, in an extract titled, 'On the Origin of Things from Forms', 1676, 
Leibniz explains the figure of the net, as follows: 
But this universal space is an entity by aggregation, and is 
continuously variable; in other words, it is a composite of spaces 
empty and ftdl, like a net, and this net continuously receives 
another form, and thus changes; but what persists through this 
change is the immensurn itself But the immensum itself is God 
insofar as he is thought to be everywhere, i. e. insofar as he contains 
that perfection or absolute affirmative form which is attributed to 
things when they are said to be somewhere (Arthur 2001: 12 1). 
According to this text therefore, infinite change is inherent in the continuous 
development from one figure to another that is also reflected in the infinity of the 
immensum (i. e. God or the world). In addition, the figure of the net suggests a 
metaphor that constantly receives and exchanges states in both a spatial and temporal 
spectrum. 16 Thus, the infinity of the figure is constructed in relation to a genetic 
order of infinity represented by the plenitude of the world. This infinity of spatio- 
temporal relations is also suggested in Leibniz's earlier vaitings on the continuum 
and, especially in his radical invention of the geometric figure that is constituted by 
imaginary or fictional qualifies; for example, Leibniz calls the polygon, a 'fictitious 
entity' that is taken as a kind of 'ideal limit to a sequence of polygons' (Arthur 2001: 
Ivi). Alternatively, Arthur notes that in these fonnulations of 1676 Leibniz writes 
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that for a body to have unity 'in space and self-identity and continuity through time', 
an 'immaterial' principle or 'something imaginary' must be involved (Arthur 2001: 
Ixii). Here, the imtTination is introduced to explain figures that approximate to a 
given moment in time, since 'magnitude, shape, and motion all 'involve something 
imaginary" (Arthur 2001: 1xii). Thus, we can suggest that immaterial or imaginary 
figures represent the provisional assignation of place, time or movement to an 
imperceptible difference. In this respect they are 'sufficient' geometric identities, 
shapes or forms, which approximate with an infinitely continuous unity. 'Substantial 
forin' is, therefore, an infinitely divisible spatio-temporal unity that is brought about 
by immaterial operations, such as the imagination (Arthur 2001: Wi). Leibniz's earlier 
writings sustain the importance of the imagination in the construction of geometric 
figures, however, the imagination is not discussed explicitly in the Monadology. But, 
as we saw in the previous section, the sensibility is represented by perception and 
appetition, and in the following discussion it will be shown that the figure of the 
plenum promotes production in the forms of a spatio-temporal relationship that 
resonates with Bergson's theory of matter and memory. 
The plenum is first mentioned in the MonadoloSy in §8 that lays out the 
nature of its qualities. It is a 'completely filled space', i. e. a space that contradicts the 
existence of the vacuum since it is constituted by matter. "' Leibniz writes; '[flor 
instance, if we imagine aplenum or completely filled space, where each part receives 
only the equivalent of its previous motion, one state of things would not be 
distinguishable from one another' (M. §8,252). Rather than constructing the plenum 
as a divisible figure of equivalent finite parts, however, Leibniz reconciles this 
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contradiction of the 'immaterial' void with the materiality of the spatial figure into a 
series of material relations, that is, a continuum. In addition, this section is a 
discussion of qualifies or difference, which affirms the notion of intensive magnitude 
- i. e. the infinitely multiple singularity - arising, not because of an exterior power, 
but as a result of its internal and differential powers. The qualifies of each Monad 
distinguish one from another, and the plenum's 'paradoxical nature' is an expression 
of this multiplicity or 'vice-diction', that is, of sufficient reason. The plenum is, 
therefore, a geometric figure that is immanently related to an intensive substance and 
an intensive extensity, but is not defived from the external movement of bodies in 
space. 
But it is also a figure that is infinite twice-over; first, it is inherently 
'fictional', insofar as it is an unassignable infinity and; second, because of its 
relationship to material plenitude. Moreover, this logic of immaterial and material 
continuity is sustained in the geometric figures of the envelope, fold and the plenum 
throughout the text. Thus, to a greater extent than Proclus and Spinoza, this 
discussion emphasises; that the identification of one figure is insufficient. Instead, 
Leibniz's method produces a continuum of figures, demonstrating the extent to which 
the text constitutes an 'analytic' contraction and expansion of geometric states. in 
addition, the geometric figures (i. e. the Monad or plenum) represent both the 
coniraction (implicatio) of all the elements in the text into one idea, and the expansion 
(explicatio) of all these ideas into a unity of incompossible statements or elements 
which, as has been noted above, %Arill be retrieved again in Bergson's theory of the 
contraction and expansion of memory. 
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The plenum is also present in Leibniz's earlier writings on the continuum and 
closely relates to his examination of extended bodies and movement; for example, in 
the paper 'On Matter, Motion, Minima, and the Continuum' 1675, Leibniz writes: 
Now, I conceive everything to be a plenum, i. e. to be matter with 
various motions, for if some whole infinite mass were understood to be 
moving with a certain universal motion, this motion could be considered 
nonexistent. Therefore, supposing the plenitude of things - in other 
words, supposing there is no part of space that does not contain matter 
moving with a motion different from an infinity of others -I show that 
the same quantity of motion is conserved as follows [ ... 
] (Arthur 2001: 
33). 
in his discussion of the heterogeneity of moving bodies Leibniz also makes 
the discussion of internal difference in the geometric figure possible, since the notion 
of a homogenous, external movement is considered to be redundant in distinguishing 
differences between bodies. Latta provides an insightful discussion about the internal 
forces of movement that constitute the plenum, interpreting the continuum to be 
comprised of the interrelated forces of appetition and perception and the external 
forces of movement in the world. He wntes: 
The conception of continuity, however, by implying a plenum, 
escapes the contradictions that are involved in the idea of the void. 
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But it still has to be shown how change is possible within a plenum, 
or how change can take place without disturbing the continuity of 
the infinite series of Monads. Any change within a plenum affects 
every part of it [ ... 
]. If, however, the universe be a quantitative 
plenum, it is impossible to understand how any change could 
originate within it. It must receive its motion from outside, and must 
thus be regarded as finite, which again is inconsistent with its reality 
as a plenum. Leibniz overcomes this &fficulty by regarding the 
universe, not as an infinite mass occupying all that there is to occupy, 
but as a continuity or infinite gradation of qualitative &fferences, 
each containing within itse#"the ptinciple of its own changes. He 
subsfitutesfor an extensive plenum of mass an intensive continuum of 
force or life [ ... 
] (Latta 1985: 40) [my emphasis]. 
Latta's explanation agrees with the principle of sufficient reason, that is, the 
hannony or ratio between the internal activities. of the Monad and nature. But this 
argument also highlights the extent to which the plenum is an intensive and infinite 
unity that is not determined as a finite space filled with matter, but is a spatio- 
temporalfigure that is constituted out of an intensive matter. Interestingly, Latta also 
continues the discussion of exchange into a section on 'passage' and the 'pre- 
Cartesian' notion of 'influxus physicus' or 'the actual passage of elements from the 
one substance to the other', to explain the relationship between the soul and body. 
Here, then, we have a concept of passage that reflects the extensive passage of affects 
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in Spinoza's method, but discussed in the context of a method that is 'intensive' 
(Latta 1985: 42). 
In the Monadology, therefore, we find that the plenum is an important figure 
of sufficient reason, designating both the internal forces of the Monad and the 
external plenitude of the nature. It expresses the relationship between the world, soul, 
mind and the body and reflects theories of plenitude in seventeenth century 
philosophy as Arthur has noted. '8 
The plenum represents, therefore, an aesdiefic geometric figure that is 
internally differentiated as a result of its material and immaterial forces of activity, 
not reducing extended matter into a mechanical series of parts, nor determined by 
motion that is generated from an external source. Instead, change is brought about by 
the internal forces of movement, such as perception and appetition. The plenum is 
produced, therefore, in relation to an intensive and qualitative series of magnitudes or 
immaterial and materialforces, thus marking an important moment of development 
towards a truly differential figure. 
In addition, it is also an aesthetic geometric figure derived from a 'discursive' 
plenitude, as was observed in Proclus' method, but reconfigures the general principle 
of genetic discursivity into the discrete infinity of the Monad itself. thus, it provides 
a 'natural' or genetic continuity of relations, not through mechamcal operations, but 
as an infinitely connected being to others in the universe. In this respect, the plenum 
can be considered to be both the figure of the world, and the discrete singularity of 
the Monad in a continuous spatio-temporal infinity, in which 'every body responds 
to all that happens in the universe, so that he who saw all, could read in each one 
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what is happening everywhere' (M. - §61,264-5). Both extensive and intensive, it 
provides, on the one hand, the plenitude of relations between discrete singularities 
and, on the other hand, the intensive enfolding of the Monad or the soul that can 
C read' itself, but 'only what is there represented distinctly', Against the infinitely 
connected space of the plenum, the soul 'cannot all at once open up all its folds, 
because they extend to infinity' (M. §61,265). Thus, in this section, the plenum 
refers to the discursive movements between figures that also distinguish Leibniz's 
interpretation of the discursive soul from Proclus' concept of discursivity because 
the principle of reflection and memory are more strongly associated with the 
individual. Proclus' concept, in contrast promotes a general principle of discursivity 
in the soul. 
in the following section, the immanence of the world is further interiorized 
when Leibniz considers the plenum in relation to the body and the actions of the 
Monad (that is, a living being). Thus, in §62, the plenum, having been assigned a limit 
as a Monad or a being with a soul, now becomes understood as the 'universe', which 
is a representation of the external harmony and once again confirms its infinite unity 
through internal and external sufficient reason. Recalling Plato's notion of the 'world 
soul' the Monad is a representation of the universe, yet it is also the embodied soul, 
Leibniz writes that it is 'more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and 
of which it constitutes the entelechy. And as the body expresses all the universe 
through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the 
whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a particular way' (M-. 
§62,265) [my emphasis]. This self-conscious subject is emphasised further in §63 
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where Leibniz defines the Monad as 'a living being'; he states, '[t]he body belonging 
to a Monad, which is its entelechy or soul, constitutes together with the entelechy 
what may be called a living being, and with a soul what is called an animal' (M, 265). 
Thus, the relationship between the geometric figure of the plenum, matter and 
the soul constructs the plenum as both a singularity (the Monad), and divisible 
infinity (the world, God). The plenum is both a differential geometric figure and the 
corporeal subject, so that the notion of figure itself becomes a continuum or 
conjunction between scientific geometry and the aesthetic forces of consciousness, 
constituting an aesthetic and geometric aggregate of 'sufficient reason'. 
Leibniz's theory of difference is founded upon this principle of self-identity 
in which matter and space are constructed as non-similar at any point in time; for 
example, in the plenum, which is matter-filled-space, the notion that identity remains 
the same over a period of time is impossible. Instead, any 'identity' that may be said 
to unify a body undergoes constant and continuous change. Thus, identity becomes a 
&fferential operation in an aesthetic geometry and, as a result the 'perfection' of a 
geometric figure (e, g. the 'perfect' circle) may be shown to exist, not as an equivalent 
truth for a sensible figure, but as a registration of the difference or the potential for 
change between one magnitude and another in a continuum. 
The aesthetic geomet6c method is not concerned, therefore, with the 
production of equivalents, but of showing the &fferences between one Monad's 
duration and its individuation ftom another. The concepts of identity, figure or form 
are derived from the principle of a continuous series of changes, marking a shift from 
the discrete mathematical identity to the aesthetic 'soul' or thinking subject. Thus, 
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identity is not merely an abstract and rational approximation, but becomes embodied 
because of the individuating powers of perception and appetition that Leibniz 
emphasises in the connection between the 'fiction' of the geometric figure and in the 
specificity of the thinking Monad, which is iffeducible to quantifiable magnitude. The 
plenum, therefore, is not constructed in terms of the split between two externally 
recognisable forms, but through the degrees of difference from within a body or state. 
It is a revision of the relationship between geometry, nature and limit, which are 
transformed by the intensification of an infinite and aesthetic geometric magnitude. 
As a result, the concepts of space and time are dramatically modified ftom an 
order in which space is generated at the expense of temporality into a relationship in 
which time is immanent. In this new configuration the continuum between space and 
time is distinguished both in the shift from a quantitative spatial understanding to a 
qualitative temporal state, and by the emphasis on the infinite, yet continuous, 
incommensurability that exists between the two modes of perception. Space and time 
become understood as 'relations', therefore, which will be explored further in relation 
to Bergson's discussions of heterogeneous space in the next chapter. As aspects of 
sufficient reason (i. e. still constituted by the harmony with God), however, space and 
time are constituted by a scientific symbolism that Bergson cannot uphold in his 
pursuit of a 'progressive' philosophy. Nevertheless, through Leibniz's analytic and 
aesthetic geometric method and figures, space and time might be considered to be 
intensive magnitudes, rather than opposing finite operations, because they are always 
in relation to other states and although divisible, they are also expressions of infinity. 
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Conclusi 
Leibniz's aesthetic geometric method demonstrates the scope of an analytic 
procedure that emphasises the operation of an infinite divisibility, which generates a 
series of aesthetic figures that are aggregates of both immaterial and embodied 
intensities. In particular, this chapter has explored this procedure in relation to a 
qualitative notion of magnitude that encompasses the discrete limit of division, but 
also affirms the necessity of aesthetic or qualitative difference in the geometric figure. 
Thus, the magnitude of the Monad or the plenum is an intensive 'ratio' between the 
incorporeal and corporeal qualifies, representing a uniquely embodied geomebic 
figure. 
Hghly reflective of the ancient and Cartesian principles of geometry, division 
and magnitude, Leibniz's aesthetic magnitude enables multiplicity to be generated, 
rather than a reconstitution of the finite One (Form) or the formless and timeless 
infinity of the 'Many; for example, in contrast to Proclus, the geometric figure (or 
soul) is an intensive extensity (rather than a mystical symbol or supernatural power) 
that is constructed from the indivisible embodied forces of perception and appetite. 
Magnitude becomes embodied and intemal, therefore, in contrast to the discursive, 
yet general, magnitude of Proclus' unfolding, so that Leibniz's aesthetic geometry is 
an intermediary between the symbolic powers that Proclus upholds and the intuitive 
and embodied 'life' that Bergson posits. 
In addition, the plenum corresponds with the genetic plenitude of this 
intensive geometric procedure, first because it is determined by a discursive division 
that is intensive and infinite, not by finite limit that produces determinate bodies, 
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and; second, it is internally and externally differentiated through the multiplicity of 
extended substances and by the unextended soul's activities of 'perception and 
appetite'. As a result, the geometric figure represents an infinite unity of the 
corporeal and incorporeal intensities in a third order of magnitude, i. e. 'sufficient 
reason', which concentrates magnitude into an embodied reason (ratio) in the 
reflective subject. Furthermore, this emphasis on the production of 'incompossibles' 
or figures that are internally differentiated by forces and limits, highlights the extent 
to which Leibniz's aesthetic figure or'reflective I' constitutes an important precedent 
to Kant's development of the aesthetic subject in the Critique of Judgment, Kant's 
'aesthetic judgment' is, therefore, reminiscent of the 'incompossibility' in Leibniz's 
4 aesthetic' reason. 
The Monadologý represents, therefore, a unique metaphysics in which a 
radical version of the geometric principle of magnitude generates qualitative difference 
in a series of infinite figures and in the immaterial 'forces' of perception and 
appetition. As a result Leibniz's method is an important mediator between Spinoza 
and Bergson's methods in which the autonomy of the geometric figure passes from a 
principle of an internal, yet finite, limit (i. e. the modes) to a series of internal and 
infinite continuities (i. e. duration). 
In addition, like Spinoza's method, the continuously divisible forms of the 
plenum and the Monad are reflected in the formal structure of the text insofar as they 
are constructed out of a series of discrete statements that constitute both entities in 
themselves and are expressions of a greater plenitude. Unlike his predecessors, 
however, Leibniz proposes not just one geometric figure, but a series of evolving 
192 
forms - the net, envelope, plenum and the fold - that suggest a shift towards a more 
'topological' notion of geometry in which the relationship between the internal and 
external conditions become more intensive, not as limit, but in the embodied and 
intuitive actions of the individual. In the next chapter, therefore, this topological and 
aesthetic geometric method will be revealed in Bergson's writings on matter and 
memory. 
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Chapter 5-. The Envelop 
Bergson's philosophical writings emphasise the importance of intuition in 
relation to the geometric method and strongly reflect the discussions of extensity, 
intensity, memory, the soul and the body that have been explored in the preceding 
chapters. In particular, Bergson provides a rigorous critique of scientific geometric 
thinking in metaphysics and proposes a radical departure from these methods in the 
notion of the 'living act'. The geometric method is pushed to its most intensive limit 
to constitute the aesthetic and intuitive body. 
In earlier chapters it was suggested that Spinoza's notion of the extensive 
body and Leibniz's intensive body provided innovative geometric solutions to the 
metaphysical problem of the division between extended and unextended matter. For 
Bergson, however, the issue of this division is developed even further to include the 
limits of the geometric method as it is defined by metaphysics. Bergson rejects the a 
priori ground that materialist and idealist thinking require, which produces the 
exclusive divisions between matter and intellect, and is derived from the traditions of 
a symbolic metaphysics (especially a Neoplatonic or Kantian metaphysics). 
Bergson's method not only promotes new concepts within the boundaries of 
metaphysics, but also seeks to reconfigure spatio-temporal relations into a new 
understanding of 'psychic' realities within a 'progressive' philosophy. But, whilst 
being highly critical of the limits that form philosophical thinking, Bergson's 
engagement with a history of metaphysical ideas is also inclusive; for example, 
Leibniz's notion of infinity and perception are shown to be sympathetic concepts to 
Bergson's ideas about infinity and perception. As we wrill see below, however, this 
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continuity is provisional because of Bergson's insistence upon the 'psychic' duration 
of the 'active' life, which opposes Leibniz's logical or 'symbolic' concept of infinity. 
Also, although Bergson rejects the 'ready-made' aspect of geometry - i. e. as an a 
priori diagram - the 'attention' he pays to extensity demonstrates the extent to 
which the geometric method can be conceived as an immanent aspect of the living 
body. ' The discussion below examines this argument, drawing attention to those 
aspects of Spinoza and Leibniz's theories that provide important precedents to 
Bergson's theories of memory, extensity, intensity and intuition. 
The chapter begins by examining Bergson's intensive revision of geometric 
relations that constitute much of the 'energetic' impetus of his book, Matter and 
Memory (1896). Geometric and spatio-temporal relations are re-thought through the 
production of a 'real', i. e. independent, ontology of duration. Yet geometric relations 
are also necessary constituents of his 'progressive philosophy; for example, space 
and time are two minor figures of discussion that are reconfigured into the notions of 
matter and memory, perception, intuition and, especially duration, 'releasing' them 
from their exclusivity as scientific concepts to become 'intertne&ate' or aesthetic 
forms of matter and memory. The initial sections of this chapter outline these new 
constituents in the formation of the 'body-image' in relation to the activities of 
perception and the two modes of memory, suggesting that these dynamic relations 
produce the aesthetic figure of the 'envelope'. Thus, Matter and Memory produces 
both a highly intensive critique of the geometric method and a revision of spatio- 
temporal relations in the promotion of an aesthetic of duration. 
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Second, the chapter considers Matter andMemory in relation to later writings, 
'Introduction to Metaphysics' (1903) and Creative Evolution (1907). In these texts 
the geometric method becomes more strongly defined as an aesthetic or 'natural' 
geometry, in which the aesthetic unity of the living body and its acts (derived either 
from memory or from the habits of the body) are emphasised in the concept of 
'extensity'. In addition, the discussion briefly explores Bergson's notions of space 
and time, in relation to his critique of 'pre-modem' science and the problems of the 
Cartesian scientific method so that geometry, space and time are defined in terms of a 
metaphysics of life and intuition, which provides valuable clarification of the meaning 
of perception and duration in the earlier text. 'Introduction to Metaphysics', for 
example, presents a crucial moment in the construction of intuition, because it 
demonstrates the importance of intuition as an aesthetic consideration that has been 
'forgotten' by philosophy and science. In this essay Bergson argues that philosophy 
and 'pre-modem' science have been misled by the insistence on relative truths and 
symbolic knowledge at the expense of concrete reality and progressive philosophy. 
Bergson's philosophy might be said to produce, therefore, a radical notion of 'natural 
geometry' or 'intuiti on' in which geometry is infused with lived'expressions of space 
and time. 
This chapter suggests that Bergson's development of an ontology of time is 
enabled partly as a result of his sophisticated understanding of geometry, which 
informs his reconstruction of the relationship between space, time and intuition. in 
particular, Bergson's understanding of geometric methods in philosophy retrieves 
Spinoza and Leibniz's concepts of extensity to inform the topological potential of 
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duration. Duration, therefore, produces topological relations between philosophy and 
the subject that dramatically reconfigure the nature of science, philosophy and life; it 
is a topological geometric method, through which unique notions of unity are 
proposed that are lived, rather than pre-given, symbolic harmonies. 2 
Bergson, therefore, conducts an intensive re-construction of the metaphysical 
relations of space and time, the self and the world to retrieve forgotten relations that 
constitute an 'absolute', not symbolic, nature. In addition, questions about the 
production and the structure of metaphysical relations are framed through an 
aesthetic and geometric reconfiguration of the relations between matter/memory, 
whole/part, limit/body, quality/quantity, and Bergson shows how (if we think 
beyond the form of these concepts that are inhefited from a 'limited' metaphysics) 
unique and liberating expressions of life can be re-established. 
Limit and unlimit 
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated the dialectic between the 
concepts of limit and unlimit, finitude and infinity, are crucial aspects in the 'union' 
between extended and unextended matter; for example, for Proclus, the unlimit was 
constituted in the divine infinity of the geometric figure; for Spinoza, an indivisible 
God was immanent in the modes of the subject and, for Leibniz, the infinite 
divisibility of limit produced an intensive, yet autonomous, being. 
Bergson, too, engages in the 'tension' between limit and unlimit to construct 
the irreducible notion of the 'living act' that displays a strong correspondence to 
Spinoza's theories of substance, in particular, because duration (i. e. pure memory) 
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represents the 'virtual' and unlimited infinity in matter (i. e. perception), which 
constitutes the extensive limit of the living organism. ' Such an emphasis on an 
extensive indivisibility suggests a strong resemblance to Spinoza's concept of 
extensity or indivisible matter in which the virtual or absolute is attributed to God 
and is internalised in the form of the 'conatus. Also, like Spinoza, Bergson considers 
extended matter in terms of the whole and part, rejecting an analytic basis of 
difference in magnitude to suggest a synthetic aesthetic geometric method. 
Bergson's rejection of reason also indicates his affiliation with Spinoza insofar 
as geometry, space and time become intermediary aspects of a discursive soul or 
intuition, that is, pure duration, and Bergson proposes that the intuitive body 
provides the basis for a different Icind of reason. But in his apparent rýection of 
'reason' does Bergson also reject ratio, or does his concern with 'relations' also 
correspond with Leibniz's investigations into ratio? As we will see below, ratio is 
present insofar as the 'relations' between matter (i. e. perception) and memory are 
brought together into a topology of intuition or aesthetic geometry. So, perhaps we 
can say that Bergson's procedure constitutes a 'natural' or intuitive reason since ratio 
(or magnitude) is upheld in an aesthetic form, which is reminiscent of both Spinoza's 
theological notion of harmony between God and the emotions and Leibniz's 
incorporeal magnitude. 
But what of Leibniz's notion of sufficient reason? In the discussion about 
scientific method below, it will be shown that Bergson's rejection of the Cartesian 
analytic method will lead him to reject this form of ratio because it represents the 
symbolic harmony between a mathematical procedure and God. Yet we will also see 
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that Leibniz's concern with the powers of perception and memory in a 'psychic' 
topology is continued in Bergson's thinking, especially because Bergson's notions of 
perception, aggregate and the continuous intensity of the life in action have 
similarities to Leibniz's analytic notion of the intensive Monad. Bergson appears, 
therefore, to accept Leibniz's claim that the psychic forces are both qualitafive and 
internal differences, but considers Leibniz's analytic method to be a scientific 
reduction. In this thesis, however, Leibniz has also been considered to affirm an 
aesthetic and 'transcendental' matter through his intensive notion of perception that 
produces a continuously changing process. In addition, it has been argued that 
Leibniz's notion of the 'sufficiency' of perception in the Monad also bears a strong 
resemblance to Bergson's notion of duration, in particular, because each is intemal 
and infinitely extensive. This thesis suggests, therefore, that there are more 
correspondences between Bergson and Leibniz than Bergson's opposition to 
'symbolic' relations might first admit. Finally, we also see that the seventeenth 
century investigations into the 'unity' of the subject, such as 'sufficient reason' or 
Lcommon notions' also have similar 'aesthetic' characteristics to Bergson's duration, 
further underlining the 'progressive' potential of seventeenth century understandings 
of extensity. We may conclude that the actions of the body and of memory constitute 
Bergson's notion of an intensive extensity that display principles of both synthetic 
and analytic geometry derived from Spinoza and Leibniz. 
Matter and Memory constitutes a radical form of aesthetic geometric method 
and aesthetic figure or intuition, in which the living subject embodies the heterogeneity 
of extended and unextended memory and duration. In addition, we find a repirise of 
199 
the intensive dialectic between limit and unlimit in Bergson's re-thinking of reason in 
Matter and Memory. On the one hand, the dialectic generates a text that seeks to 
intensify the limits of metaphysics and, on the other hand, it proposes a highly 
complex figure (i. e. unity) that is developed out of the relations between the body 
and its image, intemal and extemal space, the part and the whole and, especially 
matter and memory. 
The text's highly critical engagement with the limits of philosophy also 
constitutes an intensification of the concept of limit in which duration (i. e. time) 
provides an intensive challenge to the conditions of geometry and metaphysics after 
Kant's proposal that time is a 'repetition' of space in the Crilique of Pure Reason. 
By revisiting (or recollecting) seventeenth century concepts of extensity Bergson 
re . ects the Critique's proposal that the 'formal' intuitions of space and time cannot I 
be related to the 'pure reason' of geometry. Matter and Memory reveals, therefore, 
the interiority of an aesthetic geometry through a highly intensive examination of the 
metaphysical conditions that produce space and time. Geometry becomes radicalised. 
into an intensive 'tension'of its internal and external limits (i. e. the division between 
external space and internal time) in an account of a 'forgotten' geometry. Thus, the 
notion of limit is both a fundamental aspect of Bergson's ontology and provides the 
means for a formidable critical analysis. In this respect, the text's critique of 
metaphysics operates on three different levels of tension between limit and unlimit; 
a distinct kind of dualism between unextended and extended matter is produced 
that challenges the 'symbolic' and 'parallel' metaphysical relations upon which 
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Spinoza and Leibniz depend (see the Introduction and Chapter I especially, for a 
defence of a radicalised dualism), 
2. a revision of the relations between philosophy and science, in particular, by 
reconsidering the tensions between quality and quantity and the whole and part (see 
the Conclusion, especially); 
3. the proposition of intuitive or 'psychic' relations between matter and memory 
by a series of changes of degree (rather than the transformation of extended matter 
into unextended matter or vice-versa); i. e. matter and memory are neither identical nor 
equivalent (see Chapters L H, IR and IV, especially). 
Extensijy and percgption 
Limit for Bergson, is not merely adequate in the form of a mathematical or 
metaphysical explanation of magnitude because, in each case, ratio or difference is 
constituted by a symbolic value. Nor does he accept that the imagination's powers of 
division represent a satisfactory account of limit since it too is determined by 
division. 
instead, Bergson seeks to define a notion of infinite limit that is produced by 
the 'psychic' powers of the subject, leading him to re-think the dualistic explanations 
of unextended and extended matter. Limit, therefore, must be informed by the tension 
between a series of psychic or material states that construct the subject. Such a 
revision of the mind/body relations seeks to challenge the 'incomprehensibility' of 
how 'real' movement and change are produced in the living subject. For Bergson, 
incomprehension is evidence of a relationship that is determined by symbolic limits 
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and division, whereas 'clarity' is established through explanations of the 'natural' 
psychic 'life', not by resorting to a pre-given harmony of rational explanations. Thus, 
Bergson seeks to promote the psychic duration of the subject as the basis for the 
tension between limit and unlimit. 
Like Spinoza and Leibniz, Bergson finds the solution to the symbolic 
restrictions of scientific thought in the concept of extensity and proposes that the 
relationship between inextensive and extensive matter is re-thought through the 
removal of the division between perception (mind) and matter (body). The text 
explores two methods through which extensity is produced: first, an investigation of 
extensity as perception, that is, the nature of its extension in space in order to 
produce an understanding of 'action', and; second, a 'subtilizing' or 'dissolving' of 
extensity into 'affective sensations', that is, the production of inextensive matter or 
5 
pure memory (Matter and Memory 1991: 245). Bergson writes; '[t]hat which is 
given, that which is real, is something intermediate between divided extension and 
pure inextension. It is what we have termed the extensive' (AW: 245) [my emphasis]. 
Extended matter is 'pure perception', therefore, derived from our 
consciousness, but also affective to it. Absolutely distinct from the soul, matter is 
nevertheless imbued with duration and action in itself Extended matter is not, 
therefore, a duplicate of intuition or memory, but as an aspect of perception or the 
living body it has its own inherent extensity. Bergson writes; 'we eliminate all 
virtuality, all hidden power, from matter and establish the phenomena of the spirit as 
an independent reality. But to do this we must leave to matter those qualities which 
materialists and spiritualists alike strip from it' (Afff- 72), In contrast, as we will see 
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below, he criticises materialism and idealism for having confused extensity so that for 
materialists, matter is a 'representation of the spirit' and for idealists, it is 'the 
accidental garb of space' (A4W. 72). 
Thus, Bergson defines matter in relation to the psychic activities of the body, 
for example, promoting the psychic distinctions between our responses and 
movements that are generated by our nervous system, yet also noting that both 
matter and perceiving are necessary to our notion of life. In this sense, the body 
reflects our perception of the exterior world; for example, we respond to external 
stimulation through a set of 'mechanical, physical and chemical reactions' (AM. 28). 
'Living matter' represents zones of 'indetermination' or 'cent[res] of real action' 
through which conscious perception is produced. In addition, Bergson suggests that 
the living body perceives and acts as a result of varying intensities of stimulation and 
activities that demonstrate a reflexive relationship between the perception and action 
of the organism (MM. 3 1). Perception and the actions of the body that arise from it 
constitute a continuity between space and time. Bergson explains that 'perception is 
master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time' (MM. 3 2). 
In the first instance, therefore, extensity is a relationship between space and 
time that are produced out of the perceiving and acting body, the subject is an 
indeterminate 'unity' of the mental perceptions and the actions of the body, and 
perception is distinguished as either internally or extemally produced extensity 
because the body represents indeterminate centres of action or 'variable' relations 
between the organism and the influence of its external environment; that is, when 
perception is internal it is called memory, and when it is external it is matter (MAJ. 33- 
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34). Memory that is derived from perception, however, is always related to extension 
since it is only Pure memory that is unextended, whereas, perception is ahvays 
comprised of 'duration'. Bergson explains how the reconfiguration of perception and 
memory enables a revision of the problem of extension and inextension: 
But, just because we have pushed dualism to an extreme, our analysis 
has perhaps dissociated its contradictory elements. The theory of pure 
perception, on the one hand, of pure memory, on the other hand, may 
thus prepare the way for a reconciliation between the unextended and 
the extended, between quality and quantity. 
To take pure perception first. When we make the cerebral state 
the beginning of an action, and in no sense the condition of a 
perception, we place the perceived images of things outside the image 
of our body, and thus replace perception within the things themselves. 
But then, our perception being a part of things, things participate in the 
nature of our perception. Material extensity is not, cannot any longer be, 
that composite extensity which is considered in geometry; it indeed 
resembles rather the undivided extension of our own representation. 
That is to say, the analysis of pure perception allows us to foreshadow 
in the idea of extension the possible approach to each other of the 
extended and unextended (W. 181-182) [my emphasis]. 
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The extended and perceiving body is an infinite limit; first, because it is an 
infinitely variable, reflective 'centre of real action' and; second, because it is 
interrially and externally generated. Extended matter or a spatio-temporal body 
becomes understood, therefore, as a 'fulcrum of action' so that geometry is not 
restricted to a limit-boundary of an extended figure but is considered to be embo&ed 
into the discursive and aesthetic actions of the body that are generated from the 
internal memory and external perceptions. Moreover, as one of the most intensive 
limits that Bergson constructs, extended matter and the presentation of duration 
provide Bergson with a highly complex concretion of the tension between matter and 
memory or space and time. He writes: 
If matter, so far as extended in space is to be defined (as we believe it 
must) as a present which is always beginning again, inversely, our 
present is the very materiality of our existence, that is to say, a system 
of sensations and movements and nothing else (AW. 139). 
In the next section, we will see the concretion of this tension expressed in the 
invention of the 'body image', which also suggests a reconfiguration of the image of 
the reflective subject in the Critique ofJudkment. 
Body im 
Bergson intensifies his analysis of the perceiving body in a re- 
conceptualisation of the notion of 'image', further developing his critique of the 
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divisions that arise from the symbolic limits of idealist and materialist metaphysics. 
An intensive and aesthetic notion of the body is generated by promoting the body as a 
specific kind of image, through which a transformative and reflexive relationship 
between the world and the subject are brought together. ' 
In Chapter I Bergson proposes an alternative dualism in the relationship 
between the image and body, developing the concept of 'body image' that provides a 
material site of relationship between the internal aspects of the body (the mind) and 
the external world (matter). As a result, this theory of image reflects the production 
of extended realities which are determined by relations; for example, '[a]ll these 
images act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to 
constant laws which I call the laws of nature' (AW. 17). Images designate Psychic' 
relations, therefore, and reflect our &fferent levels of engagement or 'attention to life'. 
Such a reflective notion highlights the extent to which Bergson's attempts to re-think 
'life', in contrast to the claims that rational and speculative philosophies make for 
understandings of life (W. 14). Thus, within this aggregate of image relations, the 
body is necessarily a specific kind of image, known internally by affections and 
externally by perception. The subject and its relations with the world are created, 
therefore, through intensive mental processes: the subject is in effect, an aggregate of 
images. Bersgon explains; '[a]ll seems to take place as if, in this aggregate of images 
which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the 
medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body' 
(A/PJ. 18). In addition, this relationship is one of constant activity, detennined by 
giving to and receiving movement from the 'external world': 
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My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image 
which acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement, 
with, perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, 
within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it 
receives (MU. 19). 
But Bergson's notion of the perceiving image is also reminiscent of Kant's 
reflective subject in the third Critique, introducing a confluence that Bergson keeps 
hidden behind his fierce critique of materialsm and idealism in Kant's metaphysical 
thinking. Bersgon suggests that Kant's materialism produces insufficient explanations 
of the relations between mental phenomena and consciousness, whereas his idealism 
results in the body understood as a perception of the subject's consciousness. In this 
Critique, Bergson continues, mind, perception and memory remain as 'operations of 
pure knowledge' that make either, ineffective duplications of an external reality, or 
inert and disinterested notions of mental production and 'always [neglect] the relation 
of perception with action and of memory with conduct' (AW. 227). Thus, Kant fails 
to properly account for the relationship between sense and understanding in the CPR 
because his idealism and realism are determined by the exclusion of a 'real' 
materiality, which prevents the 'reciprocal influence' of a more radically dualistic 
substance. 
But as has been suggested in chapter 1, this disagreement cannot be applied to 
the CoJ in which Kant constructs aesthetic judgments, not cognitive ideas or forms. 
Thus, aesthetic judgment represents a more sympathetic predecessor to Bersgon's 
207 
notion of the body-image insofar as it is also concerned with the 'psychic' and 
physical activities of the individual. In this respect, therefore, aesthetic judgment is 
more akin to the notion of 'perception' than to cognitive thinking. But, Bergson's 
wish to disrupt the oveniding emphasis on the cognitive ideas that determine 
materialist and idealist thinking results in a forceful critique of Kant's project, 
focusing on the problem of 'images' in the first Critique, which can only beforms of 
sensations, rather than sensations themselves. 
Bergson's evaluation of Kant's Critical philosophy, therefore, rests firmly on 
it being both an idealism and realism that misrepresents the powers of perception and 
the body. As an idealism, Bergson suggest it fails to recognise the intermediate links 
between different sensations by categorising them under the understanding; as a 
realism he considers that it allows 'no conceivable relation' between the 'thing in 
itself' and the 'sensuous manifold' so that in each case a homogenous space is 
constructed as a 'barrier' between the mind and external objects, and perception is 
determined towards pure knowledge, not action (AW. 23 1). But we should be careful 
to note that in the third Critique images are both forms and sensations, determined by 
psychic states, which are the agents of change, space and time. So although Bergson 
appears not to recognise this potential (especially in his resistance to Kant's 
cspeculafive' philosophy) his notion of the 'body-image', which is a discrete, yet 
irreducible, unity does bear some similarity to Kant's reflective subject. In the 
follo, wring paragraphs, Bergson's emphasis on the construction of this 'body-image' 
from perception and memory demonstrates the extent to which psychic relations 
between the body and can be realised, rather than be merely 'speculative'. 
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Perception is understood as an activity of the living body in which the body is 
a 'perceptive centre' that is also part of a moving plane, vibrating as part of an 
'aggregate' of other images. Bergson explains this activity, writing; 'since there is no 
material image which does not owe its qualifies, its determinations, in short, its 
existence, to the place which it occupies in the totality of the universe' (AM. 228). 
My perception is, then, only an aspect of these objects with its powers of selection 
and editing and Bergson writes; '[p]erception, therefore, consists in detaching, from 
the totality of objects, the possible action of my body upon them. Perception 
appears, then, as only a choice' (MM. 229). Continuing this discussion, he writes that 
images are not finite. Instead, they 'outrun perception on every side' and it is the 
work of science and metaphysics to reconstitute these images in order to 'restore' the 
relationship between the part and the whole. So, like a reprise of Leibniz's 
perception, the scope of perception is also changed in Bergson's unity from being a 
constituent of the 'appearance of reality' to a relation in the aggregate of the 'body- 
image'; that is, 'simply indicating, in the aggregate of things, that which interests my 
possible action upon them' (MM: 230). 
In addition, Bergson proposes that, rather than the body-image being 
constructed as an aspect of a perception of space (e. g. from an anterior spatio- 
temporal order), the perceiving body is related to a 'homogenous' notion of space 
only insofar as our actions are 'concrete extensity' (MV. 23 1). Instead, perception 
and the body are immanent to each other: 
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To sum up: if we suppose an extended continuum, and, in this 
continuum, the cent[re] of real action which is represented by our 
body, its activity will appear to illuminate all those parts of matter 
with which at each successive moment it can deal [ ... J. Everything 
will happen as if we allowed to filter through us that action of 
external things which is real, in order to arrest and retain that which 
is virtual: this virtual action of things upon our body and of our 
body upon things is our perception itself (AIA/f. 232). 
Thus, our perception of the world is an expression of our relationship to it; 
that is, our perception 'is a part of things' and the consequence of this order of 
expression is that 'things participate in the nature of our perception', provoking a 
radical re-thinking of the relationship between matter and geometry because the 
division between the intellect and nature is removed (A/Pd. 182). But nor is this a 
return to a pre-given harmony in which there is a symbolic correspondence; instead, 
perception and the body-image enact a highly reflexive engagement with the external 
world. 
But it is not only matter or 'pure perception' that reconfigures the notion of 
the subject, because memory also reconfigures the relationship between quality and 
quantity (AW. 182). Thus, in Bergson's retrieval of an irreducible unity (forgotten by 
homogenous geometry, which denies the immanent and reflexive senses of the subject 
in the world), perception and memory form an intensive limit or 'variable relation' 
that expresses the 'indeterminacy' of the body as a centre of action. He writes; 
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'[f1rom this indetennination, [ ... 
] [w]e have been able to infer the necessity of a 
perception, that is to say, a variable relation between the living being and the more- 
or-less distant influence of the objects which interest it' (AAI. - 33). This 'variable 
relation' he concludes, is 'consciousness', given by memory to perception, because 
'there is no perception which is not full of memories' (AW 33). In the following 
section, therefore, the structure of memory and its forms as habit and duration will be 
examined in more detail. 
Memo 
In Chapter H Bergson develops the notion of body-limit as the limit of 
memory, explaining how memory provides the means through which to bring together 
mind and matter to be understood as a 'place of passage, rather than as a receptacle 
for storing images. He writes; '[i]t is then theplace ofpassage of movements received 
and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between the things which act upon me 
and the things upon which I act - the seat, in a word, of the sensori-motor 
phenomena' (AW. - 151-152). 
This definition also highlights the absolute difference between sensations and 
memory. Memory is not of the body, but as it passes into sensations, it becomes lived 
by the body so that the body is the intensive limit (or relation) between its sensations 
and memory. Matter and memory are, therefore, a radical revision of space-time and 
perception in which the living body is the intensive limit that links image to sensation 
(MY: 182). 
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The distinction between perception and memory is also partly evident in the 
difference between 'external perception', which is the 'pure' form of perception 
defined independently of its relationship to memory, and perception, which is 
constructed by memory. Bergson points out, however, that pure perception is always 
inadequate and requires memory in perception to provide a means of determining 
'with more precision the point of contact between consciousness and things, between 
body and spirit' (MM. 65). Perception becomes understood as a 'concrete' state that 
desciibes the tension between the internal consciousness of the subject and external 
matter, constituting a End of envelope through which homogenous movement 
becomes heterogeneous change. In addition, this 'concrete perception' or body- 
envelope is, therefore, 'the living synthesis of pure perception and pure memory', 
which have different rhythms of duration and internal 'tension' (AW: 246). 
Furthermore, he writes that tension provides the means through which 'to overcome 
the opposition between quality and quantity [in] the idea of extension, that [lies] 
between the inextended and extended. Extension and tension admit of degrees, 
multiple but always determined' (MU. 247). 
Until this point in the discussion, however, the notion of 'pure perception' 
remains disengaged from the body and from its subjectivity, so that Bergson sets out 
to demonstrate how this 'consciousness' is not just a geometric principle of 
concretion, but is a re-thinking that ikill involve him in jrestoring] to the body its 
extensity and to perception its duration'. Consciousness, therefore, is reconnected 
with 'its two subjective elements, affectivity and memory' (Iflff: 233). 
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Bergson explains these 'elements' in the following pages; affection, he writes, 
represents the internal 'senses' of the body that enter into our perception so that the 
body's surface constitutes the 'common limit' between our affection and other 
external bodies to produce both sensations (i. e. feelings) and images (i. e. other 
objects). The body surface is, therefore, a double site for internal and external 
relations (AM. 233). Or, earlier in the discussion he explains that, '[alffection is, 
then, that part or aspect of the inside of our body which we nfix with the image of 
external bodies; it is what we must first of all subtract from perception to get the 
image in its purity' (MAJ. 58). But in contrast to perception and sensation being 
considered different, only insofar as they are different degrees of the same order, 
4 pure perceptions' or 'images' are the limits from which sensations are produced by 
the body. Sensations and images are, therefore, considered to be true relations of one 
another so that sensations 'will then appear as the impurity which is introduced into 
[the image] being that part of our own body which we project into all others' (W. 
234-235). As a result, memory and affection are strongly reminiscent of the powers 
of the embodied soul in the preceding chapters. 
Memory is the key metaphysical innovation through which Bergson produces 
a dramatic reconfiguration of the relationship between the material and spiritual 
realifies of the subject and is expressed in two forms: duration and habit. Duration is 
the principle that confirms the reality of 'life' as a necessity for metaphysics and 
science, affirming the intuitive basis of life, not as a division between representations 
and the sense perceptions of space and time (or a repetition of a higher knowledge), 
but as an intuition that is inherently creative and active; for example, in his 
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Introduction, Bergson writes thatMatter andMemory is an affinnation of 'the reality 
of the spirit and the reality of matter, and tries to determine the relation of the one to 
the other by the study of a definite example, that of memory' (AW. 9). 
Memory is the relation of 'the spirit', which informs any cerebral states, and 
it produces a distinct set of inextensive images from those generated by pure 
perception; that is, memory does not produce extensive images (MAJ. 235). Bergson 
writes; '[m]emory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the 
present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by a 
twofold operation compels us, defacto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, 
dejure, perceive matter within matter' (AM. 73). Instead, memory gives intuition to 
matter through which we might perceive 'matter in ourselves', rather than 'matter 
within matter'. 
Underlining the distinction between matter and memory, Bergson insists that 
matter cannot in itself be intuition because perception is a 'choice' not an intuition; 
that is, perception or the selection of images arises from a more visible 'discernment 
which foreshadows spirit' (AIV. - 235). Memory, however, is related to the 
consciousness through which intuition is generated so that the material universe may 
then be considered 'a kind of consciousness' of relations and action between parts. 
Moreover, in order to 'touch the reality of spirit' a continuity between the present 
and past is required in the form of memory so that matter is abandoned for spirit. 
Memory is, therefore, a 'theoretic consequence and the experimental verification of 
our theory of pure perception' (AIM: 235). Bergson identifies two forms of memory 
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that are 'actualised'; first, those realised through our habits and, second, duration or 
true memory He explains: 
Habit rather than memory, f... ] acts our past experience but does not 
call up its image. The other is the true memory, Coextensive with 
consciousness, it retains and ranges alongside of each other all our 
states in the order in which they occur [ ... 
]. Truly moving in the past 
and not, like the first, in an ever renewed present (AM. 15 1). 
Thus, these 'cerebral states' are neither the cause nor duplicates of 
perception; for example, perceived objects are present in pure perception in which 
'the perceived object is a present object, a body which modifies our own', whereas 
memory is concerned with absent objects or images insofar as 'a remembrance is the 
representation of an absent object'. But Bergson also tells us that in order for an 
image of an absent object to be generated, the sufficiency of the body must be even 
greater (MM. 236). Both memory and perception constitute the 'sufficiency' of the 
body, therefore, through which images are constructed, recalling, once again, the 
irreducibility of Leibniz's Monad. In the section below this notion of the 'sufficient' 
body is explored in more detail in relation to the envelope, which may be said to 
constitute an aesthetic geometric figure in Matter andMemory. 
The envelop 
So, the body is a centre of action and has the ability to generate 'new action' 
that represents an intensive aggregation of 'limits'. This constant tension between the 
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production of internal sensations and external images in the 'body-limit' can be 
characterised as a topological surface-limit or event in which interiority and exteriority 
are an intensive limit-, that is, 'merely the distinction between my body and other 
bodies', rather than separated by an irreducible difference between the interiority of 
the body and the external world. Bergson explains: 
The distinction between the inside and the outside will then be only a 
distinction between the part and the whole. There is, first of all, the 
aggregate of images; and, then, in this aggregate, there are 'cent[res] of 
action', from which the interesting images appear to be reflected: thus 
perceptions are born and actions made ready (AM 47). 
Thus, the body surface is constituted by 'the common limit of the external 
and the intemal [and] is the only portion of space which is both perceived andjelt', a 
conduit for the transmission of the virtual into real action (MM. 57). This topological 
and aesthetic continuity generates the body, not as a mathematical point in space, but 
as a 'privileged image' in which 'its virtual actions are complicated by, and 
impregnated with, real actions, or, in other words, that there is no perception without 
affection'. Bergson continues, writing that 'affection is, then, that part or aspect of 
the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies; it is what we 
must first of all subtract from perception to get the image in its purity' (MM: 58). 
Chapter IV demonstrates the complexity of this topology, which is 
comprised of the extreme dualism between the memory and perception that 
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reconfigures the relationship between the body and soul (i. e. intuition). in addition, 
this dualism opposes the symbolic parallelism of idealist and materialist metaphysics 
in which the mental and physical realms are taken as 'duplicates' of each other since, 
for Bergson, the body is neither a pure site of creating perceptions, nor a site of 
storage of 'recollections or images', but becomes 'an instrument of action, and of 
action only' (MA/l. 225-6). 
So, in this emphasis on the body as an instrument of duration, we also see a 
reprise of Kant's reflective subject and its 'technical' powers of memory in the act of 
constructing geometric figures. In the following section, we will also see that Kant 
and Bergson are related through Bergson's construction of the relations between 
matter and memory and his critique of space and time in Matter and Memory. In 
addition, the chapter,, Aill go on to suggest that Bergson's retrieval of an embodied 
intuition constitutes an enfolding back to Kant and the embodied intuition of the 
Meno. 
Space and time 
This chapter proposes that one of the relations to be most dramatically 
reconfigured in Matter and Memory is that of space and time. Bergson's critique of 
pre-given, symbolic relations in metaphysics enables new concepts of space and time 
to be generated so that the restriction of time to a formal imitation of space is 
removed. Instead, by generating a highly specific and qualitatively different notion of 
time Bergson also enables space to be re-thought, constituting a relation that is not 
determined by equivalence and is liberated from the pre-given harmony of space-time. 
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So, in his affirmation of the qualitative distinctions between space and an aesthetic 
geometry in the notion of duration, and in his re-evaluation of their aesthetic 
crelations' to each other, Bergson radicalises both the nature of space in relation to 
time and geometry. In addition, this intensive critique affirms that 'intermediary' 
geometries exist, chaRenging the assumption that the modem geometries can only be 
repetitions of an absolute reason. Bergson's analysis suggests, instead, that there are 
a series of intermediary geometries generated between the homogenous and 
diagrammatic 'intuitions' of space and time and the 'true' aesthetic of 'duration'. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, this is partly achieved by limiting space, and time to 
minor figures in Matter and Memory and constructing them from an aesthetic 
discussion of extensity, so that they are expressed independently of the limited 
planes of 'ready-made' science and metaphysics. " 
But what value do space and time have? First, we see that they are 
necessarily homogenous inasmuch as they provide a site for actualising the virtual 
duration ofmemory. Space and time are necessary aspects of extensity, Bergson tells 
us, representing elements of concrete perceptions that are situated on the plane of the 
measured and physical 'diagram'. In this respect, they are constituents of a 
diagrammatic concretisation of life or 'fulcrums of action'. Bergson writes: 
Homogenous space and time are then neither properties of things nor 
essential conditions of our faculty of knowing them: they express, in an 
abstractform, the double work of solidification and of division which 
we effect on the moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a 
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fulcrum for our action, in order to fix within it starting points for our 
operation, in short, to introduce into it real change. They are the 
diagrammatic design of our eventual action upon matter (Alkf-. 211) [my 
emphasis]. 
Space and time are natural effects of our intuition, therefore, and are required 
in orderfor real change to be actualised by providing the bridge between the virtual 
and the act and operating (in contrast to Kant's homogenous and restricted intuitions) 
as discursive functions; thereby constituting a recollection of the first chapter's 
discussion about the unfolding of the unextended soul into the extended images of the 
imagination in Proclus' Commentary. In this respect, they are aspects of the 
unfolding of inextensive matter to the extensive matter. 
So, Bergson's critique of 'homogeneous' geometry reveals the operations of 
space and time as 'actualisation' of extensity. But this analysis also enables him to 
identify the forgotten relations through which a new concept of a heterogeneous and 
aesthetic geometry is produced; that is, the 'natural geometry' of the body and its 
relationship to the aggregates of matter and memory, which is the primary site of 
reconfiguring the relationship between intuition and geometry. In addition, Bergson's 
acknowledgement that the extended forms of geometry are necessary 'fulcrums', 
through which space and time can be actualised from their virtual states of pure 
memory, also constitutes the 'double movement' of realities (from the virtual to the 
actual and vice-versa), and enables an aesthetic geometry to be identified. As a result, 
this reflects both the problem of geometry's universalising tendencies, but also points 
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towards reinvigorating geometry with a qualitative specificity that has been forgotten 
in post-Kantian metaphysics. 
Thus, in his examination of extensive matter Bergson insists upon how matter 
can be actualised without it being handmaiden to an 'amorphous and inert space', 
thereby positing a relationship between matter and space that is productive and 
cactive'; that is, each is constructed in 'the act'. In addition, he suggests that the 
diagram me&ates between the liberafing procedure of extensive action (or extensity) 
and the limitations of homogenous space, writing; '[i]t might then, be possible, in a 
certain measure, to transcend space without stepping out from extensity; and here we 
should really have a return to the immediate, since we do indeed perceive extensity, 
whereas space is merely conceived - being a kind of mental diagram' (Agf. - 187). 
This leads Bergson to assess the concept of space and its objects that are 
constructed in a symbolic scientific method, especially in the Cartesian method, and 
results in his rejection of the imagination, as an operation of this symbolic limit; for 
example, he considers the nature of mathematical movement as a hand moves from 
one point to another, writing that, without the limit of the imagination introducing 
moments of division or 'halt', the movement is 'one' or a unified 'passage', so that 
movement becomes understood as the passage of a body in space (A/M. 189). 
Without the imposition of the imagination, 'real' movement is generated, therefore, 
rather than the illusion of fixed points in space. In addition, science's representation 
of actions as external and symbolic geometric properties (such as the point and line 
along which a hand is considered to move) delimits movement to a representational 
equivalent rather than attributing it with a 'real' condition of extensity. Duration, in 
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contrast, resists all symbolical representations of its changes of state because it is 
irreducible to measurement or division into instants, however infinite they might be 
(AW. 190). As a result, this discussion recalls Leibniz's theory of the approximate or 
'fictional' geometric figure and infinite divisibility. But as noted above, Leibnizs 
account is ultimately problematic for Bergson, since it upholds the symbolic 
hannony of God. In contrast, Bergson suggests that space can be an irreducible 
aspect of 'extensity' and pure movement (rather than a concept that designates either 
scientific or imagined representations of division), when he writes: 
Concrete extensity, that is to say, the diversity of sensible qualities, 
is not within space, rather is it space that we thrust into extensity. 
Space is not a ground on which real motion is posited; rather it is 
real motion that deposits space beneath itself But our imagination, 
which is preoccupied above all by the convenience of expression and 
the exigencies of material life, prefers to invert the natural order of 
the terms [ ... 
] (MM. 217) [my emphasis]. 
So, duration is constructed as a fundamental principle of the living body in the 
movement from the mental state to the idea; from the idea to the image; and from the 
image to sensation and action. Movement generated from unextended matter, the soul 
or image, therefore, does not involve a dislocation from extension; instead, the soul 
(or the virtual) remains part of the continuum and is expressed not in ideal space but 
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in 'pure' time. Bergson explains this 'passage' between the unextended to the 
actualised or extended matter-space, as follows: 
if there is a gradual passage from the idea to the image and from the 
image to the sensation; if, in the measure in which it evolves toward 
actuality, that is to say, toward acfion, the mental state draws nearer to 
extension; if, finally, this extension once attained remains undivided and 
therefore is not out of harmony with the unity of the soul; we can 
understand that spirit can rest upon matter and, consequently, unite 
with it in the act of pure perception, yet nevertheless be radically 
distinct from it. It is distinct from matter in that it is, even, memory, 
that is to say, a synthesis of past and present with a view to the future 
[ ]. We were fight, then when we said, at the beginning of this book, 
that the distinction between body and mind must be established in terms 
not ofspace but of time (MM. 220) [my emphasis]. 
In Chapter H Bergson highlights the extent to which he rejects ideal space in 
his criticism of the Cartesian dependency upon mechanical relations; for example, 
suggesting that Cartesians are confused about the structure of movement between the 
parts and the whole so that a relativity between the terms is introduced, which 
collapses into concepts of universal movement. Bergson critiques Descartes' 
scientific method, suggesting that he produces a confused metaphysic because his 
physical understandings of movement are curtailed by a symbolic set of geometric 
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relations. Descarte's conflates his methods, Bergson argues, handling 'motion as a 
physicist after having defined it as a geometer' so that it is limited to a symbolic 
expression of relations. He continues; '[flor the geometer all movement is relative: 
which signifies only, in our view, that none of our mathematical symbols can express 
thefact that it is the moving body which is in motion rather than the axes or the points 
to which it is referred' (AM. 194). 
Once again, movement and space are reduced to absolute states and Bergson's 
critique of 'movement' and motion in this chapter reveals the limitations of an 
undivided and homogenous principle of space that classical metaphysics and 
scientific geometry generate. Thus, although the classical traditions of space and time 
are useful insofar as they provide 'fulcrums' of reality they are always related to a 
symbolic relationship, rather than a continuous notion of 'life'. 
When movement is considered within the modem and qualitative sciences, 
however (e. g. Riemann's topology), Bergson suggests that there is a significant shift 
from 'the abstract study of motion', to an examination of 'the concrete changes 
occurring in the universe', which properly defines internal movement. He writes that 
movement 'whatever its inner nature, becomes an indisputable reality' (MM- 193). 
Thus, modem, qualitative science and philosophy break with the symbolic traditions 
of science and philosophy to enable heterogeneous space-time and 'real movement': 
A moving continuity is given to us, in which everything changes and 
yet remains: why then do we dissociate the two terms, permanence 
and change, and then represent permanence by bodies and change by 
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homogeneous movements in space? This is no teaching of immediate 
intuition; but neither is it a demand of science, for the object of 
science is, on the contrary, to rediscover the natural articulations of a 
universe we have carved artificially (AdW-. 197). 
In this respect, Matter andMemory affirms that science and metaphysics may 
constitute qualitative time and movement, as a result of promoting the internal 
relations that challenge the problematic 'ready-made' harmony of classical 
philosophy and science. These relations of heterogeneous change are determined by 
the reality of an intuition or aesthetic geometry that reflects the scope of duration in 
the modem sciences, and which, %Aill be considered to constitute a reprise of a 'natural 
geometry' in the following sections of this chapter. 
Intuitio 
Intuition is dramatically re-thought in Bergson's philosophy of geometry. As 
we saw in chapter 1, the Critique of Pure Reason restricts intuition to either, a 
version of 'pure' reason or knowledge, or a form of the sensibility. For Bergson, 
however, intuition is not knowledge, but the actions of the living and irreducible 
subject, reinstated in the unity between the body and memory and liberated from its 
position as, either a cognitive or a material entity. 
Intuition, for Bergson, is concerned with actual, concrete living, rather than 
symbolic knowledge that is situated into a schema of different modes of 
understanding the world. In addition, it is increasingly developed as a fundamental 
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concept throughout his writings on duration or life, opposing the symbolic limit that 
determines the intuitions of space and time in Kant's CPR. Thus, within this 
reconfiguration of relationships geometry becomes, not a closed system that is 
relegated exclusively to the symbolic artifice of mathematics and metaphysics, but is 
reconnected to intuition. Intuitive geometry is, therefore, the aesthetic principle that 
constitutes the reflective and living subject. 
In chapter 1, we saw that the relationship between geometry, intuition and 
the body the Meno is implied in Socrates' drawings of geometric figures and the 
boy's ability to answer questions about their construction. In this chapter, we will 
see how Bergson amplifies these possibilities by showing how the intuitive acts of 
construcung geometry are expressed; first, in the physical movements of the body 
(i. e. physical activity), and; second, in the 'recollection' of geometric principles (i. e. a 
mental activity) that constitute an embodied geometry, memory or absolute intuition. 
Thus, Bersgon underlines the activity of geometric construction, not as 'reason, but 
as Tift' or 'natural intuition' because the act of drawing geometric figures is derived 
from the bodily perceptions of 'habit' as memory. Intuition is not cognitive thinking, 
but action in which space and time are brought together as extensity and duration that 
also recalls Spinoza's concem with the comportment of the body and the living 
subject's activities of inhabiting the body. In contrast, as we have seen, Kant's notion 
of intuition in the CPR is a cognitive idea of image-perceptions that are not sensuous, 
but forms of thought. In the CoJ, however, Kant's attention to the act in the 
cconstruction' of geometry is apparent, but here the act remains distinct from 
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Bergson's because it is mediated by the faculty of the imagination, rather than being 
part of the sensuous manifold of perception and memory, i. e. the body. 
So, Bergson's metaphysics involves a retrieval of intuition in which intuition, 
as the actions of the body, becomes the discursivity of perception and memory; it is 
a return to the body as the site of discursvity, undoing the restrictive harmony that 
ties intuition to the non-discursive intellect or faculty of the nous. Discursivity, 
instead, is both in the body and in the mind, and demonstrates a way back to Proclus, 
Spinoza and Leibnizs notions of extensive and unextensive discursivity. 
In addition, intuition is brought into the scope of the aesthetic and thinking 
subject to represent a fully temporalised and autonomous unity. Intuition remains a 
transcendental concept but, rather than accepting its formulation as an 
incomprehensible and non-discursive level of cognition (i. e. the inexplicable 'all-in- 
one' grasping of an idea), Bergson reveals its discursive interiors in the aesthetic 
subject and in the psychic powers of memory (the soul) and perception. Thus, 
intuition is not brought back to Kant's understanding in which it is the sense-based 
forms of an absolute intuition (i. e. space and time) and the absolute, yet inexpressible 
intuition. Instead, it is a 'union' of discursive and non-discursive activities that 
constitute the living subject in which the aesthetic geometric method and its figures 
are aspects of this discursivity, not as anterior diagrarns, but as aesthetic expressions 
of intuition's 'natural' orders. So, if we examine Matter andMemory, 'Introduction to 
Metaphysics' and Creative Evolution, three fonns of intuition are identifiable; a. 
duration (action), b. philosophy and; c. 'natural geometry' (construction). 
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In Matter andMemory intuition registers the unification of duration, memory 
and 'life' as a distinct kind of unity, in contrast to the restricted notion of intuition 
that Kant produces in the CPR. For Kant, the sense-intuitions have only empirical 
powers of presentation and are limited to a symbolic harmony with the 
transcendental 'thing-in-itself (noumenon); thus, as a constituent of unification or 
harmonious construction, embodied intuition is always a limited and symbolic 
function. Bergson, however, seeks to reveal the 'true' nature of intuition in relation to 
the subject that entails a critique of the intuitions space and time so that, rather than 
producing formal appearances, intuition is an affirmation of the corporeal acts of 
construction or unifying acts in life and represents a heightened attention to questions 
of 'life' and the subject (which was desired by his 'modem' ancestors, Spinoza and 
Leibniz, but whose theories were ultimately beholden to an inherited symbolism in 
metaphysics and science). Bergson's notion of intuition and its operations are, 
however, not harmonised with 'pre-given' metaphysical principles so that notions of 
the limit, quality, quantity, the whole and the part are all intensively cross-examined 
to produce, not symbolic equivalents, but intuitive powers that are fundamental 
constituents of duration and the body as a 'centre of action'. 
Intuition is even more explicitly promoted in the later texts 'Introduction to 
Metaphysics' and Creative Evolution. In the fonner text, intuition is proposed as a 
progressive philosophy and in the latter, it becomes a 'natural' geometry that is 
intuitively produced in the act of drawing geometric figures; for example, in 
'Introduction to Metaphysics' Bergson examines the cause of 'forgetting' intuition in 
philosophy that results in philosophy's methods ladcing a relationship with its 
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4 origins' and failing to express the inherent 'extensity' of its nature. Furthermore, 
these limited methods are taken to be real truths. Bergson writes; '[rjelative is 
symbolic knowledge through pre-existing concepts, which goes ftom the jbced to the 
moving, but not so intuitive knowledge which establishes itself in the moving reality 
and adopts life itself of things. This intuition attains the absolute' (Introduction to 
Metaphysics' 1903: 276). 10 
Intuition as durafi 
Bergson's definition of intuition in Matter and Memory expresses a 
topological relationship between the body and duration. Intuition becomes a fonn of 
geometry that is generated by Bergson's insistence upon the body as a centre of 
action and resituates life into the production of philosophy and material realifies. 
Action and life are fundamental concepts in Bergson's philosophy in which a new 
kind of intuition is produced in the form of duration; the unification of fife and 
intuition is brought together in the notion of the 'act'. The actions of the body 
demonstrate an inherent relationship to spatialised experience. Duration always has a 
relationship to space, however, not to the extent that its reality - as duration - is 
lost. For Bergson, then, the body must always be an active body -a body in action 
or event - for the link between the body and space to be realised. in duration as 
extensity. Thus, although Matter and Memory is concerned with releasing time from 
the dominant perceptions of space and geometry, it nevertheless provides an 
innovative notion of geometry that is generated in the immanent relationships 
between the body, geometry and intuition in the form of duration. Intuition, then, is 
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defined as a continuum in which geometry is an intermediate 'plane', registering a 
connection between the body as a site of intuitive action and geometry as an ideal of 
space. Intuition is representative of 'life' and the actions of the body are the unifying 
site of intuition, space and time and the duration of the body. Bergson writes: 
if our belief in a more or less homogeneous substratum of sensible 
qualities has any ground, this can only be found in an act which makes 
us seize or divine, in quality itsetf, something which goes beyond 
sensation, as if this sensation itself were pregnant with details 
suspected yet unperceived. Its objectivity [ ... 
] must then consist [] 
precisely in the immense multiplicity of the movements which it 
executes, so to speak, within itself as a chrysalis. Motionless on the 
surface, in its very depth it lives and vibrates (Nal- 204). 
As the unifying site, the fiving body and its actions are understood to be the 
axis of homogeneous space and time and the axis of multiplicitous duration. Intuition 
also constitutes, therefore, the topological and continuous unification of these internal 
and external relations, so that; '[pjure intuition, external or internal, is that of an 
undivided continuity (W. 183) [my emphasis]. So, in addressing the necessity that 
spatio-temporal relations are meaningful realities Bergson revitalises the concept of 
intuition, challenging the 'impotence of speculative reason as Kant has demonstrated 
it' that divides the noumenal from sense perception (W. 184-185). Bergson's 
solution is to posit an alternative, 'third' intuition; i. e. duration. He explains: 
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It seemed to us that a third course lay open. This is to replace 
ourselves in pure duration, of which the flow is continuous and in 
which we pass insensibly from one state to another: a continuity 
which is really lived, but artificially decomposed for the greater 
convenience of customary knowledge [ ... 
] (AIM. 186). 
Thus, the connection between geometric space and duration is suggested when 
Bergson argues that geometric space is an ideal towards which we move, but never 
achieve. Geometry is not be banned, but is necessary for understanding extensity that 
is constituted by heterogeneous space and enables intermediary spatio-temporal 
conditions to be generated between its ideal and the lived duration of experiencing 
space. Moreover, the section below explores the importance of proper metaphysical 
relations Arith respect to Bergson's theory of intuition and its scope for retrieving the 
connections between duration and philosophy. 
Intuitive philosophy 
In the essay 'Introduction to Metaphysics' Bergson makes the case for an 
'intuitive thinking' that will transform the scope of philosophy into a 'progressive 
philosophy'. Intuitive thinking is that which has the scope to disrupt the logical 
artifice of symbolic metaphysical and scientific thought by introducing 'life'. He 
writes; '[bjut the simple act which has set analysis in motion and which hides behind 
230 
analysis, emanates from a faculty quite different from that of analysing. This is by 
very definition intuition' (IM: 281). 
Intuition, then, is a 'simple act' in which a particular kind of 'phil osophi sing' 
or thinking is generated that is not reducible to analytic methods. Bergson writes that, 
although the discipline of philosophy requires logical and analytic reasoning, our 
intuition is able to reverse this procedure to constitute a progressive philosophy. He 
writes; 'our mind is able to follow the reverse procedure. It can be installed in the 
mobile reality, adopt its ceaselessly changing direction, in short, grasp it intuitively' 
(IM: 275). Continuing, Bergson states that intuition introduces a 'violent' undoing or 
rupture of the dominant procedure, and enables the generation of 'fluid concepts, 
capable of following reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement of 
the inner life of things' (IM: 275). 
The essay's critique of intuition demonstrates the scope of a new unity to be 
generated, which both augments the purposes of modem philosophy and science and 
intensifies their internal structures and external relations to each other. In addition, 
intuition is intimately concerned with the production of realities. Thus, Bergson is 
not suggesting that intuition be reinstated in order to remove the work of philosophy 
or science, rather that it be properly accounted for by each method. He writes: 
Science and metaphysics then meet in intuition. A truly intuitive 
philosophy would realise the union so greatly desired, of 
metaphysics and science [ ... ]. Its result would be to re-establish the 
continuity between the intuitions which the various sciences have 
231 
obtained at intervals in the course of their history, and which they 
have obtained only by strokes of genius (IM: 276-277). 
In addition, Bergson argues that both modem science and metaphysics have 
been determined by the 'understanding', which is given to fixing, dividing and 
reconstructing to produce 'stability either in relations or in things'. '[R]elational 
concepts' are produced by science and 'concepts of things' in metaphysics, so that 
the relationship between understanding and the underlying 'intuition of reality' is 
forgotten (IM: 778). But this is also a positive critique, for Bergson shows how each 
tradition - although failing to acknowledge its relationship to life and intuition - 
contains real concepts of intuition within it; for example, 'modem' science has 
introduced a proper concept of movement and modern philosophy has a latent 
preoccupation with 'life' as duration (IM: 277). These misplaced objectives are 
captured in the spatio-temporal metaphor of the movements and structures that each 
discipline makes, such as the 'tunnelling' of metaphysics or the construction of 
bridges by scientists, both of which 'forget' the aesthetic 'moving river of things' that 
cpasses between these two works of art without touching them' (IM: 278). In 
addition, each discipline's 'blindness' is made more acute by Kant's intensification of 
the symbolic operations of science and metaphysics in which each is made 
independent of external realities, and here Bergson criticises Kant's misunderstanding 
of 'intellectual intuition' that is motivated towards the relative symbolism of science 
and the artificial symbolism of metaphysics. A recovered intuition, therefore, 
provides the necessary corrective for philosophical thinking (IM: 279). In the next 
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section this 'recovered intuition' is explored in relation to Bergson's discussion about 
c natural geometry'. 
Natural geomttiy: intuifion as construcfi 
In Creative Evolution the notion of intuition becomes more explicitly defined 
in relation to geometry, duration, space and time in the concept of 'natural geometry' 
and the act of drawing the geometric figure. Natural geometry, therefore, is the body 
and geometry brought together in the act of intuition so that geometry is explored as a 
particular form of extensity in which its relationship with intuition is reasserted as an 
active extension of space. " 
Intuition is also a logical extension of a 'natural geometry' so that the 
conditions of construction in philosophy are reconfigured because the geometric 
principle is derivedftom the body. Bergson demonstrates this 'recollection' in an 
examination of the act of drawing geometric figures that challenges the perception that 
geometry is the handmaiden to logical manufacture and reasoning. As a result, we find 
that the activities of drawing and recollection do not become reduced to a series of 
logical demonstrations, but are aspects of an aesthetic and geometric duration. 
More obviously, 'natural' geometry is a reprise of Bergson's earlier 
discussion about the intuitive body as a 'centre of action'; for example, when he 
writes, '[b]esides consciousness and science, there is life. Beneath the principles of 
speculation, so careUly analysed by philosophers, there are tendencies of which the 
study has been neglected, and which are to be explained simply by the necessity of 
living, that is, of acting [ ... 
]' (W. 198). Act is both lived and exists in construction, 
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therefore, so that the act of producing geometry is expressed through intuition; act 
represents the concrete construction of an intuitive geometry and it is this notion that 
Bergson explores in Creative Evolution (and which recalls Socrates' act of drawing in 
the Meno). 
The act of drawing has a special relation to geometry insofar as the aesthetic 
act is also inherently tied to the propensity for deductive thinking. But Bergson 
reminds us that the mind also has the propensity for intuitive thought in the form of 
duration, which can 'violently' reverse this logical progression of space and time. In 
this respect, we see the necessity of a psychological power in Bergson's argument 
for it is not enough just to propose a different way of thinking as knowledge, but 
rather to find a way that is meaningrul in reflecting the specificity of the living 
organism, thereby resisting the tendency to attribute the same methods of 
construction (e. g. deductive and inductive thought) to both organic organisms and 
inorganic matter. Bergson reminds us that geometry is both a pure knowledge, but 
also exists in an intuitive state in the act of drawing. This relationship between 
geometry and our faculties is outlined in the first paragraph of a section entitled 
'Geometry and Deduction' in which Bergson expresses the powers of geometry as 
both a step-by-step discursive extensity and an intuitive construction of embodied 
spatio-temporal unities (figures). He writes: 
All the operations of our intellect tend to geometry, as to the goal 
where they find their perfect fulfilment. But, as geometry is 
necessarily prior to them (since these operations have not as their end 
234 
to construct space and cannot do otherwise than take it as given), it is 
evident that it is a latent geometry, immanent in our idea of space, 
which is the mainspring of our intellect and the cause of its working. 
We shall be convinced of this if we consider the two essential 
functions of intellect; the faculty of deduction and that of induction 
(Creative Evolution 1904: 222). 12 
Geometry's potential for deduction and induction enables Bergson to develop 
the general discussions about geometry and intuitive acts in Matter and Memory into 
a study of an 'intuitive' relationship between man and space in Creative Evolution. 
But this later text also emphasises the power of intuition as an act of construction, 
rather than as a mode of knowledge, so that the notion of geometry is understood as a 
productive sensibility, i. e. an aesthetic. Bergson explains deduction as 'the same 
movement by which I trace a figure in space engenders its properties: they are visible 
and tangible in the movement itself, I feel, I see in space the relation of the definition 
to its consequences, of the premises to the conclusion' (CE: 222-223). Deduction 
generates ideas as part of an ongoing or infinite process. Bergson continues, writing-, 
'all the other concepts of which experience suggests the idea to me are only in part 
constructible a priori; the definition of them is therefore imperfect and the 
deductions into which these concepts enter, however closely the conclusion is linked 
to the premises, participate in this imperfection' (CE: 223). Induction, however, 
enables the construction of a unity, an image that is a form of an action. The geometric 
figure is, therefore, an infinite unity: 
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But when I trace roughly in the sand the base of a triangle, as I begin to 
fonn the two angles at the base, I know positively, and understand 
absolutely, that if these two angles are equal the sides will be equal 
also, the figure being then able to be turned over on itself without there 
being any change whatever. I know it before I have learnt geometry. 
Thus, prior to the science of geometry, there is a natural geometry 
whose clearness and evidence surpass the clearness and evidence of 
other deductions (CE: 223). 
Thus, infinity (duration or discursivity) prevents the concept from being 
limited; instead, it becomes an aesthetic condition of construction. Bergson 
continues; '[y]ou cannot represent this space to yourself without introducing, in the 
same act, a virtual geometry which will, of itself, degrade itself into logic [ ]'(CE: 
224). Thus, there is both a 'letting go' and the simultaneous notion of a 'goal' or 
unity: 
What appears, from the point of view of the intellect, as an effort, is in 
itself a letting go [ ... 
] on the contrary, if space is the ultimate goal of 
the mind's movement of detension, space cannot be given without 
positing also logic and geometry, which are along the course of the 
movement of which pure spatial intuition is the goal' (CE: 224). 
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So we find that geometry and other notions of space - space-acts - are not, 
therefore, mutually exclusive to each other. Instead, they are tied by the tension 
between a genetic process of intermediate states of concretion in space (e. g. in the act 
of drawing) and the absolute duration of the body. As we shall see below this 'double 
movement' is one of the most radical manifestations of relations that Bergson 
promotes in his 'progressive philosophy'. 
Earlier in the chapter it was shown that Bergson explores the tension of 
'double movements' in Chapter R of Matter and Memory in order to produce more 
complex, heterogeneous notions of space and time. We might suggest that double 
movement is, therefore, a kind of intuition; for example, when it is used to express 
the spatio-temporal series and 'Cliagrarn' of actual perceptions and the virtual. 
Bergson explains that multiplicity is generated in our perception of external objects, 
which arises from the movement between perceiving the objects as independent of 
consciousness and our states of consciousness, which are independent of 'objective 
reality' (W. 143). Alternatively, he writes that space and fime are brought into 
tension between the necessity of space to 'preserve' reality and the necessity of time 
to 'devour'. Later in the chapter, the double movement is a relation used to express 
the production of 'general ideas' in the movement between the 'plane of action' and 
the 'plane of pure memory'. Bergson states that; 'the general idea escapes us as soon 
as we try to fix it at either of the two extremities. It consists in the double current 
which goes from the one to the other - always ready either to crystallise into uttered 
words or to evaporate into memories' (ARf- 162). The extremities of memory, in the 
form of action and dream, are also examined under the term; for example, the capacity 
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to produce infinitely 'possible states of memory', which comprise the 'different 
planes' of continuity between action and drearn (W-. 168-170). Once again this 
movement registers the continuum of intermediate states that are produced between 
the body and mind, in which: 
the mind travels unceasingly over the interval comprised between its 
two extreme limits, the plane of action the plane of dream [ ... 
I but the 
action is not able to become real unless it succeeds in encasing itself in 
the actual situation, that is to say, in that particular assemblage of 
circumstances which is due to the particular position of the body in 
time and space (AW. 172). 
Thus, geometry cannot only be considered as a pre-given artifice of our idealist 
natures, nor is it merely a material reduction of these ideas in the natural world, but it 
is related to intuition and is part of the 'vital elan', the psychic and lived world of 
duration, as an ideal state that is never achieved. As a result, geometry is released 
from its problematic role of accountability to ready-made laws and is given back its 
relationship to immanent, intuitive acts and psychic powers in which the infinite 
continuum or process is not a logic, but life. 
Thus, the notion of act - as body - in Matter and Memory remains a general 
principle (it is an axiomatic text) that challenges metaphysical principles of a priori 
geometric production. In Creative Evolution, however, there is a more explicit 
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reference to the nature of the discursivity of the geometric method: geometric 
intuition in Matter and Memory remains a latent principle to memory. The genetic 
scope of the geometric method is more pronounced in the later texts, therefore, as 
Bergson's promotion of a philosophy of 'life' becomes more dominant; for example, 
mind, matter and space are explained as 'evolutionary' relations. That is to say, 
thinking and the ways in which we act are understood to have an affinity to 
spatialisation so that we might suggest that intuition becomes the ground between 
habit and space in 'inhabitation': 
Thus, the space of our geometry and the spatiality of things are 
mutually engendered by the reciprocal action and reaction of two terms 
which are essentially the same, but which move each in the direction 
inverse of the other. Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we 
imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses 
and intellect represent it (CE: 213-214). 
Conclusion 
Bergson's writing is given an intensive power partly through his affirmative, 
yet critical, engagement in the history of philosophy. Flis examination of Kant's 
intuition is one of the most intense sites of engagement in which Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason and its potential relationship between space and time and 'absolute' 
intuition provide Bergson with insights into new kinds of thinking that Kant fails to 
develop in the first Critique. 
239 
Moreover, Bergson radicalises the geometric method to the extent that it 
becomes an intuitive act that offers an alternative notion of construction (in 
comparison to Kant's notion of construction as it was examined in the first chapter) 
and we see that, despite the inherent difficulties of Kant's intuition, both he and 
Bergson share a curiosity about the potential for revising the scope of geometric 
methods and their production. But it is only Bergson who releases time ftom space 
and in so doing enables a radically different notion Of space to be expressed. For 
Bergson, then, we find that the construction and the actualisation of time represent 
intuitive acts and are evidence of a radicaHy intuitive geometric method (in contrast to 
Kant's 'formal' geometric method that limits the act to either, a mode of unknowable 
knowledge ideal, or a determinate empirical intuition). In each case, because Kant 
reduces intuition to a form of 'absolute' knowledge any link between its different 
kinds is disallowed. In the CPR construction for Kant, then, will always fall into two 
concepts - i. e. different knowledges - that are dependent upon an irreducible abyss 
of unintelligibility defining their limits and are, therefore, at odds vvith the evolution 
of a complex thinking organism. 
Nevertheless, the potential that intuition can be brought into a critical, yet 
properly creative act, fascinates Bergson; one might also suggest that it produces a 
highly creative relation in Bergson's own metaphysics, insofar as there is a kind of 
topological relation between his metaphysics and Kant's. Intuition then, is vital to 
Bergson's 'progressive' notions of space and time. 
We have also seen that Bergson is sympathetic to the 'modernity' of Spinoza 
and Leibniz's methods, especially their development of physics; but Bergson also 
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criticises them for upholding the symbolic determinations of Cartesian science and 
metaphysics that perpetuates the negation of time and the dominance of a 
homogenous space (CE: 366-374). Bergson points out the limitations of his 
predecessors' retrieval of the relationship between matter and space, suggesting that 
seventeenth century metaphysics repeats the limitations of 'ancient metaphysics' 
and science, so that their pursuit of a proper scientific notion of movement in modem 
physics - and hence the metaphysical exploration of matter and the soul - 
is 
restricted (CE: 167). 
In addition, Bergson suggests that both Spinoza and Leibniz sustain the pre- 
given metaphysical harmonies of unintelligible Powers - God and the soul - 
generating a unity of nature that relies upon unexplained relations and exclusions. 
Bergson's critique of the construction of space and geometry is, therefore, geometric 
thinIcing in one of its most original and most intensive forms, and an impressive 
demonstration of the internal and modem 'origins' of geometry and philosophy. 
Geometry and its interiors are made intensive not only because Bergson demonstrates 
the power of re-thinking the interiority of science and metaphysics, but also to the 
extent that his own method is highly reflective practice in relation to these two 
disciplines. 
In Matter andMemory, therefore, space exists as an intuitive aspect, not just 
in the diagrammatic code or plane of geometry, but as a highly radical notion of 
matter. Contrary to Kant's suggestion that mathematical geometry is independent of 
other forms of knowledge, Bergson views it to be inherently related to our 
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perceptions and our relationship to the external world. The CPR shows us how, 
within the pre-given tradition of metaphysics and science to which Kant is fied, 
geometry is a highly constructed artifice of their symbolic systems. Bergson, 
however, resists this symbolism and instead posits an alternative relationship 
between geometry and other kinds of relationships with the world. Geometry is not 
just a product of pure reason or intellect, rather it is also a product of our intuition, 
soul and other corporeal powers (that recall Spinoza and Leibniz, especially), 
demonstrating the rejection of geometry as an outcome of reason or artificial 
construction. Moreover, the 'assumed' correspondence or harmony between matter 
and geometry is removed in which matter is not restricted to the harmonising effect of 
a logical geometry or cleaved from a metaphysics of 'life'. 
Bergson, brings the revision of geometric 'relations' in philosophy to the 
foreftont of the discussion in a highly critical examination of the symbolic theories of 
geometry and metaphysics that have perpetually forgotten the meaningful relations 
between philosophy, science and life. Whilst space and time might be logically and 
materially realised and correspond to one another if they are contained within the 
limits of metaphysics or the mathematical and material sciences, 'real' expression of 
these relations are elided because they are produced out of symbolic and exterrial 
differences rather than 'real' and internal differences. For Bergson, mechanical or 
symbolic systems represent these relationships in which no real material or 
relationship can be realised, and in which spatio-temporal relations remain limited to 
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representations or 'signs' of intellectual reason, rather than manifesting proper 
expressions of 'lived' experience. 
So, Bergson argues that space and time should be considered, not under the 
symbolic and closed systems of Platonic or Cartesian symbolism and their respective 
sciences, but explored instead in terms of 'psychic' necessity. Space becomes, 
therefore, not more objective, rather it and geometry acquire a more concrete 
relationship to nature and, hence, are grounded in the reality of a truly temporal life. 
Space and geometry are attributed with a kind of genetic condition of change that is 
intimately tied to the experience of life in a manner reminiscent of Spinoza's 
condition of spatiO-temporal relations and extended matter. As we have seen above, 
Bergson applauds Spinoza's project for reviving the intuitive status of geometry, but 
is critical of his reliance upon a relativist metaphysics that collapses a potentially 
liberated expression of the world and life back into a hannony with understanding. 
In contrast, Bergson constructs space as an intuition in relation to its 
manifestation as habit (memory) and the tendency of the organism to orientate and 
express itself through physical spatialisations that promotes, not a symbolic or 
scientific geometry, but a 'natural' geometry that is properly intuitive, constructive 
and reflective of the limits of the body as a centre of action and duration. In addition, 
in Creative Evolution, Bergson suggests that geometry exists, which is reflexive of the 
living subject, in contrast to the notion of the symbolic geometry that is produced by 
an ancient metaphysics and underlying 'pre-modem' science. Geometry is, therefore, 
interiorised into the actions of the subject, rather than extemalised or repressed, 
representing a forgotten geometry, which Bergson suggests can be realised once a new 
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metaphysics of 'intensive quality' is retrieved. Geometry is not merely consigned to 
being a product of a closed metaphysics or science, but is brought into a 'lived' 
philosophy (and, although we have seen that Kant's reflective judgement proposes 
this shift, it remains 'speculative). In this final chapter, therefore, the notion of 
relations between geometry, space and time becomes a primary concern for 
articulating the possibility of a truly progressive philosophy. 
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Conclusion 
This discussion has exammed a series of 'forgotten' geometric methods in 
which geometry and aesthetics are brought into an irreducible unity in the form of the 
aesthetic figure or subject. It has defined the relationship between geometry and 
aesthetics in Kant's Critical philosophy, especially with regard to the shift from an 
objective or pure scientific geometry to a notion of geometry that is generated by the 
imagination as a reflective judgment. In the Critique of Juckment, therefore, an 
aesthetic notion of geometry becomes concerned, not with the external axiomatic 
aspects of the method, but with its relationship to the internal, heterogeneous and 
technical enactment of the method in the form of drawing figures, 
The retrieval of this intemally differentiated aesthetic geometry then 
modulates an analysis of aesthetic geometries expressed in a series of philosophies 
dating from the Classical period of Plato and Proclus' geometric writings, to the post- 
Cartesian philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz and, finally, Bergson's post-Kantian 
reappraisal of the living body and the sense-intuitions. Each chapter, therefore, 
identifies a method and its emergent geometric figure(s) that is generated in one 
philosophical text. 
Two primary research questions have organised this discussion: first, what is 
an aesthetic geometric method? By focusing on each text in turn, the chapters have 
defined the structure and nature of 'enactment' in each method, and have 
- for example, demonstrated that these methods are varied in a number of waysl 
Proclus and Spinoza explicitly undertake geometric fonns of wrifing. in contrast, 
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Kant, Leibniz and Bergson especially, are informed by geometric methods that are 
internal operations in their respective philosophical arguments, rather than 
constituting the primary rationale of the text that is outlined by each author, As a 
result, chapters 1,4 and 5 drew out the geometric method of the respective texts that 
do not necessarily follow the authors' own definition of their method. Leibniz, for 
example, does not explicitly define the Monadology as a geometric text, although here 
it has been argued that its axiomatic qualities are inherently geometric. Alternatively, 
Bergson's affirmation of duration over space is produced partly through his 
understanding of the geometric method. In addition, the extent to which his figure of 
the envelope can be considered to be geometric is evident precisely because of his 
understanding of the mathematical conditions of space and geometry. Thus, this 
thesis argued that Bergson's radicalization of the method is generated through his 
sophisticated understanding of geometric principles. 
A summafy of the distinctions between the geometric methods of each text 
shows that; first, chapter I argued that Kant promotes an intuitive method that is 
embodied as an aesthetic principle of subjective knowledge in the Critique of 
Judgment. In the Ciltique ofPure Reason, however, the sense-intuitions of space and 
time remain restricted to symbolic appearances of intuition, rather than providing a 
fully aesthetic geometric construction. In the second chapter it was demonstrated that 
Proclus constructs a discursive method through which the external objectivity of the 
'element' becomes 'internal'; however, it was also shown that this method is 
determined by the extemally originating principles of infinity and the divine so that 
246 
the geometric figure of the fold is not fully developed into an aesthetic embodiment. 
In the third chapter it was proposed that Spinoza retrieves a method in which the 
passage from man's embodiment of different modes of subjectivity to God's infinity 
is expressed through an axiomatic text. In addition, it was shown that Spinoza's 
axiomatic method differs ftom Leibniz's theories in a number of ways; in particular, 
Spinoza's discrete 'modal' condition of embodiment represents a synthetic method. 
In contrast, in chapter 4 it was argued that Leibniz undertakes an analytic method 
that constructs the internal figuration of the geometric method in an intensified notion 
of limit, which is expressed as an infinitely divisible infinity or magnitude. As a 
result, Leibniz's method and its figures, such as the plenum, are not discrete 
synthetic modes but a series of 'fictional' approximations of spatio-temporal 
relations. Both chapters, however, emphasise the importance of Leibniz and 
Spinoza's post-Cartesian philosophies, in the construction and enactment of 
aesthetic geometric methods, rather than scientific forms. 
Finally, chapter 5 argued that Bergson's method returned to the importance of 
the intuitive and internal geometry of Kant's third Critique. Like Spinoza's method it 
too is an aspect of real embodiment and dynamic relations, however, like Leibniz, it is 
also concerned with the internal intensification of the powers of perception. 
Bergson's method demonstrates, therefore, both a departure from the symbolic 
scientific method of his predecessors and a re-enactment of their thinking. 
The second research question considered each method's respective geometric 
figure and the manner in which they were produced. This led each chapter to consider 
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the definition of each figure as an aesthetic and geometric figuration, and to ask in 
what ways they are constructed in relation to their respective methods? Again, it was 
argued that the philosophers' articulation of these figures is distinct so that, for 
Proclus, the geometric figure of the 'unfolding' was explicitly described as a form of 
the method, whilst its counterpart, the fold, was implicit in Proclus' Commentary. In 
Kant's Critique of Judgment, however, the notion of figure is explicitly described as 
being 'double' - it is both the drawn figure and the subject - that is, the geometric 
figure is conceived to be both the aesthetic subject and the enactment of drawing out 
the geometric figure. For Kant, then, the notion of figure both registered the technical 
aesthetic of the method and the embodied figure (i. e. the body) of the individual 
subject. In contrast although Spinoza's demonstration of the method in the Ethics is 
explicit, his figure is not, and so chapter 3 proposed that the figure of the 'passage' is 
generated in the structural development of the text itself, rather than a figure that 
Spinoza constructs, himself Leibnizs notion of the figure is perhaps the most 
multiple or differentiated throughout his writings and includes figures such as the fold 
or net, but here in the Monadolqgý it is identified as being the 'plenum'. Thus, we 
find that Spinzoa and Leibniz proposed different relationships between the method 
and their respective figures; for Spinoza, the method is explicit and the figure is 
implicit, whereas, for Leibniz, the method is implicitly geometfic and the figure is 
explicitly expressed. Finally, it was shown that, despite his primary affiliation with 
Spinoza's affirmation of the active body, Bergson's method is reminiscent of 
Leibniz's insofar as he had an explicit definition of the figure, the 'envelope'. But 
Bergson's figure also provided a re-enactment of Kant's 'doubling' in which the 
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figure is both the active, thinking subject and the enactment of the geometric 
procedure. 
The geometric figure, therefore, was presented here as an aesthetic aspect of 
the geometric method, that represented the double 'acts' of the geometric method; a. 
it is the aesthetic event of the method and, b. it is the 'figure' of the subject. Thus, 
the geometric figure is constituted by the embodied subject (its feelings, senses), the 
imagination (its powers of production), memory and the drawn figure. The geometric 
figure, therefore, constitutes a central element of the project, because a unique 
'figuration' of spatio-temporal relations is constructed in each of the methods; in 
particular, in the shift from external element to internal figure. As a result, scientific 
geometry is reconnected with aesthetic principles of production; for example, in 
Proclus' reconfiguration of Euclid's Elements into a discursive method. The term 
figure is also an aesthetic bridge between the technical procedures of geometry and its 
designation as an irreducible unity in the reflective subject. It is, therefore, a term that 
reflects geometric intuition in both mathematical and artistic contexts, and registers 
the heterogeneous geometric figures that are produced by each method examined here. 
The thesis therefore re-thinks the notion of figuration as the notion of geometric and 
aesthetic production in which there is a shift from the figure as a diagram into an act 
or event. 
In addition, each of the texts selected presents an interpretation of geometric 
ideas at a time when geometry provides important contributions to philosophy and 
to the wider contexts of science and art. Thus, the selected texts provide a series of 
aesthetic figures that reflect developments in mathematics; for example, Proclus' 
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commentary engages in Euclid's mathematics; Spinoza and Leibniz's post-Cartesian 
texts reflect encounters with the analytical geometry of Descartes, and; Bergson's 
text is written after Riemann's theory of topology. In addition, Kant's theory of the 
reflective subject provides a site through which science and art are brought together in 
the aesthetic unity of the figure of the subject, so that a re-examination of aesthetic 
relations is conducted in which Kant's notion of figure is reconnected to a series of 
forgotten links in the development of geometry. 
This research might be developed in a number of ways; for example, an 
examination of these aesthetic figures as they might occur in spatial disciplines, such 
as architecture. In this context the plenum and the envelope could be used to inform 
theories of spatio-temporal organization in the history and theory of architectural 
design. ' The plenum, for example, could be examined in relation to its function as an 
interstitial space between floors. In addition, recent discussions about 'envelopes' in 
building design, such as Bernard Tschumi's project le Fresnoy in Tourcoing, France, 
might be examined in relation to Bergson's notion of envelope. ' 
Second, these discussions enable a re-thinking of feminist theories of space 
and spatial culture by informing notions of embodiment scientific method and 
aesthetics'; for example, this research enables a critique of writing, such as Luce 
Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman (1985), which is determined by a scientific 
notion of geometry and space. Alternatively, it could provide a development from the 
study of Spinoza's Ethics by Moira Gatens in Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and 
Corporeality (1996). 
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Third, the discussions inform a re-consideration of the divisions between the 
notions of 'figuration' in abstract and figurative art, and provide a means for re- 
thýinking the aesthetic mediation between these two modes of practice; for example, 
an understanding of geometry and aesthetics infonms discussions about figuration in 
Modernist art practice which have tended to be determined by scientific notions of 
geometric method, such as the opposition between Nfichael Fried and Rosalind 
Krauss in relation to Formalism and Nfinimalism in Fried's essay 'Shape and Form' 
in Art and Objecthood and other writings (1998), and Krauss's Passages in Sculpture 
(1993). 
This thesis has examined a series of aesthetic geometric procedures, therefore, 
that challenge dominant understandings of geometry as a scientific method. In re- 
thinldng the notion of the aesthetic figure in relation to a series of geometric 
principles it has proposed a 'forgotten' ontology of geometric configurations. As a 
result, each method and its respective figw-e represent heterogeneous aesthetic 
geometric principles, which resist being reduced to determinate concepts of space and 
time. 
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Notes 
Introduction 
I See, for example, De Morgan's 1848 account of Euclid's geometric principles and cited in the 
preface of Heath's edition of the Elements; 'Itlhere never has been, and till we see it we never shall 
believe that there can be, a system of geometry worthy of the name, which has any material departures 
(we do not speak of corrections or extensions or developments) from the plan laid down by Euclid' 
(T. Heath, [19561, Euclid. - The Thirteen Books of the Elements, Volume 1, London: Dover 
Publications, v). Heath expands upon this mathematical emphasis, writing that much 'valuable work' 
has investigated the axiornatic method subsequently, but that 'once the first principles are disposed 
of, the body of doctrine contained in the recent text-books of elementary geometry does not, and from 
the nature of the case cannot, show any substantial differences from that set forth in the Elements' 
(Heath 1956: v). Thus, although Heath's Commentary provides a contextualisation of the Euclid's 
writings in relation to its Platonic and Pythagorean sources, it is, principally, a revision of a scientific 
geometric method. 
2 This d&ussion suggests an alternative notion of geometric method in contrast to Husserl's 
investigations in 'The Origin of Geometry' [ 19361 (reprinted in J. Derrida, [ 19891, Edmund Husserl's 
Origin of Geometry. - An Introduction, translated by John P. Leavey, Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press). Not only does Kant's aesthetic subject provide an alternative interpretation to 
Husserl's ontology, but it is also an alternative 'origin' of geometry to Euclid's scientific paradigm. 
3 Arising from this, a fin-ther research project may exist that examines the extent to which Deleuze's 
writings are concerned with geometry. 
ChVter 1: Drawing Figure 
1 Gary Banharn provides a valuable examination of the development of the different aesthetics in 
Kant's three Critiques; for example, assessing the scope of the imagination and synthesis in the first 
Critique and the 'productive imagination' in the third Critique. Banharn summarises the three roles 
of the imagination in the first Critique as; 'an empirical rule of reproduction which operates through 
the presentation of images; a transcendental rule of synthesis whether determined as 'figurative' [ ... ] 
or as constitutive of each level of synthesis [aDdJ a mediating function between sensibility and 
understanding via schematism'. With respect to the third Critique, Banham also notes that the 
imagination is attributed with 'freedom, as providing rules of taste and in self-restriction intellectual 
feeling' (G. Banham, [20001, Kant and the End of Aesthetics, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
58). 
2 An abbreviated form of the titles of the Critiques will be used from this point onwards in the 
chapter and in the references. CPR refers to 1. Kant, (1997), The Critique of Pure Reason, edited and 
translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CoJ refers to 1. 
Kant, (1987), Critique ofJudgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
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Company. References cite the original page number (of the 1781 and/or 1787 editions of the CPR, 
where relevant), followed by the page number from the edition used in this discussion 
3 Michael Durnmett provides an analysis of the principle of mathematical form in the synthetic a 
priori in Kant's CPR in 'The Philosophy of Mathematics' (in A. Grayling, [ed. 1, t 1998], Philosophy 
2: Further Through the Subject, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 126-129). 
4 In chapter 3 the importance of 'parts' or 'scholia' will be examined in more detail in relation to 
Spinoza's geometric method. 
5 An abbreviated title (CDS) of the essay is used in references (and reprinted in 1. Kant, (1992), 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, Cambridge Edition 1, translated and edited by David Walford in 
collaboration with Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). References cite the 
original page numbers, followed by the page number from the Cambridge edition, for example, 
(CDS: 2,345/365). 
6 Gilles Deleuze notes the necessity of an internal intuition of space from which external space can be 
produced in a certain lineage of neo-Kantian thought, writing; '[ilf, in the forms of intuition, Kant 
recogaised extrinsic differences not reducible to the order of concepts, these are no less 'internal' even 
though they cannot be regarded as 'intrinsic' by the understanding, and can be represented only in 
their external relation to space as a whole In other words, following certain neo-Kantian 
interpretations, there is a step-by-step, internal, dynamic construction of space which must precede the 
'representation' of the whole as a form of exteriority'. In the same passage, Deleuze also notes that 
such an interpretation places Kant less at odds with Leibniz's writings on space (G. Deleuze, [19971, 
Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton, London: Athlone Press, 26). 
7 Kant's emphasis on the technical or aesthetic acts of production contrasts with his investigations 
into mechanical and dynamic relations; for example, in his essay 'Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science' (1786), in which geometry and its figures remain determinate (see 1. Kant, [19851, 
Philosophy ofMaterial Nature, translated by James W. Eflington, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company). 
8 Daniel W. Smith has considered the relationship between the imagination and figure in Kant's 
Critical philosophy in the essay 'Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality' (in 
P. Patton, [ed. ], 119961, Deleuze: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Pubfishers, 29-56). 
9 An abbreviated form of the tide of the Anthropology (APP) is used in references, citing the section, 
followed by the page number and refer to 1. Kant, (1978), Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View, translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell, London and Amsterdam: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
10 Caygill makes the point that Kant's method is a metaphysical one, i. e. that it is about finding a 
proper relationship between the intelligible and sensible realities. He writes: '[t]he only way to 
preserve metaphysics is to establish a procedure for determining the proper relation of the sensible and 
intelligible reabris I ... 
1. Kant offers another analogy, but one which this time he fully develops. He 
offers the example of spatial orientation, and the nature of directionality. In order to orient ourselves 
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spatially we must make a distinction between left and right; but how can this distinction be made? In 
Kant's words, is it transcendental or empirical, in Heidegger's is it ontic or ontological? We shall see 
in the next section that Heidegger's decision in Being and Time to assign this distinction to ontic 
determination does Kant an injustice, making the difference empirical: it isn't, but then neither is it 
transcendental I ... I. ' 
Caygill continues, writing; '[s]patial orientation rests on a difference which is in a sense 
outside of and yet underlying spatial orientation. Dropping the spatial metaphors, it assumes a 
procedure or activity of distinction [ ... I. 
' Caygill refers back to the CPR to ask if spatial orientation is 
an activity that is not yet defined by the faculties, and he suggests that it is a production of space that 
is, in some ways, prior to conceptual knowledge. In addition, Caygill states that it is a different kind 
of judgment, writing that it is 'because this differentiating activity cannot be represented in intuition 
that Kant calls it a feeling, or an 'affection' of the subject. This indicates that it does not form part of 
either the sensible or intelligible realms, but is yet essential for this proper calibration (H. 
Caygill, [ 19891, Art ofJudgment, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 198). 
11 Caygill has noted that Kant's commitment to the relationship between understanding and the 
intuitions is, nevertheless, underwritten by an absolute division between intuition and God, the world 
and the soul, which means that critique is always determined by an external drive or difference (H. 
Caygill, [19981, Walter Benjamin: Yhe Colour ofErperience, London: Routledge, 2). Kant's Critical 
philosophy, therefore, enables a discussion of geometry and aesthetics as aspects of the understanding 
and intuition, but does not allow for an immanent sufficiency to be attributed to die subject. 
12 Brian Massurni gives an insightful interpretation of drawing and geometry in his essay 'The 
Diagram as Technique of Existence' (see t. Alliez, and E. von Samsonow, (eds. ), [2001], Chroma 
Drama, Widerstand der Farbe, Wein: Turia + Kant, 161-176). He writes, 'Plet the clean blackboard 
be a sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its 
determination. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that which it stands for is a 
continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions. I draw a chalk line on the board [ ... 1. For this 
white chalk mark is not a line, it is a plane figure in Euclid's sense, a surface, and the only line that 
is there is the line which forms the limit between the black and the white surface. This discontinuity 
can only be produced upon that blackboard by the reaction between two continuous surfaces into 
which it is separated, the white surface and the black surface' (Alliez and SamsoDOw 2001: 163). 
13 The following chapter will examine Proclus' attention to the relationship between the discursive 
nature of the mathematical diagram and memory; for example, in first part of the Prologue he refers to 
the Phaedo and the Meno as examples of Plato's theory that recollection is the understanding or 'a 
part of the soul' that unfolds the ideas it already contains (Proclus, [1992], A Commentary on the 
First Book of Euclid's Elements, translated by Glenn R. Morrow, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 37). 
14 The aesthetic connection between Kant and Plato suggests an alternative 'origin' of geometry in 
contrast to Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry', which considers it an 'epistemological problem' (Derrida 
1989: 180). Husserl recognises that geometry and its modes of production are 'technical' insofar as 'in 
the life of practical needs certain particularizations of shape stood out and that a teclu&al prams 
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always [aimed at] the production of particular preferred shapes and the improvement of them according 
to certain directions of gradualness' (Derrida 1989: 178). Thus, for Husserl, aesthetics in geometry is 
considered as an aspect of its 'ideality' or scientific basis, not the nature of its production- 
Chapter 2: Unfoldin 
I Morrow's translation is that of Gottfried Friedlein's 1873 text, Procli Diadochi in Primum Euclidis 
Elementorum Librum Commentarii ex Recognitione Godo/redi Friedlein, Leipzig, 1873, based upon 
the Greek text by Simon Grynacus, Basel, 1533. 
2 The Commentary is comprised of two introductory Prologues and an in-depth analysis of the Book I 
of the Elements. 
3 All quotations from the Commentary are taken from (Proclus 1992). In references the title is 
abbreviated to CEE, hereafter, and give the Friedlein pagination, followed by Morrow's pagination, 
for example (CEE: 12/10). 
4 Mueller points out that the final two books of the 15 are now considered not to be by Euclid (CEE: 
xlvii). 
5 Deleuze notes Proclus' definition of 'series' in relation to the Pythagorean divine notions of the 
One, Many, limit and unlimit (see, G. Deleuze, [2001], The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
translated by Tom Conley, London: Athlone Press, 23 and 146). Later in this chapter an elaboration 
of these principles is given; also, see chapter 4 for a discussion of the infinite and multiple in relation 
to Leibniz's geometric method and figures. 
6 Eric Alliez provides a valuable analysis of the fold and Neoplatonism in relation to the construction 
of the soul and time in Plotinus' philosophy. He distinguishes between three different kinds of 
folding; 'a. Greekfolding (pli) of the forces engaged in the relation to others that is constitutive of the 
relation to self [ ... ]. 
b. the Greco-Roman unfolding (d6pli) of the relation to self in power relations 
c. the neoplatonic refolding (repli) or the self within the whole that puts it outside itself [ ... I' 
(k Alliez, [19961, Captial Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, Theory out of Bounds, Volume 
6, translated by Georges van den Abbeele, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
73). 
7 Plato's theory of the Divided Line in the Republic, Book VI, 510-510e, is demarcated by the upper, 
transcendental realm of Being and the lower sensible realm of Becoming, emphasising the division 
between the faculties of reason and understanding from the faculty of imagination and sense opinion 
(see Plato, [19891, Collected Dialogues ofPlalo, including the letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cainis, Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
8 Ian Mueller provides ftee useful diagrams that show the different metaphysical schema informing 
the Commentary. They are; figure 1. the order derived from the Divided Line (Plato 1989: Republic, 
Book IV, 441-441e); figure 2. the Neoplatonic order and, figure 3. an alternative order of the soul 
mediating between the non-sensible and sensible realms (CEE: xvii-xviii). 
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9 Proclus, however, attributes the creative power to soul and the reproductive power to understanding. 
This discussion is also an interesting precursor of philosophical discussions concerned with notions 
of 'fife-force'; for example, Freud's examination of the 'to-and-fro' movement between pleasure and 
displeasure, or the forces of Eros and Thanatos, in the essay 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920), 
(see S. Freud, [1955], The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Volume 18, 
translated and edited by James Strachey, London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis). 
Or, Baudriflard's discussion of the economics of force between Eros and Thanatos (in J. Baudrillard, 
[19931, Symbolic Exchange and Death, translated by lain Hamilton Grant, London: Sage 
Publications). In each case, concepts of life and death produce notions of production that are 
cbaracterised by a two-fold movement. 
10 In the Timaeus (34-37) Plato describes the world's soul as a mixture of mathematical matter and 
cosmic powers, a 'strip' divided into parts to form the cosmos and the metaphysical principles of the 
Existent, the Same and the Different, in constant, autonomous movement. It is conceived as being 
immaterial and partless, and corporeal and divided (Plato 1989: 1164-1166). 
11 Deleuze explores the diagram in relation to Francis Bacon's paintings, writing that: JtN diagram 
is thus the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines and zones, line-stokes and color- 
patches. And the operation of the diagram, its function, says Bacon, is to be 'suggestive. ' Or, more 
rigorously, to use language similar to Wittgenstein's, is to introduce 'possibilities of fact' [ ... 1. 
Because they are destined to give us the Figure, it is all the more important for the traits and color- 
patches to break with figuration. This is why they are not sufficient in themselves, but must be 
'utilized. ' They mark out possibilities of fact, but do not constitute a fact (the pictorial fact). In order 
to be converted into a fact, in order to evolve into a Figure, they must be renjected into the visual 
whole; but it is precisely through the action of these marks that the visual whole will cease to be an 
optical organizatiorr, it will give the eye another power, as well as an object that will no longer be 
figurative' (G. Deleuze, [20031, Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation, translated by Daniel W. 
Smith, London and New York: Contimiurn, 101-102). 
12 Robin Durie's essay 'The Strange Natuic of the Instant' is a valuable examination of this 
discussion (see R. Durie, [ed], [20001, Time and the Instant: Essays in the Physics and Philosophy 
of Time, NLinchester: Clinamen Press, 1-24). 
hapter 3: Passig 
1 The term 'expression' is used wpeatedly by Spinoza in the Ethics to underline the immanence of 
God in substance and its modes; for example, in Part 1, Definition 6, he writes; '[bly God I mean an 
absolutely infinite being; that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses 
eternal and infinite essence' (B. Spinoza, [ 19921, Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect 
and Selected Letters, edited by Seymour Feldman, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 31). This chapter is also informed by Deleuze's examination of the term which, he 
suggests, eniphasises the importance of the internal movements of thought in Spinoza and Leibniz's 
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post-Cartesian philosophies (see G. Deleuze, [1992], Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 
translated by Martin Joughin, New York: Zone Books). 
Martin Joughin's Preface succinctly summanses this argument, stating; 'Spinoza and 
Leibniz: two different expressions of 'expressionism in philosophy' characterized in this book as a 
system of implicatio and explicatio, enfolding and unfolding, implication and explication, implying 
and explaining, involving and evolving, enveloping and developing. Two systems of universal 
folding: Spinoza's unfolded from the bare 'simplicity' of an Infinity into which all things are 
ultimately folded up, as into a universal map that folds back into a single point; while Lcibniz starts 
from the infinite points in that map, each of which enfolds within its infinitely 'complex' identity all 
its relations with all other such points, the unfolding of all these infinite relations being the evolution 
of a Leibnizian Universe' (Deleuze 1992: 5). 
2 This argument will not, however, extend to evaluate whether Descartes' geometric writings might be 
considered a 'forgotten' geometry. 
3 All citations from the 'Commentary on Descartes' 'Principles of Philosophy" are taken from E. 
Curley, (ed. and trans. ), (1985), 7he Collected Works of Spinoza, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. References give the Part, original page and line number, followed by Curley's pagination; for 
example, (Curley 1985: 1,129,5-7/226). 
4 Later this chapter will note Spinoza's criticism of what he calls Descartes' 'occultist' union between 
the mind and body. In addition, chapter 5 notes Bergson's frustration with Descartes' scientific 
method that leads him to acknowledge Descartes' skill as a physicist, but to criticise his dependency 
upon the 'symbolic' limits of modem rational science. 
5 Deleuze notes that Spinoza constructs the geometric method in relation to a 'way of being', which is 
reflected in his practical work of polishing optical lenses. Deleuze writes; jiln Spinoza's thought, life 
is not an idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being, one and the same eternal mode in all its 
attributes. And it is only from this perspective that the geometric method is fully comprehensible 
[ 
... 
J. The geometric method ceases to be a method of intellectual exposition; it is not longer a means 
of professorial presentation but rather a method of invention [ ... 
I' (G. Deleuze, [19881, Spinoza: 
Practical Philosophy, translated by Robert Hurley, San Francisco: City Lights Books, 13-14). 
6 See also Bergson's description of Spinoza's approach as having the impact of a 'dreadnought', in K. 
Ansell Pearson and J. Mullarkey (eds. ), (2002), Henri Bergson: Key Writings, London: Continuum, 
and cited in chapter 5, note 9, below. 
7 AN citations from the Ethics are taken from (Spinoza 1992). In references the title is abbreviated to 
E, hereafter References give the following; Title, Part, Proposition or Definition, Corollory or 
Scholium, and page number, for example (E: 1, Prop 7/34). 
8 See, for example, Martin Joughin's discussion about erifolding/unfolding and implicatiolexplicatio 
(Delcuze 1992: 5-7). 
9 In his introduction, Seymour Feldman writes; 'Spinoza's Ethics is perhaps the first purely 
philosophical treatise that presents its conclusions consistently and completely in an axiomatic 
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manner. In this respect it is the paradigm of the hypothetical-deductive method suggested by Aristotle 
in his Posterior Analytics as the model for a scientific theory, which until Spinoza was only 
exemplified by Euclid's geometry' (E: 7). 
10 Richard Arthur provides an excellent survey of the development of atomistic theories in which 
Spinoza and Leibniz participated (see R. Arthur, (ed. and trans. ), 120011, The Labyrinth of the 
Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, GW Leibniz, The Yale Leibniz Series, 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press). 
11 Deleuze notes the confluence between the geometric plan and immanent plane that is in Spinoza's 
emphasis on the modal nature of 'life', writing-, '[w1hat is involved is no longer the affirmation of a 
single substance, but rather the laying out of a common plane of inunanence on which all bodies, all 
minds, and all individuals are situated. This plane of inimanence or consistency is a plan, but not in 
the sense of a mental design, a project a program; it is a plan in the geometric sense: a section, an 
mtersection, a diagram. Thus to be in the middle of Spinoza is to be on the modal plane, or rather to 
install oneself on this plane - which implies a mode of living, a way of Iffe' (Delcuze 1988: 199). 
12 Spinoza can be said to be 'materialist' insofar as he anticipates the modern concern with biology 
and bio-pbysical definitions of matter. See, for example, (Deleuze 1988: 56-57) and Seymour 
Feldman's introduction to the Ethics (E: 12). 
13 Spinoza continues this discussion into an extended examination of the motion of extended bodies 
and their constitution as divisible parts, motion, internal and external qualities and capacity to affect 
other bodies (E: 72-76). 
14 See Part 11, Proposition 40, Scholium I (E: 89). 
15 It might be possible to suggest that Spinoza's common notions have some correspondence to 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the 'percept' when they write that the definition of art ties in its 
attempts to 'create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, 
through the actions of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations' (G. Deletize and 
F. Guattariý [ 19941, What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New 
York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 197). 
16 Deleuze writes; JbM joyful passions lead us closer to this power [of action], that is, increase or 
help it; sad passions distance us from it, that is, diminish or hinder it. The primary question of the 
Ethics is dws: What must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passionsT (Delem 
1992: 273). 
17 Deletize notes the historical 'pantheist' tradition in the relationship between the implication and 
explication (implicaitol explicatio) that produce a synthetic unity - 'complicatio' - that is underscored 
by the Neoplatorne principles of 'multiplicity in the One, and of the One in the Many' and noting 
that the principles of implication and explication do not therefore constitute opposition but synthesis 
(Deleoze 1992: 16). 
18 Deleuze uses the concept of 'speeds' to register the multiple kinds of activity that are generated in 
the body by the emotions; for example, of the modes, he writes; '[flor, concretely, a mode is a 
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complex relation of speed and slowness, in the body but also in thought, and it is a capacity for 
affecting or being affected, pertaining to the body or to thought' (Deleuze 1988: 124). 
19 Deleuze writes that the Ethics is a twice-written book; the first book is the formal geometric 
method, the second 'subterranean' book is the 'broken chain of the scholia, a discontinuous volcanic 
line, a second version underneath the first, expressing all the angers of the heart and setting forth the 
practical theses of denunciation and liberation' (Deleuze 1992: 28-29). 
20 Isabelle Stengers, for example, discusses whether it is possible to think of an ethics of science that 
might be informed by feminist practice or radical politics and suggests that such a re-thinking of the 
scope of the scientific method reflects Bergson's inquiry. See 1. Stengers, (1997), Power and 
Invention: Situating Science, Aeory Out of Bounds, Volume 10, Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
ChV-ter 4: The Plenum 
1 See, for exwnple, Leibniz's writings on the problem of bodies, motion and rest in 'on Uhtter, 
Motion, Minima, and the Continuum', 1675 (Arthur 2001: 30-41). In his introduction, Arthur notes 
that I-eibniz gave up 'the ontology of perfect solids and perfect fluids' during this period, suggesting 
he develops a different ontology in which 'matter has varying degrees of resistance to division, land] a 
given body can respond to the actions of the plenum by differing internal divisions, manifested as 
elasticity. ' (Arthur 2001: 1xv). 
Much of Arthur's commentary on the problem of the Continuum informs a discussion about 
geometric method, in particular, the development of Leibniz's concepts of substance, infinite 
divisibility, and the 'unassignables' or 'indiscernibles'. Arthur's text is especially strong in 
underpinning Leibniz's ontology of the Monad in conjunction with a rigorous examination of the 
development of the physical and mathematical sciences in the seventeenth century that directly 
contributes to developing a concrete and analytic understanding of Leibniz's philosophy, whilst 
recognizing the inherent labyrinthine nature of his writings in which internal disagreements, 
correspondence with other writers, progressive changes of opinion and contradiction come together to 
form a discontinuous, yet continuous philosophy; for example, Leibniz's philosophy of infinity is 
intimately related to the operations of Geometry. It is another aspect of his interests in the labyrinth 
of the contimiurn, such as, his text 'De usu geometriae' (1676), in which he considers geometry to be 
the basis for discussions about the 'Confinuum, writing; '[olnly Geometry [ ... I can provide a thread 
of the Labyrintli of the Composition of the Continuumý of maximum and minimum, and the 
unassignable and the infniite, and no one will arrive at a truly sofid metaphysics who has not passed 
through that labyrinth' (cited in Arthur 2001: xxifi). 
2 In his 'Treatise on Calculus' (1675-76), Leibniz defines calculus as; 'every curvilin= figure is 
nothing but a polygon with an infinite number of sides, of an infinitely small magnitude. ' Arthur 
explains, 'according to this conception any curve can now be represented as a infinite 'sum' of such 
differentials [ ... 1. 
Similarly, the area can be represented as an infinite sum of the products of each 
ordinate and a differential [ ... I' (Arthur 200 1: liv). 
259 
3 This is reflected in the different 'levels' with which the two texts begin; the Ethics begins with a 
definition of the infinite, yet indivisible, substance or God, whereas the Monadology begins with an 
explication of the infinite divisibility (i. e. magnitude) of the Monad. 
4 As a result, the relationship between quality and quantity becomes the central condition of 
production, not as an opposition of forces, but as a variation in degrees of intensity in the Monad- 
Deleuze examines these relations in Leibniz, Kant and Maimon's theories of qualitative difference in 
(Deleuze 1997: 170-176). 
5 There is an expanded discussion about Kant's Newtonian understandings of space and time and 
Leibniz's theories of geometry, space and time that is reflected in Leibniz's correspondence with 
Samuel Clarke about Newton's theories of space and time, between 1705-1716 (see, H. G. Alexander, 
[ 1956], The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester: N4ancbester University Press). This debate, 
however, is too large to be addressed by this thesis, but it is also noted that Deleuze suggests the 
differences between Kant and Leibniz's positions are mediated through Salomon N4aiinon's 
'reformulation' of the CPR by means of a Leftiman form of qualitative 'difference'. Deletize outlines 
how Malmon overcomes the external difference that constitutes 'the Kantian duality between concept 
and intuition' by 'showing how inadequate the point of view of conditioning is for a trariscendental 
philosophy: [so that] determinability must be itself conceived as point towards a priwiple of 
reciprocal determination' (Deleuze 1997: 173). 
6 The internal infinity, difference and magnitude also suggests a strong precedent to the Jena 
Romantics concept of 'fragment', whose magnitude is an excessive unity that challenges the notions 
of finite extension and agency. See, for example, P. Lacoue-Labarthe and J-L. Nancy, (1988), The 
Literary Absolute: the 7heory of Literature in German Romanticism, translated by Philip Barnard 
and Cheryl Lester, Albany, New York: SUNY. 
7 All citations from the Alonadology are taken from the edition, G. W. Lcibniz, (1973), Discourse on 
Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, Monadology, translated by G. R. Montgomery, La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. In references, the title is abbreviated to M, hereafter, 
followed by the section number and page number. 
8 Arthur writes that the problem of the atom and the void is 'a tangled thread' throughout Leibniz's 
writings, which develops from his theories of atoms as unextended 'indivisibles' to; 'the insensibly 
small, very hard particles' such as the 'bullae' and the 'terrellas' [which are] akin to the 'chemical' 
atoms of Sennert [and represent] 'units of formation' or 'action' in his writings before 1676' (Arthur 
2001: xlW-xliv). After 1676, however, Arthur writes that Leibniz embraces 'atomism', positing the 
'necessity' of an 'indestructible core'. But with respect to the Monadology we find that it goes a step 
finther, reflecting Leibmz's subsequent rejection of atomism for substance, which be calls the 
'substantial atom', 'the combination of soul and body' or the 'corporeal substance', in which there is 
the indivisible soul (Arthur 2001: x1viii). 
9 Also see p. 37 below, for Leibniz's definition of the immensurn from 'On the Origin of Things 
from Forms' (1676) and cited in Arthur 2001: 121. 
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10 Keith Ansell Pearson notes that Bergson's critique of knowledge is a 'philosophy of life', which 
recalls Spinoza's philosophy of a 'practical way of living' (K. Ansell Pearson, [20021, Philosophy 
and the Adventures of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life, New York and London: Routledge, 
17). Ansell Peason also notes that both Spinoza and Bergson are linked by a cominitinent to a 
univocal and transcendental immanence (Ansell Pearson 2002: 103). 
11 There are a number of differences between Leibniz and Bergson's concepts of perception and 
memory: 1. Leibniz provides a particularly strong concept of intensity, however, we will see that 
Bergson considers perception and its intensity in relation to a much more explicitly defined spatio- 
temporal order. In this respect, Bergson augments Leibniz's project into a more fully formed 
topological or geometric project 2. Bergson considers the relationship between memory and the 
actions of the individual in relation to an embodied and trarmendental 'intuition'. Bergson's 
thinking, therefore, displays a more psychological mode of interpretation than Leibniz's logic, despite 
the sufficiency of the Monad that is derived from perception and appetite. 
12 Robin Durie, for example, highlights the extent to which a 'potential' theory of infinity as 
magnitude is problematic, since it does not admit the corporeality of being (entelechia). He cites 
Aristotle's discussion about the reality of a 'potential' magnitude and the Entelechy in the Physics: 
"To be' means to be potentially [dynamei] or to be actually lentelechial; and the infinite is either in 
addition or in division. It has been stated that magnitude [inegethos] is not in actual operation infinite 
[i. e., there is a limit to the actual size things can be]; but it is infinite in division - it is not hard to 
refute indivisible lines - so that it remains for the infinite to be potentially [4waineil. We must not 
take 'potentially' here in the same way as that in which, if it is possible for this to be a statue, it 
actually will be a statue, and suppose that there is an infinite which will be in actual operation. ' 
(Aristotle's Physics III, 206a, 14ff, cited in Durie 2000: 13). 
13 The seventeenth century notion of substance provides a distinct shift in the concepts of infinity and 
magnitude from those that existed in the Ancients philosophy. Durie states that, according to Zeno, a 
magnitude of an infinite aggregate is impossible, or insufficient, since it is only potentially given 
(Durie 2000: 13). For Leibniz, however, the notion of aggregate or incompossibility is not just 
demonstrated as a logical idea, but is established as the definition of an intemsive and thinking 
substance that is sufficient. 
14 See, for example, The Fold in which the 'amplitude' of the soul (its intension and inflection) is 
similar to Bergson's memory in which the 'living present' or act is 'essentially variable in both 
extension and intensity' (Deleuze 2001: 70). 
15 Deleuze writes, Jt1his procedure of the infinitely small, which maintain the distinction between 
essences (to the extent that one plays the role of inessential to the other), is quite different to 
contradiction. We should therefore give it a special name, that of 'vice-diction. ' (Deleuze 1997: 46). 
16 Arthur suggests that 'metaphor of the net presages that of the folds of matter' (Arthur 2001: 402). 
17 The relationship between space and matter is also evident in the use of the term 'plenum' in 
architecture, which refers to an interstitial space or void between the floor and the ceiling, and in the 
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combustion engine, the plenum is a 'chamber' for the circulation of air. Note too Deleuze's opening 
refeience to the operation of folding in relation to the baroque architectuial form of interconnected 
chambers, floors and layers in The Fold, writing; 'the Baroque differentiates its folds in two ways, by 
moving along two infinities, as if infinity were composed of two stages or floors: the pleats of 
matter, and the folds of the soul' (Deleuze 2001: 3). 
18 Arthur writes that; 'Leibniz was committed to a plenistic physics from the beginning, largely under 
the influence of Hobbes. But this was the dominant view of his contemporaries, shared by the 
Cartesians and even atomists like Huygens. It was not displaced in continental Europe until the 
spread of Newtonianism, in the latter part of the eighteenth century' (Arthur 2001: 460). 
ChVter 5: The Envelop 
1 There is scope for a study of the concept of the 'ready-made' in relation to Duchamp's work and his 
interest in geometry; for example, see discussions about 'Finfinite' in M. Sanouillet and E. Peterson, 
(1973), The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, Marchand du Sel, Cambridge and New York: Da Capo 
Press. See also L. Dalrymple Henderson, (1998), Duchamp in Context: Science and TechnoloD, in the 
Large Glass and Related Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
2 Developments in mathematics and geometry in the runeteenth century focus on the break away firom 
Euclidian geometry, becoming increasingly concemed with the mathematical possibility of a spatial 
'fourth dimension' and non-Euchdian principles of space-time. In each case, these geometries sought 
to disrupt the apparently teleological determination of Euclidian geometry towards ideal truths. Thus, 
non-Euclidian geometry challenges the axiomatic a priori conception of mathematics, in particular, 
focusing on the possibility of alternative solutions to the 'truth' of Euclid's fifth postulate; '[tlhat, if 
a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two 
right angles, the straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less 
than two right angles. ' (Heath 1956: 155). Gauss, Lobacbevsky and Bolyai's theories of lines that 
will necessarily meet - the lines on a sphere - in the 1820s and 30s lead to Beltrami's 'pseudospbeic' 
in the 1860s which provided an accessible diagram of curved space. Other non-Euchdian geometnes 
took the issue of congruence as evidence that Euclid's geometry did not fully describe spatial relations 
(for example, the non-congmence of the left and right hand). See, for example, L. Dahymple 
Henderson, (1983), The Fourth dimension and Non-Euchdian Geometry in Modern Art, Princeton: 
Pfinceton University Press. 
Most complex of these was Riemann's theory of topological manifolds (explained in his 
lecture 'On the Hypothesis that Lie at the Foundations of Geometry' of 1854 and published in 1867) 
that distmguished between bounded and infinite space, and congruence, diverging significantly from 
Euclidian principles of transformation to produce geometric figures that are 'locally' and 'globally' 
differentiated. 
Lawrence Sidar explains, for example, that 'topological structure' is evident in the intrinsic 
difference between two surfaces, such as a plane and a cylinder, determined at a local and a global 
level. Sklar explains that at a global level 'the two surfaces differ, even neglecting their embedding in 
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three-space, in the global properties of connectivity determinable by a geometer confirmed to the 
surface and ignorant of the embedding. ' At a local level they differ if we arc given 'free mobility 
throughout the surface'; for example, 'if we start from a point on a plane and travel along any 
geodesic (straight line) through that point without ever reversing direction, then we will never return 
to our initial point. On a cylinder, however, through each point fliere is a geodesic (the circle around 
the cylinder through that point) such that if we travel along that geodesic, never reversing direction, 
we will sooner or later return to our starting point. This shows that the intrinsic identity of a [figure, 
such as a] cylinder and a plane is a local matter' (L. Sklar, [19771 Space, Time and Spacetime, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 41-42) [my emphasis]. 
3 See, for example, Keith Ansel] Pearson, who examines the multiplicity of Bergson7s notion of the 
'virtual' (Ansell Pearson 2002). 
4 In his essay 'Laughter: an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic' (1900), Bergson suggests that the 
imagination abstracts from the particular perception; '[the] artistic imagination [ ... 
I simply reveals 
what we have hidden from ourselves in our percept" power of condensation which is at the same 
time an abstraction from the individual to the general' (cited in J. Mullarkey, 119991, Bergson and 
Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 59). 
5 All quotations am taken from H. Bergson, (1991), Matter and Memory, translated by Nancy 
Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, New York: Zone Books. In references, the title is abbreviated to 
MAI, hereafter. 
6 Mullarkey defines the image as a universal designation of 'the objects of every type of perception' 
(Mullarkcy 1999: 32). 
7 For an interesting 'psychical' interpretation of topology and the body see Bernard Burgoyne's 
discussion in his essay 'Autism and Topology', in which he examines the 'weak' topological 
structures of the autistic chil& In note 32 to the essay he writes; 'Je1qually topological structure can 
be obtained by considerations of boundary or frontier. There exists a range of topological notions, all 
of which can be demonstrated to be equivalent in having this power to generate the structure of a 
space: where there are limitations of the equivalence they raise questions about the foundations of 
topology and the foundations of matliernatics. The equivalent notions include the concepts of 
neighbourhood, interior, closure, closed set, net, limit, filter and ideal' (B. Burgoyne, [ed. ], [2000], 
Drawing the Sout Schemas and Models in Psychoanab4sis, London: Rebus Press, 215) [my 
emphasis]. 
8 Mullarkey, for example, discusses Bergson's development of heterogeneous notions of space in 
Mauer and Memory, in distinction to the 'homogenous' notion of space in the earlier essay 'Time and 
Free Will' (1888), (Mullarkey 1999: 13). 
9 See for example, Bergson's impressive analysis of Spinoza's geometric method the Ethics in the 
essay 'Philosophical Intuition' in The Creative Mind (1933), which Bergson suggests has 'behind' it 
the 'subtle' 'lightness' of intuition that clides the conceptual weight of his method. He writes; 
'[nlevertheless I know of nothing more instinctive than the contraq between the form and the a matter 
of a book like the Ethics: on the one hand those tremendous things called Substance, Attribute and 
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Mode, and the formidable array of theorems with the close network of definitions, corollaries and 
scholia, and that complication of machinery, that power to crush which causes the beginner, in the 
presence of the Ethics, to be struck with admiration and terror as though he were before a battleship of 
the Dreadnought class; on the other hand, something subtle, very light and almost airy, which flees at 
one's approach, but which one cannot look at even from afar, without becoming incapable of attaching 
oneself to any part whatever of the remainder, even to what is considered essential, even to the 
distinction between Substance and Attribute, even to the duality of thought and Extension. What we 
have behind the heavy mass of concepts of Cartesian and Aristotelian parentage is that intuition which 
was Spinoza's, an intuition which no formula, no matter how simple, can be simple enough to 
express' (Ansell Pearson and Mullarkcy 2002: 236-237). 
10 AD quotations are taken from 'Introduction to Metaphysics' (1903), reprinted in (Ansell Pearson 
and Mullarkey: 2002). In references, the title is abbreviated to IK hereafter. 
II On intuition and geometry, Mullarkey writes; 'Bergson believes there is no 'simple and 
geometrical definition of intuition'. He cites the Creative Mind in which Bergson writes that a 
changing reality requires 'views of it that are multiple, complementary and not at all equivalent'. 
Mullaikey continues; 'JiIntuition entails w1wever is required by a subject in a particular context to 
adjust to the full alterity of that situation as it extends beyond the confines of [the subject's] 
perspective' (Mullarkey 1999: 159). 
12 All quotations are taken from H. Bergson, (1964), Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur 
Mitchell, London: Macmillan and Company. In references, the title is abbreviated to CE, hereafter. 
Conclusion 
1 Massuim has outlined an interesting question in relation to the construction of the architectin-al 
drawing or diagram when he writes; '[g]rappling with the question of double architectural vision 
requires acknowledgmg that the diagram is a technique of existence and that design is always 
collective. Architecture will always benefit from the application of powers of formal analysis. But its 
basic medium is not geometry, or topology, or CAD, or design in general, or critique, or any other 
formalizable field. Its basic mediurn is the field of experience' (Alliez and von Samsonow 2001: 175). 
2 The arclutect, Bernard Tschumi and his office have designed a number of projects that develop an 
architectural notion of the 'envelope'; in particular. le Fresnoy. an international arts centre in 
Tourcoing, France (1991-2) in which a 'folded' roof enveloped two existing buildings (B. Tschumi, 
[1994], Event-Cities (Praxis), Cambridge Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 390-523). 
In addition, Tschumi develops this strategy of the 'in-between' in the design of a Concert 
Hall and Exhibition Complex in Rouen (1998-). In relation to this project, Tschumi writes; 
JaIrchitecture also can be defined by surfaces, whether continuous of discontinuous, amorphous or 
obsessively articulated. The very large public assembly space at Rouen is conceived as two envelopes, 
two event-spaces, one inside the other. Within the inner envelope, the auditorium is programmed 
according to various venues [ ... 1. Between the two envelopes 
is the access area [ ... 1. 
This 'in-between' 
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is conceived as a large public space, activated by various circulation routes' (B. Tschumi, [20001, 
Event-Cities 2, Cambridge Massachusetts and London: NUT Press, 620). 
3 See, for example, Elizabeth Grosz's discussions of spatio-temporal relations and fbminist 
philosophy (E. Grosz, 11998], Space, Time and Peversion: Essays on the Polifics of Bodies, London 
and New York: Routledge, 83-101). 
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